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ABSTRACT 
 
My three dissertation essays explore food security questions in Ethiopia, Philippines and 
India.  Specifically, I estimate how food security responds to (1) land degradation in Ethiopian 
highlands, (2) domestic marketing policies in Philippines, and (3) trade protection policies in 
India. In my first paper, I merge environmental maps with geographically coded farmer survey 
data in Ethiopian highlands to estimate the effect of land degradation on the value of agricultural 
production. Because land degradation may be endogenous to agricultural production choices, this 
analysis explicitly controls for endogeneity using bequests and type of energy used for cooking 
as instrumental variables. I find that land degradation reduces agricultural value by 4 percent, 
which is smaller than when endogeneity is not accounted for. I also generate a differential 
impacts map based on the estimates from the spatial weighted regression. By identifying those 
regions or sectors of Ethiopia most at risk of losing agricultural value from land degradation, this 
paper provides important information for targeting conservation measures. My second paper 
examines the effect of government grain procurement and distribution in the Philippines. I use a 
structural Vector Autoregression model to estimate impacts of policy shocks on market prices 
and then use the estimates simulate ‘no policy’ prices. I compare the simulated ‘no policy’ prices 
with actual historical prices. I find that government activities have a very small impact on rice 
price levels and variability. Specifically, I find that the government’s activities only impacted 
food prices during the small number of years when the country was self-sufficient in production. 
Finally, in my third paper, I examine how trade policies, specifically export bans, affected 
domestic rice and wheat market integration in India. I verify that Indian markets maintain 
segmented equilibria by testing for and finding thresholds in a Threshold Vector Error 
Correction Model. More specifically I find that export bans may have had have had unintended 
consequences of increasing domestic price differences thereby resulting in the lack of domestic 
market integration. Since the decisions to use these blunt instruments are taken by domestic 
governments worldwide, studying the domestic effect of these policies has the potential to affect 
the use of these policies by other countries in the future. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“The quest for food security can be the common thread that links the different 
challenges we face and helps build a sustainable future.” – José Graziano da Silva, 
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Director-General 
 
Food security1 is a stated objective of agricultural policy in many countries – be they rich, 
poor, importer or exporter. FAO projections show increasing pressure on the environment from 
increased population and food production demands (FAO, 2000). Furthermore, increased 
environmental constraints have induced food price volatility, spurring increasingly 
interventionist commodity policies (SOFI-FAO, 2006).  My research clarifies the roles of 
environment and policy as drivers of food insecurity at a time when environmental crisis have 
heighted awareness of sustainability concerns and food price volatility has encouraged policy 
based market distortions. 
My three dissertation essays explore food security questions in Ethiopia, Philippines and 
India.  Specifically, I estimate how food security responds to (1) land degradation in Ethiopian 
highlands, (2) domestic marketing policies in Philippines, and (3) trade protection policies in 
India. 
Examining the three very different kinds of issues and dimensions of food security 
broadens the scope of my work. In addition, these countries have different levels of food 
insecurity. The typology of food security (Yu, You and Fan, 2010), classifies Ethiopia as lowest !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1!Food security refers to a household’s or country’s ability to provide future physical and economic access to 
sufficient, safe, and nutritious food that fulfills the dietary needs and food preferences for living an active and 
healthy lifestyle (FAO Agricultural and Development Economics Division, 2006).  The three facets of food security 
are food availability, food access and food use (World Food Summit, 1996).!
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food security, India as low food security and Philippines as lower middle food security. This is 
consistent with the rankings of FAO’s SOFI (2011). The differences in the natural resources and 
government policies through food price controls and trade protection means they may respond 
differently to food price shocks. Thus, the diversity of rankings of undernourishment in these 
countries plus the biophysical, economic and political environment strengthens the information 
this study provides. 
A large proportion of the hungry are concentrated in areas that are highly vulnerable to 
environmental degradation and climate change (FAO, 2006). Agricultural extensification in most 
developing countries is caused by population pressure and food scarcity. Farmers are driven to 
overgraze fragile rangelands and forest margins, threatening the very resources upon which their 
livelihood depends. In my first paper, I estimate the effect of land degradation on the value of 
agricultural production in Ethiopian highlands. Ethiopia’s population largely relies on agriculture 
as its primary source of income and the country has one of the highest rates of soil erosion in the 
world. While land degradation is widely recognized as reducing agricultural potential, few 
studies have explicitly measured its effects on the value of agricultural production. This study 
integrates a fine resolution environmental map with a geographically coded farm household 
survey to compare production, farm characteristics, and an index of land degradation that 
captures soil, water and ecological quality. Unlike much previous work, I explicitly control for 
potential endogeneity and account for the spatial nature of the land degradation process. I also 
use the estimates from the regression to generate a map of differential impacts of land 
degradation. By identifying regions of Ethiopia most at risk of losing value of agricultural 
production from land degradation, this paper provides important information to policy makers to 
target soil conservation measures. 
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A large literature emphasizes the role of policy, rather than the environment, in 
exacerbating food insecurity (Andersen, 2012). In the Philippines, rice is the most important food 
crop, and thus, the government has made numerous attempts to influence its price. In 1972, the 
Philippine government established the National Food Authority (NFA) to ensure continuous 
supply of rice at stabilized prices through domestic stocks and import controls. The NFA’s 
activities have received criticism but there has been little empirical work on its effectiveness. My 
second paper provides a better understanding of the past impact of the NFA and also informs 
the debate about an appropriate future role for the NFA. I estimate the effects of the NFA on rice 
prices using a structural vector autoregression (VAR) model and monthly data from January 
1990 to January 2013. While I provide exclusion restrictions to make the model identified, I also 
verify my restrictions through a data-determined approach using PC algorithm and Directed 
Acyclic Graphs. I use the estimates from the regression and simulate price paths for the 
counterfactual (i.e. prices had there been no NFA intervention) and compare with historical 
prices. By doing so be able to determine how much the NFA’s price setting activities have 
impacted market prices.  
Agricultural export restrictions have been seen by many as worsening food price 
volatility, and pushing up world prices, to the detriment of poor consumers in developing 
countries (Anania, 2013). At the same time, others have argued that these measures can help 
safeguard domestic food security. In my third paper, I empirically estimate how the Indian 
export ban affected the integration within the domestic market. Threshold cointegration model is 
used to characterize integration between selected wheat and rice markets in India over the period 
of trade protectionist policies. Since the decisions to use these blunt instruments are taken by 
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domestic governments worldwide, I believe that studying the domestic effect of these policies 
has the potential to affect the use of these policies by other countries in the future. 
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Chapter 2 
MAPPING THE DIFFERENTIAL IMPACTS OF LAND DEGRADATION ON VALUE 
OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN ETHIOPIAN HIGHLANDS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Land degradation is a major constraint to growth and development, particularly in low-
income countries (Rosegrant and Ringler, 1997; Raina et al., 1991). Land degradation is defined 
as a decline in the productive capacity of the land which includes not only the soil resource, but 
also the water, vegetation, landscape, biodiversity and microclimatic components of an 
ecosystem needed to produce environmental services (Scherr and Yadav, 1996). Productivity on 
up to three-quarters of the world’s agricultural land is reduced due to land degradation (IFPRI, 
2000).  
Ethiopia has the highest rate of soil depletion in sub-Saharan Africa with 42 tons per 
hectare eroding each year on cultivated land (Stoorvogel and Smaling, 1990; Pender et al., 2001). 
A substantial literature explores the causes of land degradation in Ethiopia. The causes include 
climatic effects such as soil desertification due to reoccurring droughts, unsustainable farm 
practices such as deforestation, overgrazing and extensification, lack of investment capacity, 
delayed returns on investment, and lack of inputs and information (Viste et al., 2012; 
Descheemaeker et al., 2011). The source of household cooking energy is another important 
factor in land degradation. While the use of fuel wood for cooking energy has led to 
deforestation, the use of dung and crop residues reduce organic matter and soil cover which 
eventually impacts soil fertility (Gebreegziabher et al., 2006 & 2008). Land degrading activities 
may also be exacerbated by the changing patterns of land ownership among ethnic groups (Berry 
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2003). Frequent land redistribution leads to tenure insecurity thereby reducing the incentive to 
engage in land conservation practices.  
Estimates of the cost of loss of soil and essential nutrients in Ethiopia range from $139 
million to $7 billion annually (Bojo and Cossells, 1995; Suttclife, 1993; Berry, 2003; Sonneveld 
2002). Even the lower estimates amount to 3-4 percent of agricultural GDP, which is a 
substantial income effect in a country where 85% of the rapidly growing population depends on 
agriculture (Berry 2003). Dreschel and Gyiele (2001) estimate a range of losses from soil 
degradation using nutrient studies in areas of high and low nutrient loss. The estimated total loss 
per hectare per year varies from 400 birr ($46) in areas of low nutrient loss to 4,736 birr ($544) 
in areas of high soil nutrient loss.  In the regions most affected by soil erosion, this loss amounts 
to about 10 to 12 percent of the agricultural GDP. The costs of land degradation are not only 
financial.  Land degradation also leads to reduced biodiversity and stream sedimentation 
affecting water quality, storage and marine resources (Scherr and Yadav, 1996).  The wide range 
of estimates reflects substantial uncertainty of the impact of land degradation on agricultural 
production.  
In contrast to previous studies, I find that land degradation reduces agricultural value by 4 
percent, which is smaller than previous studies for three reasons. First, I account for farmer’s 
behavior. The previous studies rely on crop simulations with limited data on farm and farming 
practices and only measure the direct costs of soil erosion on yield which likely overestimate the 
effect of land degradation since they assume farmers will not respond to deteriorating soils by 
choosing new crops or new technologies. Second, unlike much previous work, this study 
recognizes the endogeneity of land degradation; which if not addressed, potentially leads to 
biased estimates of the effect of land degradation (see Nkonya et al., 2008; Lipper and Osgood, 
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2001 for an exception). Finally, I account for heterogeneity by merging the large and 
comprehensive cross-sectional farm-level data with a fine resolution environmental map enables 
me to represent the vast agroecological and socio-economic diversity of Ethiopia (Deressa, et al., 
2008). Previous authors use more aggregate scales of data at the county or state level (Schlenker, 
et al., 2006; Mendehlson et al., 1994), despite there being substantial farm-level variation in 
productivity and returns (Kirwan, 2007).  
To further improve the efficiency of the estimates, I account for the spatial nature of the 
land degradation process in the regression and project the differential impacts on a map based on 
the parameter estimates (Anselin, 1988). The results are valuable to policy makers in developing 
site-specific plans  to target aid or extension to areas where value of agricultural production is 
most at risk of decline due to land degradation. This paper not only provides a new estimate of 
the effect of land degradation for Ethiopia but also demonstrates the feasibility of a method 
matching comprehensive environmental characteristics to farm survey data that can be applied to 
other countries as well. 
2.2 Literature Review 
Large simulation models are often used to predict the effect of the environment on crop 
growth and agricultural productivity. Examples of large-scale simulation models include 
Decision Support System for Agro-technology Transfer (DSSAT) by Nelson (2009), Agro-
PEGASUS by Deryng et al. (2009) and Future Agricultural Resources Model (FARM) by the 
Economic Research Service of the Department of Agriculture. DSSAT simulates the impact of 
climate change on global food availability and malnutrition while Agro-PEGASUS simulates 
growth as a function of temperature, soil moisture and fertilizer level. FARM, on the other hand, 
! 8!
projects the effects of rainfall and temperature on agricultural productivity through a computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) model of the world agricultural economy. The advantage of the 
biophysical crop growth simulation approach is that the crop varieties and fertilizer applications 
can be fixed and the productivity effects can be simulated to generate large-scale estimates with 
little data. A limitation of this approach is that these models assume that farmers do not change 
their crop and technology choice in response to changes in resource availability or climate 
(Hertel and Rosch, 2010). Moreover, crop simulation relies on data from agronomic experiments 
which may not be replicable on a country-wide scale. Mendelsohn et al. (1996) stress that since 
agronomic experiments are set up in a controlled environment, they fail to account for farmer 
adaptation leading to overestimation of the sensitivity of crops to environmental changes. 
An alternative to the crop simulation method is to estimate statistical relationships 
between crop yields and environmental changes such as temperature, rainfall and/or soil erosion 
either based on cross-sectional, time series or panel data. This method can be readily 
implemented for large geographic areas, implying that it can be applied at a national or global 
spatial resolution (Hertel and Rosch, 2010). However, in most regions of the world, time series 
on yields and climate are limited in length. The limited data results in large standard errors and 
significant uncertainty about the likely impacts of environmental changes on yields.  
Attempts have been made to analyze the vulnerability of Ethiopian farmers to 
environmental shocks in studies using panel datasets. For example, Dercon (2004), Dercon et al. 
(2005), Dercon and Krishnan (2000) and Skoufias and Quisumbing (2003) analyze vulnerability 
of Ethiopian farmers using a repeated household level survey in 15 villages. However, 
longitudinal data are hard to find and researchers often end up with a small sample. Deressa et al. 
(2009) stress that while these studies are informative and methodologically sound, the use of a 
! 9!
small data set reduces the ability to represent the vast agroecological and socio-economic 
diversity of Ethiopia and limits the ability to compare vulnerability of specific regions.  
Mendelsohn et al. (1994) propose a Ricardian Approach which uses cross sectional data 
to estimate a hedonic model of farmland pricing. This model is based on the notion that a tract of 
land capitalizes the discounted value of all future profits or rents that can be derived from the 
land (Mendehlson et al., 1996; Schlenker et al., 2006). The advantage of the Ricardian method is 
that it relies on cross sectional variation to estimate the effect of climate on future land rents, 
while allowing for the implicit choices of landowners regarding the allocation of their land 
among competing uses instead of directly modeling farmer decisions.   
 However, in most developing countries land markets are not well developed and the 
observed land value may not reflect future agricultural productivity. For example, Ethiopia’s 
long history of land redistribution may reduce willingness to pay for land, leading to an 
underestimate of land value (Ahmed et al., 2002; Holden and Yohannes, 2002; Jayne et al., 
2003). Land rights and security may also influence land management and productivity by 
affecting farmers’ access to credit (Place and Hazell 1993; Pender and Kerr, 1998). For this 
study, instead of land values, I measure the effects of land degradation on the value of 
agricultural production per hectare.  I calculate the value of agricultural production from crop 
yields, livestock and forestry timber production expressed in average market prices regardless 
whether the household consumed the agricultural produce, held back the output for future 
seeding purposes or sold the produce in the market. 
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2.3 Theoretical Framework of Agricultural Value of Production 
Given the nature of household agriculture production, this paper assumes that farm 
households in Ethiopia are likely to be both consumers and producers. Thus, I assume that 
farmers maximize the net value of their agricultural production, Vh,k , rather than profits directly. 
Optimal land management will require a farmer to consider returns to each activity and the 
competing demands that they place on the land (Graff-Zivin and Lipper, 2008). 
Suppose that production function in any given period is equal to a function of inputs x( ) , 
environmental characteristics e( )  and land degradation d( ) : f x,e,d( ) . Farmers choose the 
combination of inputs that maximizes their potential returns given their production function, and 
that production function is altered by land degradation. Let pa  represent the market price per 
unit of agricultural output. For simplicity, I will also assume that this price represents the per unit 
value of agricultural output consumed by the farmer.  
The value of agricultural production associated with the use of land , in 
household h, can be expressed as, 
Vh,k = pa. f (x,e,d)−Ch,k = !π h,k pa,ωi,e,d, yh( )−Ch,k   (2.1) 
where   represents the fixed costs of production and the term pa. f (x,e,d) !represents! the!profit!for!all!the!farm!produce!had! they sold everything in the market, π h,k pa,ωi,e,d, yh( ) .! 
The value of agricultural production depends on several factors which include a vector of 
output prices , a vector of input prices , a vector of costs  and 
kth k =1,...,Nk( )
Ch,k
p1,..., pnk( ) ωi Ch,k = Ch,1,...,Ch,nk( )
! 11!
exogenous environmental quality e and the variable of interest d. Farm and farmer characteristics, 
yh , such as distance to market and other facilities, land tenure characteristics (Pender et al., 
2003; Huffman and Fukunaga, 2008; Berry, 2003), farmer’s education, gender, assets and 
income (Weir, 1999; Kiome and Stocking, 1995; Molua, 2011; Liverpool and Winter-Nelson, 
2010) also affect value of agricultural production. 
 Neighboring farms could affect a farm household’s practices (Evenson, 1989; Bantilan 
and Davis 1991). I employ a theory-driven approach in incorporating the neighborhood effects of 
farming (Anselin, 2002). Past literature has used the spill-over effects as a structure for this kind 
of spatial correlation (Durlauf, 1994; Borja, 1995; Glaeser et al, 1996). I modify equation (2.1) to 
take into account the characteristics of nearby farmers, in as much as they are likely to affect the 
agricultural productivity of their neighbor. Spatial spill overs can be incorporated by including a 
spatially lagged dependent variable as an additional predictor or by premultiplication of spatial 
weights matrix W to the variable of interest. 
Vh,k = !π h,k pa,ωi,e,d, yh( )−Ch,k +W Vh,k−1"# $%   (2.2) 
 
where Vh,k−1 !denotes! the! neighboring! farms.! Equation (2.2) represents the returns 
associated with the  use of land for a given farm household and includes the termW Vh,k−1"# $% !, the 
spatially lagged dependent variables with weights matrix W, denoting neighboring farms.  
 
 
 
kth
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2.4 Identification Strategy 
In equation (2.2), one might expect land degradation, d , to be endogenous. The quality 
of the environment is influenced by the choice of agricultural inputs and farm investment 
decisions. Moreover, agricultural input and farming decisions are a function of the socio-
economic situation of the farmers, and in turn the socio-economic situation of farmers depends 
on crop output. This effect represents the “complicated feedback loop” between farm production 
and resource quality (Lipper and Osgood, 2001).  To estimate this measure, I use an instrumental 
variables approach detailed in the following section. 
One might also expect that input and investment choices are also endogenous. Choices 
such as what to plant, what inputs to use and whether to adopt soil conservation measures may 
depend on unobserved farmer and plot characteristics. In this paper, I adopt the assumption made 
in Ricardian models that farmers put their land to its best, or most profitable use. Typically 
farmers know environmental characteristics of specific fields such as soil type, slope, elevation 
and temperature among other things as given and adjust their inputs and farming practices 
accordingly. Moreover, I recognize that farmers likely face credit constraints or other barriers, 
but as long as all farmers in the sample face similar constraints, the approach should lead to 
unbiased estimates. To consider this problem I examine the range of agricultural technologies 
used in the sample and compare it with the Atlas of Ethiopian Rural Economy.  I find that the 
vast majority of farms use the same technology, indicating that if credit or other constraints 
affect farm production choices, those constraints appear to affect all farmers equally.2 Because of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!2!The statistics from the farmer survey are consistent with the Atlas of Rural Ethiopian Economy, which indicates that my sample is 
representative of farm practices in Ethiopia. The IFPRI farmer survey data show very little variation in crop and technology choice. The vast 
majority (92.44%) of farm households plant cereals and grains i.e. barley, maize, millet (mashilla), wheat (duragna), teff and sorghum; whereas 
the Atlas reports that cereals and pulses are the main crops. I also observe very little variation in production technology in the survey.  The vast 
majority of farms (95%) are rain-fed and only 26 out of 1,000 households have water pumps. Atlas reports that agriculture is mainly rainfed with 
minor use of a gravitational irrigation system. The IFPRI survey shows that farm tools and machinery do not greatly differ across farms. Only 14 
! 13!
the great homogeneity in production choices and potential endogeneity of technology, I do not 
include specific crop and technology choices in the analysis. 
2.4.1 Instrumentation for Endogenous Land Degradation 
Very few studies of land degradation use an instrumental variable approach because 
finding a good instrumental variable for land degradation is often difficult. A few studies use 
terms of trade weighted by agricultural production (Lipper and Osgood, 2001), land ownership 
and ethnicity (Pender et al., 2003) and the type of land contracts (Huffman and Fukunaga, 2008). 
In this paper, I explore intergenerational bequest and the farm household’s main source of 
household energy as possible instrumental variables.  
I argue that if the farmer inherited his land from his ancestors, he is more likely to want 
to pass it along to his children, and to pass it along in good condition. Other authors show that in 
Ethiopia, corporate and rented farms tend to use up soil faster than intergenerational family 
farms because of greater incentive for soil conservation (McConnell 1983; Rola and Coxhead 
2001). Thus, I explicitly use the interaction of number of children and dummy variable whether 
the farmer inherited the land from their ancestors as the bequest variable. 
In Ethiopia, household cooking energy sources include the use of fuel wood, animal dung, 
LPG, kerosene or electricity. The use of fuel wood leads to deforestation and land degradation. 
The lack of nearby fuel wood sources causes many households to switch from fuel wood to 
animal dung for cooking and heating purposes.  However, this substitution strips away nutrients 
and disturbs the topsoil which can cause land degradation as well (Gebreegziabher et al., 2006). I !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
farm households out of 1,000 own heavy machinery, i.e. tractors, ploughs and trailers. According to the Atlas, 83% of the farmers use of maresha 
with oxen as the preferred draft animal for soil cultivation and 94.16% do not use any improved seed variety. Approximately 83.93% of farmers 
have already adopted soil conservation practices in their farm. These practices include fanya ju (terraces) and any combination of soil, stone and 
wood bunds. The combination of fertilizer and chemicals does not vary much either. Fertilizer use is characterized by the use of urea, manure and 
DAP (Diammonium Phosphate). Nine out of 10 (91.8%) of farmers use 2-4D herbicide. Thus, the assumption of homogeneity of farmers is 
supported by the survey data and consistent with the published Atlas of Rural Ethiopia.   !
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posit that farm household’s source of energy for domestic use directly affects land degradation 
but not agricultural value of production.  
In finite samples, the results of estimation with weak instruments can be more biased than 
ordinary least squares (Deaton, 1997). I test the relevance of the excluded instruments (Bound et 
al., 1995). I also further test the validity of my restrictions by comparing the OLS and IV models 
using the Hausman (1978) specification test and I investigate the robustness of the regression 
results to estimation by OLS, IV and reduced form (RF) approaches.  
2.4.2 Challenges to the Identification Strategy 
One might be concerned that intergenerational bequest may be directly related to the 
value of agricultural production.  Farmers who have tenure security may have more incentives 
and access to credit to invest in technologies that reduce land degradation. To resolve this issue, I 
explicitly control for land tenure in the second stage estimation. In addition, I explicitly control 
for number of children in the estimation as well, thus using only the interaction term as my 
instrument. Second, one might be concerned that those households who use fuel efficient cook 
stoves are wealthier, thus that my instrument might pick up a wealth effect. To control for wealth, 
I include a measure of current value of assets including farms tools and machinery and other 
measures of wealth such as value of livestock, gift income and aid received separately in the 
regression.  
2.4.3 Addressing Spatial Patterns in the Data  
 Finally, in my conceptual framework, I argue that land degradation is spatial in nature 
and spatial autocorrelation should be accounted for. I test for the presence of spatial 
autocorrelation using the Moran’s I Index (Anselin, 2002).  It is worth noting that spatial 
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autocorrelation should be included only after endogeneity is corrected. If the spatial 
autocorrelation is due to unobserved variables, then this is a valuable technique to improve 
parameter estimates.   
2.5 Data Sources and Description 
This study is based on two data sets: the Global Land Degradation Information System 
(GLADIS) data provided by Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and household survey in 
Ethiopia from International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). These two data sets are 
combined based on spatial location. 
I extract soil type, slope, irrigation intensity, and land degradation data from GLADIS. In 
GLADIS, the geographic areas are divided into fine resolution grids of 0.05 degrees, or 5 arc 
minute km per grid cell (9x9 km). I generate dummy variables for certain types of soil. Slope is a 
continuous variable. Irrigation intensity represents increasing categories of intensity of irrigation: 
1 if 0 to 2 percent of the land is irrigated, 2 if 2 to 16 percent of land is irrigated, and 3 if 16 
percent or more of the land is irrigated. Data on land degradation are normalized from 0 to 1 and 
represent the average value for years 1981-2003, where 0 is the ideal no land degradation 
scenario.  
I extract demographics, farm characteristics and socio-economic data from IFPRI farm 
household survey. The household survey was carried out in the Nile basin within Ethiopia by the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) for the 2004-2005 crop year.  In addition to 
the farmer survey, I obtained average rainfall data and temperature for 2004-2005 from the 
IFPRI water research team’s Climate Research Unit of East Anglia database.  
! 16!
The survey covered five major regions. Amhara is the biggest region in the Nile basin of 
Ethiopia, covering 38 percent of the nation’s total land area, followed by Oromiya (24 percent), 
Beneshangul Gumuz (15 percent), Tigray (11 percent), and Southern Nation, Nationalities and 
People’s Region (SNNPR) (5 percent) (Ethiopian Ministry of Water Resources, 1998; Kato et al, 
2009). The final dataset contains 1,000 households. Each household is geocoded, a feature of 
these data that has not previously been used.  
I generate the value of agricultural production variable using IFPRI data instead of yield 
because some plots may produce more than one crop, feed livestock or have forest. Thus, 
estimation of a single measure of production is difficult. This approach of aggregating all 
earnings from crops, livestock and forest products on a plot into a single measure of value of 
crop production has been used in many previous studies in Ethiopia and sub-Saharan Africa 
(Kato et al, 2009; Pender et al, 2001; Nkonya et al., 2008). Value of agricultural production is the 
sum of the total production regardless of whether the produce is consumed at home, sold in the 
market or held back as seed for next year’s crop. To get total farm production, I add all of these 
uses and subtract the post-harvest and pest losses and then multiply the result by the market price 
farmers faced divided by the total hectares of land devoted for that purpose.  
I also derive the instrumental variables from the IFPRI survey. Intergenerational bequest 
variable was generated by interacting a dummy variable for inherited land and the number of 
children. I generate a dummy variable for the use of an extracting cooking energy, valued at 1 if 
the households use fuel wood or animal dung as a source of cooking energy, and 0 otherwise.  
Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics and definition and sources for all the variables used in 
the study. More descriptive details on each dataset are found in the appendix.  
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While I believe the GLADIS data hold great potential for analyses of this sort, these data 
come with two limitations.  First, although the 9x9 km grid size used was relatively fine, the 
information for that grid may have been derived from larger polygons.  An examination of the 
raw data shows that there is variation in the level of land degradation relative to the spatial 
distribution of the respondents. The mean arc distance between neighbors is about 5.07 km, with 
a minimum distance of 0 km and maximum distance of 30.22 km. And about one-third of the 
sample is more than 9 km apart, implying they must be in different grids.  Moreover, using 9x9 
km grids is still an improvement from previous studies that use county-level scale environmental 
data (example Schlenker et al, 2006; Mendelsohn et al, 1994, 1996, 2004). Second, while 
GLADIS provides detailed cross-sectional geographic information, by its nature, it prevents 
time-series analysis. Panel data may have been favorable, but I argue that in my case, cross 
sectional variation is sufficient to isolate expected changes in the value of agricultural production 
from the variation in soil degradation, which itself is a long-run phenomenon.  
I also note a limitation in the IFPRI survey data. While the survey only covers the major 
agricultural regions in the highlands of Ethiopia, the highlands constitute about 44 percent of the 
total land area, 45 percent of the total crop area including 88 percent of the total population at an 
average density of 144 per km2 and supports 70 percent of the livestock population of the 
country (Deressa et al, 2008).  Thus, I argue that the survey captures some of the key variation 
within the agricultural sector of Ethiopia. Moreover, the data allow me to conduct my analysis at 
the farm household level, thus, allowing me to capture spatial heterogeneity and help control for 
farm household level covariates. Combining the two datasets yields a total sample size of 828. 
172 households were dropped because of missing GPS information or incorrect GPS codes lying 
outside the map of Ethiopia.  
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2.6 Results and Discussion 
 Table 2.2 shows regression results: OLS for value of agricultural production per hectare 
without correcting for endogeneity in first column, OLS for land degradation in the second 
column (equivalent to first stage of 2SLS) and Instrumental Variable regression for value of 
agricultural production per hectare in the third column (equivalent to second stage of 2SLS). I 
calculate the Moran’s I statistic to verify whether spatial correlation is present in my data. This 
model includes a spatially-lagged land degradation variable in the regression, which represents 
the average land degradation of the four nearest neighboring plots. The spatially weighted IV 
regression results are in the fourth column.  
Without correcting for endogeneity, the estimated effect of land degradation on value of 
agricultural production is 43.2 Ethiopian Birr or about 8.9% of the average value of agricultural 
production and is significantly different from zero (1st column, Table 2.2). 3 Note however, that 
this coefficient might be biased due to endogeneity. The test for endogeneity reveals a Wu-
Hausman F statistic of 0.0537, which implies that land degradation is indeed endogenous in the 
system.   Thus, I use instrumental variables. 
 
The second column of Table 2.2 presents the results of estimating land degradation on all 
the covariates of farm and farmer characteristics. The coefficients on the two chosen 
instrumental variables (bequest and cooking energy) are significantly different from zero 
satisfying not only the partial correlation requirement for validity of IVs, but also validating what 
has been found in the literature. I obtain a Sargan statistic of 0.183 with a chi-square statistic of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!3!Average!value!of!agricultural!production!per!hectare!is!482!Ethiopian!Birr.!
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0.7726, which shows that the instruments are statistically valid. The Pagan-Hall test for 
heteroskedasticity suggests that the disturbance term is homoskedastic4.  
The factors that affect the agricultural value of production are presented in the 3rd 
column of table 2.2. After controlling for endogeneity, the coefficient on land degradation is -
17.18 Ethiopian Birr or about 3.56% of the average value of agricultural production. Compared 
to the 8.9% result from the OLS regression, the IV results suggest that not accounting for 
endogeneity will overestimate the impacts of land degradation to value of agricultural production. 
Unobservables are correlated with both land degradation and value of agricultural production.  
If all of the agricultural lands are degraded, the loss for the country as a whole is 
approximately $262 Million5. While much smaller than the upper bound estimate of $7 billion 
from the crop simulation model, this amount is almost twice the lower bound estimate of $139 
million.  
 Environmental characteristics that significantly affect the value of agricultural production 
include the Entisol soil type (decrease value of agricultural production), rainfall (increases value 
of agricultural production) and temperature (decreases value of agricultural production). None of 
the coefficients on the land tenure characteristics were significant in directly determining 
agricultural value. The positive impact of access to information through extension agent visits 
implies that farmers who are more exposed to new ideas and concepts provided by extension 
agents are able to adjust their production which eventually increases the value of their production 
(Nkonya, 2008). Farmer demographics that significantly affect value of agricultural production 
include livestock ownership (increases value of agricultural production), and asset index 
(increases value of agricultural production).    !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!4!Test!Statistic:!13.923;!ChiHSq!PHValue:!0.3793!5!FAOSTAT!Average!Value!of!Agricultural!Production!in!2004H2005!is!$7,483,834,000.!
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2.6.1 Do neighboring farms affect others value of agricultural production? 
 
 I next control for spatial correlation in the value of agricultural production and land 
degradation.  The Moran’s I statistic valued at 0.6923 in Figure 2.1 shows the cluster maps and 
significance map of value of agricultural production which verifies the presence of a spatial 
correlation. My likelihood ratio test for spatial dependence confirms a positive spatial correlation 
or a spatial lag model where the value of agricultural production on one farm affects another 
through land degradation, thus exhibit a “spill-over effect”.  
 In the last column of table 2.2, to deal with the simultaneity of land degradation on own 
and neighboring farms, I include an instrumented spatially-lagged land degradation variable in 
the regression, which represents the average land degradation of the four nearest neighboring 
plots. Note that in this regression, I predict land degradation from the first stage to correct for 
endogeneity. Including variables about neighboring farms’ characteristic does not substantially 
change my finding that land degradation decreases the value of agricultural production. The 
marginal effect taking spatial lag into account is 16.75 Ethiopian Birr.  However, taking spatial 
lag into account improves the efficiency of my estimates. Hence, the results for the similar 
variables in IV regression are the approximately the same but notice that most of the standard 
errors were reduced increasing the confidence in the new estimates.  
 The result implies that land degradation not only affects the value of agricultural 
production directly, but also indirectly by influencing the neighboring farms’ value of 
agricultural production. However, it’s not just the externality issue but also the spatial 
heterogeneity across a landscape. In other words, it matters that slope changes over space, as 
well as soil type and land cover. Thus, by including spatially weighted characteristics, I can 
observe both the direct and indirect effects of land degradation.  
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2.6.2 Robustness Tests 
 I estimate several model specifications to explore the robustness of my findings.  First, 
one might be concerned about input costs. Average value of agricultural production might be too 
small if the fixed costs of production are huge, thus, possibly inducing a bias into the estimates. 
As a robustness check, I run the same regression using net income per hectare as the dependent 
variable. I find that the estimates did not vary much from the use of agricultural value of 
production. The marginal effect of land degradation on net income is -17.42 or about 3.61% of 
the average value of agricultural production per hectare. Second, one might be concerned how 
land tenure might affect adoption of soil conservation measures so I ran models which include 
and exclude land tenure measures to see how my variable of interest, land degradation, changes. 
I find that none of the specifications yield significant coefficients on land tenure variables. 
Moreover, land degradation coefficients were significant in both equations with very little 
change in their magnitude. I also include and exclude current value of assets and livestock as one 
might be concerned that it may influence land degradation. I find that livestock ownership is 
highly significant in all specifications and the adjusted R squared significantly increases after 
adding these variables. The coefficient on the variable of interest, land degradation, remains 
largely unchanged.  
 Appendix Tables A1 and A2 present the key estimation results for my robustness tests. 
The different estimation procedures and model specifications did not result in significant changes 
in land degradation, the variable of interest. I can therefore conclude that the results are generally 
robust across different models. In all models, I tested for multicollinearity and found it not to be 
a serious problem for almost all explanatory variables (variance inflation factors <5). The 
variance inflation factors for each model are presented in Appendix Table A2. Estimated 
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standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering (nonindependence) of observations 
from different plots for the same household.  
2.6.3 Differential Impact Maps and Policy Implications 
The left panel of figure 2.2 shows the map of differential impacts of land degradation on 
the value of agricultural production. While the right panel shows markers on which respondents 
in the IFPRI sample has adopted soil conservation practices. The differential impacts map 
basically maps the predicted value of agricultural production after running the spatially weighted 
regression to represent the predicted loss in value of agricultural production from land 
degradation. This process is similar to multiplying each covariate characteristic’s average value 
with their estimated coefficients. These estimates are then mapped by woreda (district) using 
ArcGIS by spatially joining the grids to the nearest feature. The map represents the predicted loss 
in value of agricultural production from land degradation. The darker areas represent those areas 
where the value of agricultural production is most affected by land degradation. By visual 
examination, I can clearly see the ‘hotspots’. Notice that the small pockets of high impact areas 
are the also the areas that do not adopt soil conservation practices based on the IFPRI survey 
data.  The differential impacts map allows me to identify regions or sectors in the community 
that are more susceptible to losses in value of agricultural production due to land degradation and 
where land degradation has the potential to cause the greatest economic harm. These results can 
help inform policy makers to target aid, extension and policy to those who need it most. 
Since the figure indicates a large degree of heterogeneity in the value of agricultural 
production lost to land degradation, I deduce that the benefits of conservation policy would be 
larger with spatial targeting. I estimate land degradation by region and find substantial 
differences in marginal effects of land degradation by region. Table 2.3 summarizes the marginal 
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effects of land degradation per region. Table 2.4 shows land degradation regressions by region to 
identify the source of land degradation in each region, so that appropriate soil conservation 
policies could be designed. Soil types are significant for regions of Amhara, Oromiya and BG 
suggesting appropriate complimentary input for each soil type. Population density and irrigation 
are significant for Oromiya and BG. Thus, the results suggest policies to provide subsidies for 
complimentary inputs such as fertilizers, irrigation projects and provide more agricultural 
extension to highly populated regions. Moreover, the significance of the instrumental variable on 
source of energy used in cooking stoves suggests a two-pronged policy to stem deforestation and 
to disseminate more efficient stove technologies. 
2.7 Conclusion  
 My study estimates the impact of land degradation on the value of agricultural production 
in Ethiopia using a cross section of farm household data matched to detailed environmental data 
from a fine-resolution environmental characteristics map to account for farmer’s behavioral 
response and heterogeneity.  I use an instrumental variable approach to control for the 
endogeneity of land degradation. 
Controlling for farmer’s behavior endogeneity and heterogeneity, I find that land 
degradation reduces value of agricultural production by 3.56% or 17.18 Ethiopian Birr per 
hectare. While much smaller than the upper bound estimate of $7 billion from the crop 
simulation model, this amount is almost twice the lower bound estimate of $139 million. Where 
85% of the population depends on agriculture, this loss is substantial. 
 I also find that the type of fuel used in cooking stoves and bequest variables are good 
instruments for land degradation. The significance of type of energy used in cooking stoves 
suggests a two-pronged policy to stem deforestation and to disseminate more efficient stove 
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technologies. The positive bias suggests that unobservables are correlated with both land 
degradation and value of agricultural production.  
 This result is consistent with the story that poorer farmers may have more degraded land to 
begin with and are most at risk from losing from land degradation. To account for the spatial 
nature of the problem of land degradation, I control for spatial autocorrelation and found 
significant clustering or spill-over effects. The estimation efficiency was substantially improved 
by the inclusion of neighboring characteristics increasing the confidence in my estimates. 
 A limitation of the study is that I cannot take into account the time component of the land 
degradation process. Nevertheless, the paper demonstrates the vast possibility of analysis one 
could generate by geographically combining datasets.  
 The spatial cross sectional analysis of the data implies that the strategies to reduce land 
degradation’s effect on agricultural value of production must be location-specific. The map of 
differential impacts of land degradation on the value of agricultural production and region wise 
regressions show substantial heterogeneity in the effect of land degradation, implying that when 
designing aid and extension, it is important for policy makers to know the areas that are most 
degraded and areas where agricultural value is at risk to losses in value of agricultural production 
from land degradation. Moreover, interventions might enjoy greater success if they are tailored 
to addressing those local characteristics of the land and behavior that induce land degradation. 
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Variable Name Definition Source Mean Std Min Max
Value of Agricultural 
Production
continuous variable, sum of the total 
produce regardless of whether the 
produce is consumed at home, sold in 
the market or held back for farming 
purposes less the post harvest and pest 
losses multiplied by the market price 
farmers faced in 2004-2005 divided by 
the total hectares of land devoted for 
that purpose; Ethiopian Birr/ha IFPRI 482.414 741.245 0 9325.153
Land Degradation
continuous variable, represents the 
degree of land degradation, normalized 
from 0 to 1 GLADIS 0.55844 0.16446 0.06287 0.7502422
Bequest = 
Inheritance*Children
Interaction term between inheritance as 
the source of ownership dummy and 
number of children IFPRI 1.19203 2.10615 0 10
"Bad" Cooking Energy
=1 if source of energy is animal dung, 
fuel wood or both, =0 otherwise (LPG, 
kerosene, electric) IFPRI 0.65942 0.47419 0 1
Aridisol Soil (useless 
without irrigation)
=1 if Aridisol Type of Soil, =0 
otherwise
GLADIS / 
USDA 0.20531 0.40418 0 1
Entisol Soil (useless 
without fertiizer) =1 if Entisol Type of Soil, =0 otherwise
GLADIS / 
USDA 0.26208 0.44003 0 1
Mollisol Soil (most 
unproductive soil, dry 
and sand-like)
=1 if Mollisol Type of Soil, =0 
otherwise
GLADIS / 
USDA 0.23068 0.42152 0 1
Slope continuous variable in % GLADIS 4.46981 2.08937 0 8
Elevation continuous variable in MASL units IFPRI 2586.62 7836.39 0 220274
Rainfall
continuous variable, Mean Rainfall in 
2004-2005, in mm IFPRI 932.322 201.144 211.142 1216.208
Temperature
continuous variable, Mean Temperature 
in 2004-2005, in degrees Celsius IFPRI 19.0347 2.685 14.0061 24.75047
Population Density
continuous variable, number of 
inhabitants per kebele's area IFPRI 148.368 314.986 0 2578.857
Access to Basic 
Facilities
continuous variable, average distance  
in kilometers of farm to roads and 
bridges and market where they sell 
output, in kilometers IFPRI 5.68279 3.90851 0.05 45
Access to Information
continuous variable, number of visit 
times of entension agents (2004-2005) 
cropping season IFPRI 2.14476 4.61522 0 48
Irrigation Intensity
increasing categories of intensity of 
irrigation,  (1-0 to 2%, 2-2 to 16%, 3-
>16%) GLADIS 1.48913 0.99144 0 3
Distance of farm from 
home
continuous variable, distance of farm 
from home in kilometers IFPRI 1.0431 0.69926 0.20263 10.1579
Farm Characteristics
Table 2.1 Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics
Environmental Characteristics
Socio-Environment Characteristics
Candidates for Instrumental Variables
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Variable Name Definition Source Mean Std Min Max
Inheritance Dummy
=1 if source of ownership is through 
inheritance; =0 if government 
redistribution IFPRI 0.33213 0.47126 0 1
Land Certified 
Dummy =1 if land is certified; =0 not certified IFPRI 0.18599 0.38933 0 1
Rent Dummy =1 if land is rented; =0 not rented IFPRI 0.08454 0.27837 0 1
Sharecrop Dummy
=1 if hh is practicing sharecropping; =0 
otherwise IFPRI 0.28019 0.44937 0 1
Big Ethnic Group
=1 if member of Oromo or Amhara, =0 
otherwise IFPRI 0.64493 0.47882 0 1
Children number of children IFPRI 3.94203 2.24799 0 12
Male headed hh =1 if male; =0 female IFPRI 0.89734 0.30369 0 1
Farming Years
continuous variable, number of farming 
years IFPRI 23.5664 13.0183 1 68
Asset Index
continuous variable, total current value 
of assets (i.e. farm tools and 
machineries) IFPRI -0.0462 1.17731 -3.0821 4.827992
Livestock Ownership 
Dummy
=1 if household owns livestock, =0 
otherwise IFPRI 0.49638 0.50029 0 1
Regional Fixed 
Effects
Tigray Region
=1 if household is in the region, =0 
otherwise IFPRI 0.17874 0.38337 0 1
Amhara Region
=1 if household is in the region, =0 
otherwise IFPRI 0.35507 0.47882 0 1
Oromiya Region
=1 if household is in the region, =0 
otherwise IFPRI 0.22585 0.41839 0 1
Benishangul Gumuz 
Region
=1 if household is in the region, =0 
otherwise IFPRI 0.17995 0.38438 0 1
SNNP Region
=1 if household is in the region, =0 
otherwise IFPRI 0.06039 0.23835 0 1
Neighbor's Land 
Degradation
continuous variable, represents the 
degree of land degradation, normalized 
from 0 to 1 GLADIS 0.55898 0.1628 0.06288 0.75024
Land Tenure Characteristics
Neighbor's Characteristics
Continued Table 2.1 Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics
Farmer Demographics
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OLS without 
correcting for 
endogeneity
First Stage 
Regression
Instrumental 
Variable Approach
Spatially Weighted 
Regression
Value of 
Agricultural 
Production per 
hectare
Land Degradation
Value of 
Agricultural 
Production per 
hectare
Value of Agricultural 
Production per 
hectare
Land Degradation -43.2* -17.18*** -16.75***
(23.70) (9.44) (7.61)
Candidates for Instrumental Variables
Bequest -35.0 -0.00299**
(22.91) (0.0013)
"Bad" Cooking Energy -80.8 0.0245**
(82.33) (0.0110)
Environmental Characteristics
Aridisol Soil -124.1 -0.337*** -411.1 -411.1
(168.20) (0.0191) (1058.00) (1047.00)
Entisol Soil -298.4** -0.0985*** -293.12** -293.12**
(123.80) (0.0162) (123.80) (119.40)
Mollisol Soil 0.0 -0.234*** -194.1 -194.1
(155.50) (0.0191) (737.80) (730.10)
Slope 30.4 0.0732*** 91.5 91.5
(35.11) (0.0039) (229.60) (227.20)
Elevation 0.001 -8.06E-08 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.0000) (0.00) (0.00)
Rainfall -0.2 -7.79e-05** -0.338 -0.338
(0.24) (0.00003) (0.31) (0.31)
Temperature -75.95*** 0.0479*** -30.63** -30.63**
(24.66) (0.0028) (17.50) (14.00)
Socio-Environment Characteristics
Population Density 0.152* -3.30e-05*** 0.1 0.1
(0.08) (0.000011) (0.13) (0.13)
Access to Basic Facilities 4.2 -0.00163** 2.217 2.217
(6.09) (0.0008) (7.94) (7.85)
Access to Information 11.45** -0.00317*** 8.802* 8.802*
(5.48) (0.0007) (6.10) (5.98)
Farm Characteristics
Irrigation Intensity 62.65* -0.0101** 56.77* 56.77*
(33.48) (0.0045) (47.28) (41.28)
Distance of farm from home 1.2 0.00376 1.5 1.5
(34.61) (0.0046) (35.86) (35.48)
Land Tenure Characteristics
Inheritance Dummy 119.1 0.016 -6.1 -6.1
(100.70) (0.0135) (53.67) (53.10)
Rent Dummy 31.6 0.0516*** -80.4 -80.4
(89.68) (0.0118) (186.70) (189.50)
Sharecropped Dummy -52.5 -9.47E-04 -55.4 -55.4
(55.71) (0.0075) (56.16) (55.57)
Land Certified from Govt 81.5 -0.0397*** 40.3 40.3
(72.02) (0.0096) (146.10) (144.50)
Table 2.2 Regression Results
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OLS without 
correcting for 
endogeneity
First Stage 
Regression
Instrumental 
Variable Approach
Spatially Weighted 
Regression
Agricultural Value 
of Production Land Degradation
Agricultural Value 
of Production
Agricultural Value of 
Production
Farmer Demographics
Big Ethnic Group -51.4 -0.0269** -80.9 -80.9
(102.30) (0.0137) (130.90) (129.50)
Number of Children 5.5 0.0128*** -5.7 -5.7
(13.12) (0.0018) (11.40) (11.28)
Male head -6.1 0.0211** 16.9 16.9
(79.65) (0.0107) (103.70) (102.60)
Farming Years -2.4 -0.000555** -3.1 -3.1
(1.91) (0.0003) (2.69) (2.66)
Livestock ownership dummy 488.3*** -0.00934 478.9*** 478.9***
(48.36) (0.0065) (57.92) (57.31)
Asset Index 41.65* -0.00467 42.72* 42.72*
(23.37) (0.0031) (27.58) (27.29)
Regional Fixed Effects
Tigray Region 344.8** -0.142*** 203.1** 223.6**
(173.50) (0.0227) (156.00) (141.00)
Amhara Region -28.0 -0.0908*** -63.3 -63.3
(157.90) (0.0209) (367.50) (367.50)
Oromiya Region -182.5 -0.00345 -158.1 -158.1
(136.60) (0.0183) (138.00) (138.00)
Benishangul Gumuz Region -712.4*** 0.200*** -524.1*** -489.3***
(186.20) (0.0240) (123.80) (117.80)
Neighbor's Characteristics
N's Land Degradation -27.3***
(14.09)
Constant -1,085* 1.426*** -1293.4* -1293.4*
(597.00) (0.06) (453.00) (440.10)
Observations 828 828 828 828
R-squared 0.2370 0.7250 0.2330 0.2425
Underidentification test 1.057a 0.222a
                 Chi-sq(2) P-val 0.148 0.9891
Overidentification test 0.183b 0.322b
                 Chi-sq(2) P-val 0.7726 0.8873
a Anderson Canonical Correlation LM Statistic
b Sargan Statistic
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Continued Table 2.2  Regression Results
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Region Marginal Effect of Land Degradation
Tigray -12.06*
(10.5)
Amhara -14.30**
(12.37)
Oromiya -19.87**
(15.62)
BG -15.92*
(13.1)
SNNPR -21.06
(35.09)
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.3  Marginal Effects of Land Degradation by Region
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Region Tigray Region Amhara Region Oromiya Region BG
Land Degradation Land Degradation Land Degradation Land Degradation
Candidates for Instrumental Variables
Bequest 0.00463 -0.011** -0.00875* -0.00104**
(0.0076) (0.0011) (0.0019) (0.0009)
"Bad" Cooking Energy 0.131* 0.0201 0.0564** -0.0215**
(0.0624) (0.0032) (0.0056) (0.0118)
Environmental Characteristics
Aridisol Soil -0.0126 -0.00843 0.0688** 0.689***
(0.2050) (0.0096) (0.0296) (0.1930)
Entisol Soil 0.0512 -0.0166** 0.0355* 0.386***
(0.1560) (0.0073) (0.0201) (0.1120)
Mollisol Soil 0.0209 -0.0270*** 0.0674*** 0.315
(0.1790) (0.0089) (0.0244) (0.2310)
Slope 0.0114 0.00540*** -0.0171*** -0.146***
(0.0302) (0.0020) (0.0055) (0.0434)
Elevation 0.00000793 1.97E-08 0.000000603 -0.00000238
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Rainfall 0.000166 2.40e-05 1.29e-05 -0.000502
(0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0003)
Temperature 0.00608 0.00235* 0.00482** -0.00533
(0.0211) (0.0013) (0.0024) (0.0368)
Socio-Environment Characteristics
Population Density 0.000022 0.00000455 0.000192** 0.00429***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0011)
Access to Basic Facilities 0.00168 -0.000124 -0.00109 7.77e-05
(0.0022) (0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0002)
Access to Information 0.00206 -0.0000589 0.00143 0.000879
(0.0030) (0.0002) (0.0018) (0.0007)
Farm Characteristics
Irrigation Intensity -0.00109 -0.00334** 0.00298 0.122
(0.0205) (0.0016) (0.0061) (0.0370)
Distance of farm from home 0.00993 0.000765 0.00147 0.0188***
(0.0091) (0.0016) (0.0026) (0.0036)
Farmer Demographics
Big Ethnic Group 0.0148 0.0242* 0.00424
(0.0636) (0.0135) (0.0026)
Number of Children -0.0018 0.00107 -0.000947 0.000203
(0.0028) (0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0006)
Male head -0.00422 0.00372 -0.00334 0.00248
(0.0153) (0.0042) (0.0062) (0.0048)
Farming Years -0.000649 -0.0000487 0.000245 0.0000142
(0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Livestock ownership dummy 0.0097 0.00248 -0.00111 0.000468
(0.0110) (0.0023) (0.0043) (0.0022)
Asset Index 0.00973* 0.000426 -0.000468 -0.00193*
(0.0050) (0.0012) (0.0021) (0.0011)
Table 2.4   Regression Results by Region
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Region Tigray Region Amhara Region Oromiya Region BG
Land Degradation Land Degradation Land Degradation Land Degradation
Land Tenure Characteristics
Inheritance Dummy -0.0213 0.00564 0.00245 0.000112
(0.0291) (0.0054) (0.0081) (0.0039)
Rent Dummy 0.000000729 -0.0000037 -0.0000327 0.0000172
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Sharecropped Dummy 0.00253 -0.00286 -0.00536 -0.00288
(0.0125) (0.0024) (0.0053) (0.0040)
Land Certified from Govt Dummy -0.00214 -0.00196 -0.0023 -0.0154***
(0.0292) (0.0028) (0.0095) (0.0044)
Constant -0.173 0.0171 0.154** 0.609
(0.4530) (0.0260) (0.0650) (1.1920)
Observations 148 294 187 149
R-squared 0.6480 0.7994 0.6940 0.8620
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Continued Table 2.4   Regression Results by Region
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Figure 2.1    Cluster and Significance Maps of Land Degradation induced decline in Value 
of Agricultural Production and Moran’s I-statistic 
!
!  
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Figure 2.2   Differential Impacts of Land Degradation on the Value of Agricultural Production 
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Chapter 3 
DOES PHILIPPINE PROCUREMENT AND DISTRIBUTION  
IN THE RICE MARKET MATTER? 
 
 
3.1 Introduction and Motivation 
Rice is the staple food in the Philippines. It accounts for 1/3 of the total food 
consumption (in terms of domestic utilization in metric tons)6 and is grown on about 4 million 
hectares of the total 13 million hectares of arable land (Glipo, Vibal and Cainglet, 2002). Since 
rice is the most important food crop, the government has made numerous attempts to influence 
its price. In 1972, the Philippine government established the National Food Authority (NFA) to 
ensure continuous supply of rice at stabilized prices through domestic stocks and import control. 
The agency procures and sells rice at administratively determined prices and stores and 
maintains rice stocks as a contingency against future shortages. 
However, variability in rice production and consumption results in periodic regional 
surpluses or deficits (Rufino, 2011). Furthermore, the problem is exacerbated by market 
inefficiencies such as poor rural and market infrastructure (Goletti et al 1995; Moya et al 2002), 
fragmented markets (Dawe et al, 2008; Intal and Ranit, 2001), inefficient distribution, poor 
transportation (Intal and Ranit, 2001) and exogenous supply shocks such as extreme weather.  
Since 1972, the private sector marketing channel has operated alongside the NFA. Prices 
in the private sector are set by supply and demand conditions, while the NFA purchases and sells 
at administratively set prices; therefore it is not clear how the NFA’s marketing activities affect 
the level and variability of rice prices.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!6!http://www.bas.gov.ph!
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Because of this, the NFA has been criticized. (Jha and Ramaswami, 2010; Jha and Mehta, 
2008; Tolentino, 2006; Intal and Garcia, 2005; Esguerra et al., 2001; Subbarao et al., 1996; 
Unnevehr, 1985) But there have been few academic studies on the matter (Umali et al., 1992; 
Shively et al., 2002; Yao et al., 2005 as an exception). Umali et al. (1992) concluded that 
increased market integration during the period of 1983-1986 was attributable to declining levels 
of government intervention in the marketing system. Shively et al. (2002) used trends, seasonal 
terms, and deviations from trend output variables to analyze rice price changes in the Philippines. 
They found that the buffer stock program had little influence on rice prices. Yao et al. (2005) 
used seemingly unrelated regressions to examine effectiveness of the program. Yao et al. (2005) 
found that the NFA successfully increased producer prices in 5 of 13 regions through stock 
accumulation and paddy rice purchase at floor prices. However, NFA stock releases did not 
correlate strongly with retail prices in their study. 
Given that the previous literature is mixed regarding whether or not NFA interventions 
have had an effect on Philippine rice market, I hope to address the issue using a novel approach. 
I differentiate producing regions and consuming regions as well as major intervention regions 
(with high distribution and procurement). I expect the high distribution and consuming regions 
are most affected by the NFA program.   
This paper uses a structural vector autoregression (VAR) approach similar to Jayne et al. 
(2008) and Mason et al. (2013) and monthly price data from January 1990 through January 2013 
to estimate the impacts of the NFA’s pricing decisions on private sector rice price levels and 
variability. However, an important method which makes this study differ from Jayne et al. 
(2008) and Mason et al. (2013) is that I verify the exclusion restrictions set for model 
identification through a data determined approach using PC algorithm and Directed Acyclic 
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Graphs. The structural VAR allows for a set of underlying supply, demand, and policy shocks to 
influence market prices. I use the structural VAR results to evaluate the effects of NFA policy 
shocks on market prices using impulse response analysis. Finally, I use the estimated models to 
simulate the counterfactual path that market prices would have taken in the absence of NFA 
activities. The level and variability of these simulated prices compared to the realized historical 
prices demonstrate the effects of the NFA on rice market prices. 
This paper makes an important empirical policy analysis contribution to the agricultural 
economics literature. The findings provide better understanding of the impact of NFA policies 
and inform the debate about an appropriate future role for the NFA in Philippine rice markets. 
Results showed that the NFA buying price premiums had a significant effect in the major 
producing region and the major procurement region in the following month. While for the major 
distribution region, the NFA sell price premiums take longer to respond to changes in price 
policy suggesting that market prices were tracking the world prices. Finally, comparing historical 
price data to simulated prices with no NFA activities show that the interventions had a very small 
impact on both rice price levels and variability. NFA’s impact in raising food prices occurred 
primarily during self-sufficient years and had little or no effect at all in importing years.  
3.2 Government Price Stabilization Policy and the Philippine Rice Market 
A stated goal of the NFA is to support farm gate prices and reduce the retail price of rice 
(NFA website7). To accomplish this, the NFA sells rice through accredited retailers at a fixed 
margin on the sale, while at the same time, offers to buy raw rice from farmers at a support price 
based on the average domestic cost of production plus an administratively determined mark-up.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!7!http://www.nfa.gov.ph/!
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It holds buffer stocks equivalent to 30 days of consumption plus 15 days of emergency holdings 
by buying paddy during peak harvest; then the NFA sells rice from its stocks at strategic times 
when prices are at seasonal highs in order to reduce the retail price (Intal and Garcia, 2005; Yao 
et al., 2005). 
The private marketing channel operates along side NFA. In the private channel, prices are 
set by supply and demand forces, while the NFA purchases and sells at administratively set 
prices. The two marketing channels are interrelated because farmers can decide to sell their rice 
to private markets or the NFA. 
Apart from the price setting function, the NFA can also influence market process through 
stockholding8 policies and monopolizing importation9. However, Mason et al (2013) and Jayne 
et al (2008) show that the effect of price setting activities on market prices is similar to effect of 
stockholding activities. Furthermore, they show that the effect of government activities are well 
captured by the price premium alone because the extent to which the government is building or 
reducing stocks is tied so closely to the size of the buy and sell price premiums. In this paper, I 
only focus on the effects of the official price setting process of the NFA, while indirectly 
incorporating the effect of importation. I assume that the NFA influences market prices in two 
main ways: by changing the size of the buy price premium (difference between the NFA buy 
price and the farmgate market price in surplus producing regions) and by changing of the sell 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!8!The NFA Council sets the level of stocking based on the recommendation of the National Inter-Agency 
Committee (Intal and Garcia, 2005). The NFA’s regional and provincial offices manage approximately 296 
warehouses with a combined storage capacity of more than one million metric tons of grains (NFA website, www. 
nfa.gov.ph).  
9 Historically, the NFA has also controlled the importation of rice through quantitative restrictions. Prior to 1996, the 
NFA was the country’s sole rice importer. In 1996, with the enactment of the Agricultural Tariffication Act, private 
enterprises gained the rights to import minimal quantities of rice. In 2003, substantial amount of imports was still 
through the NFA amounting to 75% of total rice importation (Intal and Garcia, 2005).
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price premium (difference between the NFA sale price and retail market price in consuming 
regions). 
3.3 Methodology 
 I take a structural vector autoregression (VAR) approach (Sims, 1980; Bernanke, 1986; 
Shapiro and Watson, 1988) to estimate the effects of NFA marketing activities on private sector 
rice prices. VAR models have proven useful for estimating policy effects in the presence of 
limited data and uncertainty about the correct structural model of the underlying data generating 
mechanism (Myers et al., 1990).  
 I segment the VAR into blocks of prices yt  and policy variables pt . A general dynamic 
model of the relationship between the variables is specified: 
Byt = Bi yt−i +
i=0
k
∑ Ci pt−i +
i=0
k
∑ Ayuty                (3.1)
Dpt = Gi yt−i +
i=0
k
∑ Di pt−i +
i=0
k
∑ A putp               (3.2)
 
where B,Bi,Ci,Ay  and D,Di,Gi,A p  are matrices of unknown parameters, k is the 
number of lags, and uty  and utp  are vectors of mutually uncorrelated structural error terms.  
A distinct feature of VAR models is that they are unrestricted (equations 3.1 and 3.2)  
(Sims, 1980). That is the Ay  and A p  matrices allow the error terms from one equation to enter 
other equation, so that the error terms within each of these vectors are not mutually uncorrelated 
(Bernanke and Mihov, 1998). In order to estimate the dynamic response of market variables to a 
policy shock (i.e. in order for impulse response analysis to have a causal, ceteris paribus 
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interpretation), a set of identifying restrictions needs to be imposed on contemporaneous 
interactions among the variables.  
  In particular, I set restrictions on C0,G0,B,D,Ay  and A p  (Bernanke, 1986; Fackler, 1988). 
I follow Jayne et al. (2008) and Mason et al. (2013) in their approach to identify the model. 
First, I set C0 = 0  which implies that there is no contemporaneous response of market 
changes to NFA policies. In other words, the rice market variables yt( )  depend on current and 
past values of yt but only on the past values of the policy variables pt( ) . This assumes market 
variables respond to lagged policy changes but not contemporaneously. This may seem like a 
restrictive assumption because it implies rice sellers and buyers respond to a change in the NFA 
price premiums after a full period before they become fully aware of the change and start altering 
their behavior. In most developing countries like the Philippines access to information can be 
sporadic and incomplete. Hence, it takes time for buyers and sellers to become aware that 
premiums have changed. Also, even when market participants become aware of premium it may 
be too costly to alter their marketing channel because of adjustment costs. If C0 = 0 , the effect of 
a policy shock on market variables is independent of B and Ay  parameter matrices (Bernanke 
and Blinder, 1992; Bernanke and Mihov, 1998). Thus, there is no need for any identification 
restrictions on the market variables B or Ay( ) .  
 However, with C0 = 0 , the system is still not identified. The policy effect is still 
sensitive to restrictions set to identify D , G0  and A p  in policy block, i.e. alternative orderings 
of the policy variables (buy price premium and sell price premium). Choleski factorization is the 
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most common identification scheme used in VAR models which imposes a recursive ordering 
among variables (Sims, 1980). If C0 = 0 , Choleski decomposition requires A p  to be a diagonal 
matrix, D  to be lower triangular with ones on the principal diagonal and G0  left unrestricted. 
Defining D  in this way imposes a recursive ordering on the policy variables, pt( ) . In the context 
of this paper, I place the buy price premium first and the sell price premium next because I 
assume that NFA determines its buy price premium based on how much rice is being delivered 
and then sets the sell price premium based on what was obtained. But sensitivity of impulse 
response function to orderings of policy variables are also presented in the diagnostic section.  
I verify the validity of these identification restrictions using Directed Acyclic Graph 
Analysis which I describe in detail in section 3.5. After estimating the model, impulse response 
analysis can be used to trace out the dynamic response of a given market variable to a one-time 
random shock to one of the policy variables, ceteris paribus. That is ∂yi,t+s
∂u j,tp
, where yi  is a price 
variable and u j,tp  is the structural error policy variable. And because structural error terms are 
orthogonal, the impulse response functions have a causal interpretation.  
Finally, given the estimated VAR, I simulate the counterfactual values of the variables if 
there had been no NFA activities. This is accomplished by setting all of the random shocks to 
market variables or the market variables error terms uty  to their estimated historical values and 
constructing a new series of policy shocks ut*y  and ut*p  so that the buy premiums and sell 
premiums are zero. The latter results in simulated price paths that would have occurred had buy 
premiums and sell premiums been zero. I compare the simulated paths of the market variables to 
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the historical in terms of mean, standard variation and coefficient of variation to inform whether 
the NFA has affected market price levels and stability.  
3.4 Data 
 I use monthly data from January 1990 through January 2013. The farmgate and retail 
prices by region are from Bureau of Agricultural Statistics website (http://www.bas.gov.ph). All 
prices are expressed in Philippine peso per kilogram (Php/kg). The NFA price, sales and 
purchase data were acquired directly from the NFA. The NFA purchase and sale prices were 
pan-territorial and pan-seasonal (i.e. uniform throughout the country and remain fixed during the 
marketing season, except for some years when they were revised in the middle of the year as a 
response to crop supply forecasts and weather shocks). Computing for the price premium is 
straightforward by calculating the spread between NFA prices with Central Luzon and ARMM 
prices. Summary statistics for all the variables used in the study are reported in Table 3.4 and the 
series are depicted in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. 
From Figure 3.1, it seems like the sell premium does not change frequently and appears 
to be set administratively. While buy premiums seem to be determined in response to market 
conditions. This makes sense because NFA would base their buy price premium on how much is 
being delivered or produced which is more exogenous and then the NFA would base the sell 
price premium on how much NFA obtained. 
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3.5 Application of VAR Method to Philippine Rice Market and DAG Verification 
 For the market variables, I include the major producing and consuming regions and 
regions where there is considerable NFA intervention. In particular, the market variables, yt , 
include wholesale prices for Central Luzon (a major producing region), ARMM (a major 
consuming region), Mimaropa and NCR (high procurement and distribution regions). I also 
include world prices since NFA still imports substantial amount as seen in the difference of 
procurement and distribution quantities10.  
Table 3.1 presents annual per capita consumption of rice by region from 2008-2009 and 
Table 3.2 presents average palay area harvested by region from 1990-2012. Table 3.3, on the 
other hand, summarizes average annual palay procurement and distribution of rice per region 
from 2000-2012. 
For the policy variables, pt , I include variables that represent the operation of the 
Philippines’ rice price policy. I include the buy price premium in the major producing region of 
Central Luzon and the sell price premium in the major consuming region of ARMM. Both these 
policy variables can be positive, zero or negative and if both are set to zero then the market 
would be operating without the NFA influence11.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!10!Including other market variables such as trade flows, consumption levels, private storage, transportation costs, 
etc., might provide more information but data on these variables are not available.!11!Other potential variables that might have been included in the policy vector are how much the NFA was actually 
selling and buying at administratively determined prices and measure of tariff rate the government imposes on rice 
imports. Positive net purchases indicate the government is adding to their stocks while negative net purchases 
indicate they are running down stocks. However, as shown by Jayne et al. (2008) and Mason (2011), the effects of 
stocks and price premiums are the same. Thus, this suggests that the effects of the NFA on market prices is well 
captured by price premiums alone because the extent to which the NFA is building or reducing stocks is tied closely 
to the size of their buy and sell price premiums and discounts. On the other hand, the measure of tariff rate the 
government imposes on rice imports changed very infrequently over time making it not suitable for linear VAR 
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While setting exclusion restrictions is a possible way to achieve an identified system, 
Etienne (2013) noted that this may have an element of subjective judgement of the researcher. To 
reduce this problem, I follow Swanson and Granger (1997) to verify the exclusion restrictions 
using a data determined approach based on conditional and unconditional correlations among 
reduced-form VAR structural innovations. I employ PC algorithm of Spirtes, Glymour and 
Scheines (2000) of Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAG) of Demiralp and Hoover (2003) embedded 
in Tetrad IV software. PC algorithm starts with a completed undirected graph connecting the n 
innovations or structural errors (n=number of variables) from the reduced form VAR. Edges 
between the variables are removed based on either zero unconditional or conditional correlations 
based on Fisher’s z test. I use 10% significance level as recommended by Spirtes, Glymour and 
Cheines (2000) based on their Monte Carlo simulation for different sample sizes. 
Figure 3.3 reports the pattern from TETRAD IV’s application of the PC Algorithm to the 
reduced form VAR model. The result conforms to my proposed exclusion restrictions presented 
in section 3.3. The market variables respond to lagged policy changes but not to 
contemporaneous policy changes, i.e. no significant contemporaneous correlation from UParmm, 
UPncr, UPcluz and UPmim to either UPsp or UPbp. Similarly, policy changes respond to lagged 
market variables but not contemporaneously, i.e. no significant contemporaneous correlation 
from UPsp or UPbp to any of UParmm, UPncr, UPcluz and UPmim. With this verification, I can 
then proceed to estimate the structural VAR model I specified in section 3.3. 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
framework. Moreover, the NFA plays a monopoly role in importation of rice and the levels of tariff they set are 
closely related to their local buy and sell price premiums as well.!
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3.6 Diagnostic Tests 
I tested the data for unit roots. A summary of Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests for 
unit roots are reported in Table 3.5 and the detailed results are in the Appendix Table B1. I tested 
for stationarity in levels and in differences. Also, the lag order k is determined using Akaike and 
Schwarz-Bayesian information criteria and likelihood ratio (LR) tests. In Dickey-Fuller 
regressions, the regressors were estimated with and without a time trend. Phillips-Perron tests 
were also applied as a consistency check, again both with and without time trend. The tests imply 
that all the wholesale price variables in levels exhibit unit root but were difference stationary. I 
then proceed to do VAR in differences of wholesale prices.  
In addition, I test for serial correlation and autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity 
effects. Given plots of the data in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, I suspect seasonality may be an issue. 
Domestic rice production in Philippines is seasonal, inevitably resulting in seasonal variation in 
the price of rice. That is the price of rice is lower during the harvest season and higher during the 
lean months. Because Philippines has two seasons, I control for seasonality by adding a seasonal 
dummy variable as an exogenous shock in the system without changing the identification 
assumptions and restrictions (Hylleberg et al., 1990; Saikkonen et al., 2000). Correlograms for 
both the price and policy variables displayed strong evidence of seasonality. Further, a VAR 
regression without seasonal dummy variables show significant evidence of autocorrelation (See 
Appendix B2). And a likelihood ratio test based on the determinants of the error variances and 
covariance from estimations with and without seasonal dummy variables reject the null 
hypothesis that the seasonal dummy variables are not necessary.  
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I also test for linear trends, and find that trend terms are not significant in any of the 
equations which was also confirmed by a likelihood ratio test. Thus, I do not model it explicitly 
in the regression. Enders (2008) also recommended not including trend terms in VARs so that 
the dynamic interrelationships between the variables remain as unrestricted as possible. (See 
Appendix B3) 
3.7 Results 
3.7.1 VAR Estimation Results 
 A seven variable VAR with seasonal dummies was estimated using lagged prices. The 
Akaike information criteria and Schwartz Bayesian criteria suggests two lags. However, 
Likelihood ratio test and Lagrange multiplier test for autocorrelation both suggest that four lags 
was sufficient to eliminate autocorrelation in the residuals in all the Dickey-Fuller regressions 
(See Appendix Tables B4 and B5). So a lag of four was chosen.  
I also tested the residuals for autocorrelation using Ljung-Box Q statistics. Results from 
Ljung-Box Q statistics suggest four-lagged dependent variables. The same test applied to the 
squared residuals supports no autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) in any 
residual series. Model specification tests for residuals are reported in Table 3.6. For stability 
conditions, I find that the eigenvalues lie within unit circle, and thus satisfy VAR conditions for 
stationarity (see Appendix B6). Hence I choose a lag length of four for the model. 
The VAR results are presented in Table 3.7. Based on the VAR coefficients, I find that 
policy variables do not consistently affect the four regions. For a major producing region, Central 
Luzon, buy premiums coefficient is negative and significant in the second, third and fourth lag. 
While for ARMM, the region with the biggest per capita consumption, the sell premium is 
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significant in the third lag. World prices are significant in all regions at one and two lags which 
suggest that local prices are highly responsive to world price shocks despite heavy government 
intervention. While the domestic markets do not appear to be responding to each other but driven 
much by action in the NCR as the first lag of NCR is highly significant in all price equations. 
Seasonality is highly significant in the regions where NFA intervenes the most suggesting efforts 
to dampen seasonal swings in price are not fully effective. 
3.7.2 Impulse Response Results 
 As mentioned in the previous sections, the underlying dynamic interrelationships 
between rice prices and NFA premiums is that sellers and buyers of rice have two alternative 
marketing channels: either they can buy or sell through the private sector at prices set by forces 
of supply and demand or through the NFA at administratively set prices.  
So if NFA raises its buy price in a producing region such as Central Luzon, then one 
might expect more supply entering the NFA channel and less in the private market. And as 
supply contracts, this should create an upward pressure on market prices in Central Luzon. 
Similarly, if NFA raises its sell price in a consuming region, i.e. ARMM, then I will expect 
people buying in the private market channel instead of buying from NFA. High demand could 
lead to increase in prices as well. 
 I investigate the dynamic response of market prices to changes in NFA buy and sell 
premiums using impulse response analysis. Impulse response analysis uses moving average 
representation of VAR to trace out the dynamic effect of a one-time shock to the system on each 
variable in the system. Here I am interested in the dynamic response of market prices to shocks 
to the NFA buy and sell premiums. Thus, I would expect positive shocks to the premiums to 
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have positive effects on the market prices, with an effect being spread over time as a result of 
adjustment costs from moving between marketing channels. 
While I verify the exclusion restrictions in section 3.3, the policy effects can still be 
sensitive to the alternative orderings for the policy variables. I derive orthogonal impulse 
response functions, which in this case correspond to selecting Cholesky decomposition for the 
contemporaneous affects matrix and are depicted in Figure 3.4. In Appendix Figure B1, I present 
impulse response functions for different orders or policy variables and find no difference at all.  
The solid line in Figure 3.4 represents the impulse response function and the grey band is 
the 95% confidence interval for the IRF. As expected, positive shocks to the premiums have 
positive effects on the market prices, with an effect being spread over time as a result of 
adjustment costs from moving between marketing channels. However, none of the confidence 
intervals exclude zero, which indicates that they are not statistically significant. This is further 
support that the NFA policies are not significantly influencing market rice prices. 
3.7.3 Simulated Effects of NFA marketing activities 
 I simulate prices in the absence of NFA market channel by: (1) recursively constructing a 
set of alternative policy scenario shock, i.e. ut*y  and ut*p  , that generate zero values for NFA buy 
and sell price premiums over the entire sample period; (2) assuming that the shocks to the market 
variables remain at their estimated sample values over the sample period; and (3) constructing 
dynamic forecasts of the Central Luzon and ARMM price paths under the alternative policy 
scenario and actual market shocks. 
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 The resulting estimated NFA price effects are tabulated in Table 3.8 and graphed in 
Figures 3.5-3.8. The effect of NFA over the entire sample period was very little. This is 
consistent with earlier findings by Shively et al. (2002) and Yao et al. (2005). Except for NCR, 
the effect of NFA was to raise the average prices in Central Luzon, ARMM and Mimaropa by 
approximately 0.85 to 1.56%. NFA also stabilize prices as seen by reduced standard deviations.12 
 Based on Figure 3.5-3.7, it was mostly felt only in the early 1990s and has little or no 
effect at all in the later years, with an exception during the price spike of 2008, which my results 
indicate would have been slightly worse had the NFA not been active. The differences are more 
prominent looking at the percentage differences of the prices in Figure 3.9. Recall that in the 
1980s up to early half of the 1990s Philippines was self-sufficient (Intal and Garcia, 2005). Thus, 
it is mainly when in self-sufficient years that I observe significant differences between actual and 
simulated prices. Suggesting that as world markets have come to play a large role in the 
Philippine rice market, the NFA’s ability to influence prices has diminished. 
3.8 Conclusion 
In 1972, the Philippine government established the National Food Agency (NFA) to 
ensure continuous supply of rice at stabilized prices through domestic stocks and imports control. 
The NFA procures rice at support price and sells rice at an affordable price to poor consumers. In 
addition, the NFA stores and maintains rice stocks as a contingency against future shortages. The 
NFA has received a lot of criticism but there has been little empirical work investigating effects 
of the NFA on private sector grain prices. Given the importance of rice in the Philippine 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!12!It is worth noting that the simulations are based on time series when NFA exists. Thus, care 
should be taken in interpreting the simulation results. Ideally, I could use coefficient estimates of 
VAR from the time series when NFA does not exist but the data was not available.!
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economy, empirical research on the historical effects of the NFA activities will provide a better 
understanding of the past impact of these policies and also inform the debate about an 
appropriate future role for the NFA. 
In this article, I use a structural vector autoregression (VAR) approach using monthly 
data from January 1990 through January 2013 to estimate the impacts of NFA’s pricing decisions 
on private sector rice price levels and variability. I also use the VAR results to evaluate the 
effects of NFA activities on market prices using impulse response analysis and to simulate the 
path that market prices would have taken in the absence of NFA.  
Results from the VAR show that NFA buying price premiums had a significant effect for 
major producing region. While for major distribution and consumption region, NFA sell price 
premiums had a significant effect in the third lag suggesting that market prices in these regions 
are most likely tracking the world prices and takes longer to respond to changes in price policy 
despite heavy government intervention. Impulse response function reveal that the effect of 
government policy shocks would impact prices in the short term. That is increasing the market 
prices abruptly and after about 4 months, the prices would then start to diminish and this process 
lasts for about a year. Finally, comparing historical price data and simulations of prices in the no 
NFA scenario show that NFA activities have a very small impact on both rice price levels and 
variability. NFA’s impact in raising food prices occurred primarily during self-sufficient years 
and had little or no effect at all in importing years.  
Islam and Thomas (1996) state that for a buffer stock program to be effective, the agency 
must be in control of the timing of the purchases and be able to make cost-effective purchases 
and sales. As in the case of the NFA’s price stabilization program, operational inefficiency has 
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been apparent. The deficits of the NFA accounted for 31% in 2002 and 43% in 2005 of the total 
deficit of all government corporations (Intal et al, 2012). The Coffrey International Development 
Report, in their review of the NFA’s operational efficiency and effectiveness, reports poor 
financial management information system and lack of integrated logistics have led to ineffective 
monitoring of stocks and operations leading to losses. Also, overstaffing and government 
bureaucratic rules results in higher administrative costs than necessary. Finally, where 
transportation and warehousing infrastructure is not well developed, a calamity leads to private 
hoarding and possible drastic increases in the prices of rice which dampens the purpose of price 
stabilization. The results of the paper suggest that the government should leave a greater role for 
the private sector in stabilizing rice prices. 
3.9 References 
AGILE. (2000). Restructuring of the National Food Authority. Report for the Bureau of 
Agriculture. 
Barrett, C. B. (1997). Liberalization and food price distributions: ARCH-M evidence from 
Madagascar. Food Policy, 22(2), 155-173. 
Bernanke, B. S. (1986). Alternative explanations of the money-income correlation. 
 
Bernanke, B.S. & Blinder, A. (1992). The Federal Funds Rate and the Transmission of Monetary
 Policy”. The American Economic Review, 82(4), 344-349. 
 
Bernanke, B. S., & Mihov, I. (1998). Measuring monetary policy. The Quarterly Journal of
 Economics, 113(3), 869-902. 
 
Coffrey International Development (2007). Philippines: PEGR Reform Agenda R003- A-01.
 Review of the National Food Authority’s Operational Efficiency and Effectiveness.
 Final Report, March 2007.  
 
Dawe, D. C., Moya, P. F., Casiwan, C. B., & Cabling, J. M. (2008). Rice marketing systems in 
the Philippines and Thailand: Do large numbers of competitive traders ensure good 
performance?. Food Policy, 33(5), 455-463. 
 
!! 57!
Demiralp, S., & Hoover, K. D. (2003). Searching for the Causal Structure of a Vector 
Autoregression*. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and statistics, 65(s1), 745-767. 
Enders, W. (2008). Applied econometric time series. John Wiley & Sons. 
Esguerra, J., Balisacan, A., & Confesor, N. (2001). The Philippines: Labor market trends and 
government interventions following the East Asian financial crisis. Betcherman, G. et al, 
195-244. 
Etienne, X. L., Irwin, S. H., & Garcia, P. (2013). Dissecting Corn Price Movements with 
Directed Acyclic Graphs. 
Fackler, P.L. (1988). Vector autoregressive techniques for structural analysis. Revista de Analisis 
Economico, 3(2): 119-134. 
Glipo, A., Vibal, V. & Cainglet, J. (2002). Trade Liberalization in the Philippine Rice Sector: 
Implications of HB 3339 on Rural Employment and the Country’s Food Security. 
Development Forum, No. 1, Series 2002. 
Goletti, F., & Christina-Tsigas, E. (1995). Analyzing market integration. Prices, Products, and 
People: Analyzing Agricultural Markets in Developing Countries. 
Hylleberg, S., Engle, R. F., Granger, C. W., & Yoo, B. S. (1990). Seasonal integration and 
cointegration. Journal of econometrics, 44(1), 215-238. 
Intal Jr, P. S., Cu, L. F., & Illescas, J. A. (2012). Rice Prices and the National Food Authority
 (No. DP 2012-27). Philippine Institute for Development Studies. 
Intal, P. S., & Garcia, M. C. (2005). Rice and Philippine politics (No. DP 2005-13). Philippine 
Institute for Development Studies. 
Intal, P. S., & Ranit, L. O. (2001). Literature review of the agricultural distribution services 
sector: Performance, efficiency and research issues (No. DP 2001-14). Philippine 
Institute for Development Studies. 
Islam, N., & Thomas, S. (1996). Foodgrain price stabilization in developing countries: Issues 
and experiences in Asia (Vol. 3). Intl Food Policy Res Inst. 
Jayne, T. S., Myers, R. J., & Nyoro, J. (2008). The effects of NCPB marketing policies on maize 
market prices in Kenya. Agricultural Economics, 38(3), 313-325. 
Jha, S., & Ramaswami, B. (2010). How can food subsidies work better? answers from india and 
the philippines. Answers from India and the Philippines (September 1, 2010). Asian 
Development Bank Economics Working Paper Series, (221). 
Jha, S., & Mehta, A. (2008). Effectiveness of public spending: the case of rice subsidies in the 
Philippines. Asian Development Bank. 
Mason, N. M., & Myers, R. J. (2013). The effects of the Food Reserve Agency on maize market 
prices in Zambia. Agricultural Economics. 
!! 58!
Moya, P. F., Dawe, D., Pabale, D., Tiongco, M., Chien, N. V., Devarajan, S., & Wardana, P. 
(2004). The economics of intensively irrigated rice in Asia. Increasing Productivity of 
Intensive Rice Systems Through Site-Specific Nutrient Management, 586(100), 29. 
Myers, R. J., Piggott, R. R., & Tomek, W. G. (1990). Estimating sources of fluctuations in the 
Australian wool market: an application of VAR methods. Australian Journal of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics, 34(3), 242-262. 
Negassa, A., & Myers, R. J. (2007). Estimating policy effects on spatial market efficiency: An 
extension to the parity bounds model. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 
89(2), 338-352. 
Rufino, C. (2005). The Philippines Inter-Regional Market Integration for Rice. Agricultural 
Distribution, Services, and Trade Project, Bureau of Agricultural Research. 
Saikkonen, P., & Lütkepohl, H. (2000). Testing for the cointegrating rank of a VAR process with 
structural shifts. Journal of business & economic statistics, 18(4), 451-464. 
Shapiro, M., & Watson, M. (1988). Sources of business cycles fluctuations. In NBER 
Macroeconomics Annual 1988, Volume 3 (pp. 111-156). MIT Press. 
Shively, G. E. (1996). Food price variability and economic reform: An ARCH approach for 
Ghana. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 78(1), 126-136. 
Shively, G. E., Martinez, E., & Masters, W. A. (2002). Testing the link between public 
intervention and food price variability: evidence from rice markets in the Philippines. 
Pacific Economic Review, 7(3), 545-554. 
Sims, C. A. (1980). Macroeconomics and reality. Econometrica, 48(1): 1-48. 
Spirtes, P., Glymour, C., & Scheines, R. (2000). Causation, prediction, and search (Vol. 81). 
The MIT Press. 
Subbarao, K., Ahmed, A. U., & Teklu, T. (1996). Selected social safety net programs in the 
Philippines. 
Swanson, N. R., & Granger, C. W. (1997). Impulse response functions based on a causal 
approach to residual orthogonalization in vector autoregressions. Journal of the American 
Statistical Association, 92(437), 357-367. 
Tolentino, B. (2006). Food security and the threat from within: rice policy reforms in the 
Philippines. Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological 
University. 
Umali, D. L., & Duff, B. (1992). The Philippine rice marketing system: implications for grain 
quality improvement. Consumer Demand for Rice Grain Quality: Terminal Report of 
IDRC Projects, National Grain Quality (Asia), and International Grain Quality 
Economics (Asia), 175. 
!! 59!
Unnevehr, L. J. (1985). The costs of squeezing marketing margins: Philippine government 
intervention in rice markets. The Developing Economies, 23(2), 158-172. 
Yao, R. T., Shively, G. E., & Masters, W. A. (2005). How successful are government 
interventions in food markets? Insights from the Philippine Rice Market. Department of 
Agricultural Economics, Purdue University. 
! 60!
3.10 Tables 
 
Table 3.1   Annual Per Capita Consumption of Rice by Region in kilograms, 2008-2009
Region Consumption in Kg Rank
NCR 100.984 16
CAR 131.612 5
Ilocos Region 125.008 8
Cagayan Valley 122.356 11
Central Luzon 123.24 10
CALABARZON 112.736 14
MIMAROPA 136.344 3
Bicol Region 124.28 9
Western Visayas 133.692 4
Central Visayas 95.212 17
Eastern Visayas 127.244 7
Zamboanga Peninsula 109.096 15
Northern Mindanao 115.7 12
Davao Region 113.152 13
SOCCSKSARGEN 136.5 2
Caraga 128.128 6
ARMM 144.664 1
Source: Bureau of Agricultural Statistics, bas.gov.ph
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Table 3.2   Average Palay Area Harvested by Region in hectares, 1990-2012
Region Area Harvested in ha Rank
NCR -                                          17
CAR 96,509.05                                16
Ilocos Region 358,784.11                              4
Cagayan Valley 476,805.53                              3
Central Luzon 587,023.79                              1
CALABARZON 123,158.74                              13
MIMAROPA 250,631.95                              7
Bicol Region 294,060.11                              6
Western Visayas 572,604.32                              2
Central Visayas 97,473.37                                15
Eastern Visayas 236,122.79                              8
Zamboanga Peninsula 141,763.89                              10
Northern Mindanao 138,116.11                              11
Davao Region 104,178.37                              14
SOCCSKSARGEN 312,621.11                              5
Caraga 124,987.16                              12
ARMM 176,354.79                              9
Source: Bureau of Agricultural Statistics, bas.gov.ph
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Region Procurement Distribution
Philippines 4,152,497.00                  26,843,037.00                
NCR -                                  5,681,376.00                  
CAR 34,935.00                       544,756.00                     
Ilocos Region 389,693.00                     2,005,111.00                   
Cagayan Valley 156,478.00                     502,178.00                     
Central Luzon 164,298.00                     2,374,580.00                  
Calabarzon 30,616.00                       1,287,597.00                  
Mimaropa 2,357,274.00                  867,707.00                     
Bicol 430,384.00                     1,729,610.00                  
Western Visayas 392,968.00                     1,146,200.00                  
Central Visayas 980.00                            1,680,593.00                  
Eastern Visayas 19,172.00                       1,388,614.00                  
Zamboanga Peninsula 7,159.00                         1,401,444.00                  
Northern Mindanao 6,787.00                         1,157,195.00                  
Davao Region 283,185.00                     1,846,654.00                  
Soccksargen 85,041.00                       1,074,093.00                  
Caraga 15,340.00                       724,438.00                     
ARMM 54,308.00                       560,146.00                     
Table 3.3  Average Annual Rice Procurement and Distribution by Region, 2000-2012, 
in bags of 50 kilos
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Table 3.4   Summary Statistics of all the Variables used in the study, units and sources
Variable Unit Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Sources
Central Luzon Wholesale Price Php/Kg 277 17.75162 6.351406 7.6 32.75 Bureau of Agricultural Statistics
ARMM Wholesale Price Php/Kg 277 18.17177 6.625161 6.75 31.84 Bureau of Agricultural Statistics
Mimaropa Wholesale Price Php/Kg 277 17.7896 6.781272 6.9 32.5 Bureau of Agricultural Statistics
NCR Wholesale Price Php/Kg 277 17.82762 6.587463 7.57 35.29 Bureau of Agricultural Statistics
World Price of Rice Php/Kg 277 13.65201 7.559923 4.99618 43.30185
Central Bank of the Philippines 
(Exchange Rate), 
Indexmundi.com (World Price)
NFA Selling Price Php/Kg 277 14.40751 4.532838 6.25 25 National Food Authority
NFA Buying Price Php/Kg 277 12.9235 5.062905 4.82 56.34 National Food Authority
NFA Selling Premium - 277 -5.068159 4.765 -20.74 -0.2 National Food Authority
NFA Buying Premium - 277 2.843863 5.674427 -7.31 47.32 National Food Authority
Wet Season Dummy - 277 0.66787 0.4718298 0 1
Dry Season Dummy - 277 0.33213 0.4718298 0 1
Description from Philippine 
Atmospheric, Geophysical and 
Astronomical Services 
Administration
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Market
Including 
Constant and 
Trend
Including 
Constant but No 
Trend
Excluding both 
Constant and 
Trend
Central Luzon Wholesale Price U U U
ARMM Wholesale Price U U U
Mimaropa Wholesale Price U U U
NCR Wholesale Price U U U
World Price U U U
NFA Buying Premium U U U
NFA Selling Premium U U U
diff Central Luzon Wholesale Price S S S
diff ARMM Wholesale Price S S S
diff Mimaropa Wholesale Price S S S
diff NCR Wholesale Price S S S
diff World Price S S S
diff NFA Buying Premium S S S
diff NFA Selling Premium S S S
ln Central Luzon Wholesale Price S U U
ln ARMM Wholesale Price S U U
ln Mimaropa Wholesale Price S U U
ln NCR Wholesale Price S U U
ln World Price S U U
ln NFA Buying Premium S U U
ln NFA Selling Premium S U U
diff ln Central Luzon Wholesale Price S S S
diff ln ARMM Wholesale Price S S S
diff ln Mimaropa Wholesale Price S S S
diff ln NCR Wholesale Price S S S
diff ln World Price S S S
diff ln NFA Buying Premium S S S
diff ln NFA Selling Premium S S S
U indicates unit root, S is stationary
Table 3.5   Stationarity Summary of Variables used in the Study
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Table 3.6   VAR model Evaluation of Residuals
Test Central Luzon ARMM Mimaropa NCR World Buy Premium Sell Premium
- AR(2) 0.2094 0.15062 0.13834 0.59959 0.04879 0.43935 0.12646
(0.9006) (0.9275) (0.9332) (0.7410) (0.9759) (0.8028) (0.9387)
- AR(4) 0.32003 0.4418 0.54664 0.89581 3.2896 6.162 0.18008
(0.9885) (0.9787) (0.9688) (0.9252) (0.5106) (0.1874) (0.9962)
- AR(6) 0.86624 6.6022 7.9957 3.635 10.687 18.782 2.2757
(0.9902) (0.3592) (0.2384) (0.7259) (0.986) (0.1145) (0.8927)
- ARCH (2) 7.4577** 9.584*** 2.5287 5.2486 8.611*** 7.0376** 0.04346
(0.0240) (0.001) (1.00) (1.00) (0.000) (0.0296) (0.9785)
- ARCH (4) 7.5345 2.727 2.6952 5.7616 6.344 7.0842 0.12145
(0.1102) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (0.1315) (0.9982)
- ARCH (6) 7.5612 3.4563 2.737 6.1763 3.966 7.3354 0.1412
(0.2720) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (0.2909) (0.999)
Notes: The AR (ARCH) residual tests are Ljung-Box Q tests for the relevant order autocorrelation in the residuals (squared residuals) of the series.
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VARIABLES d.Central Luzon d.ARMM d.Mimaropa d.NCR d.World d.BuyPremium d.SellPremium
L.d.Central Luzon -0.356*** -0.0927 -0.0167 0.0161 0.0846 0.704 -0.101
(0.084) (0.076) (0.064) (0.093) (0.147) (0.654) (0.121)
L2.d.Central Luzon -0.105 -0.0686 0.0121 -0.0862 0.0313 0.486 -0.0333
(0.089) (0.080) (0.068) (0.098) (0.155) (0.692) (0.127)
L3.d.Central Luzon -0.0357 0.161** 0.0569 -0.137 0.07 1.383** -0.147
(0.087) (0.078) (0.067) (0.096) (0.152) (0.678) (0.125)
L4.d.Central Luzon -0.132 -0.086 -0.0772 -0.0763 0.00763 0.772 -0.0329
(0.084) (0.076) (0.064) (0.093) (0.147) (0.656) (0.121)
L.d.ARMM -0.0097 -0.00792 -0.0204 -0.104 -0.196 -0.99 -0.0456
(0.083) (0.075) (0.064) (0.092) (0.146) (0.651) (0.120)
L2.d.ARMM 0.018 -0.11 0.0265 0.0242 -0.182 1.283** 0.0682
(0.082) (0.074) (0.063) (0.091) (0.144) (0.642) (0.118)
L3.d.ARMM -0.123 0.0811 0.0719 -0.0596 -0.0028 -0.377 -0.174
(0.082) (0.074) (0.063) (0.091) (0.143) (0.639) (0.118)
L4.d.ARMM 0.13 -0.0733 -0.00535 0.0925 0.015 0.697 -0.0504
(0.084) (0.075) (0.064) (0.093) (0.146) (0.653) (0.120)
L.d.Mimaropa 0.132 0.097 -0.0509 -0.0409 -0.259 0.359 0.0479
(0.113) (0.102) (0.087) (0.126) (0.199) (0.887) (0.163)
L2.d.Mimaropa -0.039 -0.0584 -0.0397 0.0464 -0.147 -0.184 -0.134
(0.110) (0.100) (0.085) (0.122) (0.193) (0.861) (0.159)
L3.d.Mimaropa 0.0282 -0.0748 -0.176** 0.1 0.222 -0.432 0.123
(0.106) (0.096) (0.081) (0.117) (0.186) (0.827) (0.152)
L4.d.Mimaropa -0.289*** -0.00611 -0.115 -0.18 -0.232 0.12 0.198
(0.100) (0.090) (0.077) (0.111) (0.175) (0.781) (0.144)
L.d.NCR 0.418*** 0.196*** 0.333*** 0.134* 0.510*** -0.823 -0.116
(0.071) (0.064) (0.055) (0.079) (0.125) (0.558) (0.103)
L2.d.NCR -0.0797 0.00396 -0.071 -0.192** -0.303** -0.98 0.0955
(0.078) (0.070) (0.060) (0.086) (0.136) (0.608) (0.112)
L3.d.NCR 0.0661 -0.0703 -0.0485 -0.0083 0.0534 -1.018* -0.0707
(0.078) (0.070) (0.060) (0.087) (0.137) (0.610) (0.112)
L4.d.NCR 0.0731 0.0626 0.0522 -0.118 -0.0718 -0.676 0.155
(0.078) (0.071) (0.060) (0.087) (0.137) (0.611) (0.113)
Table 3.7   VAR Results with Seasonal Dummies
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VARIABLES d.Central Luzon d.ARMM d.Mimaropa d.NCR d.World d.BuyPremium d.SellPremium
L.d.World 0.130*** 0.0661* 0.0595* 0.111** 0.460*** -0.167 -0.114*
(0.041) (0.037) (0.031) (0.045) (0.072) (0.319) (0.059)
L2.d.World 0.134*** 0.140*** 0.0805** 0.182*** -0.136* 0.143 -0.0743
(0.043) (0.039) (0.033) (0.047) (0.075) (0.333) (0.061)
L3.d.World 0.0127 0.0433 0.0317 0.0203 -0.198*** -0.229 -0.136**
(0.044) (0.039) (0.034) (0.048) (0.077) (0.341) (0.063)
L4.d.World 0.0732* 0.0461 0.0406 0.0604 0.175** -0.144 0.0411
(0.043) (0.039) (0.033) (0.048) (0.075) (0.335) (0.062)
L.d.BuyPremium -0.0136 -0.00314 -0.00904 -0.0162* -0.0153 -0.595*** 0.000474
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.015) (0.065) (0.012)
L2.d.BuyPremium -0.0180* -0.000719 0.00119 -0.00823 0.00277 -0.439*** -0.00209
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.011) (0.017) (0.074) (0.014)
L3.d.BuyPremium -0.0145* -2.33E-03 -4.30E-03 -0.00898 -0.00882 -0.242*** 0.0135
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.016) (0.073) (0.014)
L4.d.BuyPremium -0.0148* -8.35E-04 3.17E-04 -0.0124 -0.00908 -0.140** 0.0054
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.014) (0.064) (0.012)
L.d.SellPremium 0.0489 0.0339 -0.0136 -0.0192 -0.00761 -0.397 -0.0632
(0.050) (0.045) (0.038) (0.055) (0.087) (0.388) (0.072)
L2.d.SellPremium -0.0114 0.00431 -0.0672* 0.00702 -0.0826 -0.142 0.0067
(0.049) (0.045) (0.038) (0.055) (0.087) (0.386) (0.071)
L3.d.SellPremium 0.0128 0.0996** 0.0552 -0.00108 0.00435 -0.404 -0.142**
(0.049) (0.044) (0.038) (0.054) (0.086) (0.383) (0.071)
L4.d.SellPremium 0.0287 -0.0217 -0.0117 0.0639 0.104 -0.00225 0.0143
(0.049) (0.045) (0.038) (0.055) (0.087) (0.386) (0.071)
wetseason_dummy -0.0845 -0.00556 -0.247*** -0.267** -0.113 1.054 0.086
(0.102) (0.092) (0.078) (0.113) (0.178) (0.795) (0.147)
Constant 0.116 0.0645 0.227*** 0.270*** 0.155 -0.762 -0.0554
(0.083) (0.075) (0.064) (0.092) (0.146) (0.651) (0.120)
Observations 272 272 272 272 272 272 272
R-squared 0.3846 0.2933 0.4181 0.2955 0.3288 0.3124 0.2262
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively
Continued Table 3.7   VAR Results with Seasonal Dummies
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Table 3.8    Summary of NFA Effects on Central Luzon and ARMM wholesale rice prices
Historical Simulated % difference Historical Simulated % difference
Mean 17.83 18.01 -1.00% 18.29 18.45 -0.85%
Standard Deviation 6.33 6.47 -2.26% 6.53 6.67 -2.05%
Coefficient of Variation 35.48% 35.94% -1.28% 35.69% 36.13% -1.21%
Historical Simulated % difference Historical Simulated % difference
Mean 17.90 18.18 -1.56% 17.97 18.24 -1.49%
Standard Deviation 6.72 6.81 -1.24% 6.49 6.59 -1.50%
Coefficient of Variation 37.57% 37.45% 0.32% 36.10% 36.10% -0.01%
Central Luzon Prices ARMM Prices
Mimaropa Prices NCR Prices
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3.11 Figures 
Figure 3.1   Monthly NFA Buying Prices and Selling Prices for 1990-2013 
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Figure 3.2   Monthly Rice Wholesale Prices for Central Luzon, ARMM, Mimaropa and NCR, 1990-2013 
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Figure 3.3    Contemporaneous Correlations Identified by the DAG 
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Figure 3.4   Impulse Response Functions 
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Figure 3.5   Historical and Simulated (No NFA) Prices for Central Luzon 
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Figure 3.6   Historical and Simulated (No NFA) Prices for ARMM 
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Figure 3.7   Historical and Simulated (No NFA) Prices for Mimaropa 
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Figure 3.8   Historical and Simulated (No NFA) Prices for NCR 
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Figure 3.9   Percentage differences of the historical and simulated prices (ln historical/ln simulated) 
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Chapter 4 
IMPACT OF THE WHEAT AND RICE EXPORT BAN ON INDIAN 
 MARKET INTEGRATION 
 
4.1 Introduction  
In response to the dramatic increase in world grain prices in 2007 and 2008, many 
governments restricted exports to ensure sufficient domestic food supplies (Abbott, 2009; Abbott, 
2010). In 2007, India, one of the world’s largest grain exporters, banned exports of wheat and 
some varieties of rice, lifting the ban only four years later in September 2011 (Chand, 2009 and 
Chand et al, 2010). While a few papers explore the effect of export bans on world commodity 
prices (Gotz, Glauben and Brummer 2010; Abbott 2010; Liefert et al 2012; Martin and Anderson 
2012; Welton 2011; Djuric 2009 and 2011), I empirically estimate how the Indian export ban 
affected not only the integration of the domestic market and the world market but the integration 
within the domestic market. Understanding the spatial effects of an export ban can better inform 
countries of the true costs and benefits of this form of blunt trade instrument on their own 
markets. 
For domestic producers to benefit from international trade, markets need to be both open 
and spatially integrated (Gonzales-Rivera and Helfand, 2001; Asche, Bremnes and Wessells, 
1999; Sexton, King and Carmen, 1991; Ravallion, 1986). In an integrated spatial market, prices 
are determined simultaneously in different locations (Liu, 2003).  Large price spreads induce 
product movement from one location to another. However, in the absence of spatial market 
integration, price information may be conveyed inaccurately distorting decisions of economic 
agents, which could lead to inefficient product movements. In agriculture, geographic markets 
are relevant because most agricultural products are either bulky or perishable. Areas of 
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production and consumption are generally separated; hence, large transaction costs exist. Thus, it 
is useful to know if and how government market interventions affect market integration and thus 
the efficiency of domestic markets. 
Both wheat and rice are important grains for India. India is second largest producer of 
rice in the world accounting for 20% of world supply and the third largest producer of wheat 
accounting for 12% of world supply (Cagliarni and Rush, 2011). In terms of consumption, rice is 
the staple for the eastern and southern parts of the country while wheat is the staple for the 
northern parts of the country (Cagliarni and Rush, 2011). Because of the important role of these 
grains in local consumption and household food security, the Indian government has traditionally 
intervened when domestic markets face large price increases.  
Countries impose export bans to insulate the domestic price from international price 
volatility and ensure availability in the domestic market at a lower than world price. Along with 
exacerbating the increase in world prices, export bans may have unintended consequences for the 
domestic market, such as increasing domestic price volatility due to the inability of the world 
market to mitigate against short run supply shocks and exacerbating existing market 
inefficiencies (Welton, 2011). If commodities cannot move freely within the country, export 
restrictions may increase price differentials (Porteous, 2012).   
Furthermore, Indian agriculture is highly regulated by production and consumption 
subsidies, minimum export prices and domestic trade restrictions (Acharya et al., 2002; Kubo, 
2011).  According to Kubo (2011), given the already limited efficiency of domestic agricultural 
markets within India, the export ban might have further exacerbated market distortions.  
In the case of India, the impacts of the export ban might differ between the two crops. 
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Prior to the 2007 export ban for wheat, the level of wheat exports was already quite low due to 
India’s stagnant wheat yield and declining planted acres from 1996 to 2006. As a result, the 
Indian government actively imported wheat to slow the rising domestic prices in the wake of a 
production shortfall and widespread hoarding by traders (Western Australia Trade Office). The 
government even reduced the import tariff on wheat to zero to encourage the private sector to 
import wheat.  Appendix Figure C4 presents imports and exports vis-à-vis wheat production 
from 1996-2013. Thus, there was a reversal of trade flows for wheat prior to the ban, raising the 
question of whether the ban was, in fact, binding.  Conversely, rice was actively being exported 
right up to the moment of the ban.   
Several authors find that market liberalization generally increases market integration 
(Goleti and Babu, 1994 for Malawi; Dercon, 1995 for Ethiopia; Alexander and Wyeth 1994 for 
Indonesia). Welton (2011) explicitly considers the effect of an export ban on domestic prices and 
price volatility in the case of Russia. Using a detailed description of the ban and following 
market changes, Welton (2011) finds that traders stored grain in expectation of the lifting of the 
ban, limiting the ban’s immediate effect on domestic grain prices. Eventually, a supply response 
led to a sharp fall in domestic price and widened the price gap between domestic and world 
markets, prompting the government to end the ban. Thus, the Russian export ban led to short run 
price increases in both the domestic market and world market, and did not successfully isolate 
the domestic price from the world price in the short run (Welton, 2011).  
Few studies analyze the Indian export ban, and those that do are largely descriptive and 
do not use extensive data (Woolverton and Kiawu, 2009; Dorosh, 2008; Slayton, 2009, Abbott, 
2010; Martin and Anderson, 2011; Liefert, Westcott and Wainio, 2011; Clarkson and Kulkarmi, 
2012). While Acharya et al. (2002) use farmgate and retail prices for several markets in India to 
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quantitatively analyze the extent of price transmission for rice and wheat, the paper only uses a 
special reference to the world food crisis of 2007/08 and not the ban per se. They find that while 
domestic prices did increase during the global food crisis, the increase was considerably less than 
the increase in the world prices.  
In this paper, I ask three research questions: What effect did the Indian export ban have 
on the integration of domestic markets with the world market? What effect did the export ban 
have on the integration within the domestic market? Did the export ban worsen the price effects 
of domestic supply shocks?  I see several contributions of the paper.  First, I analyze the effect of 
the export ban not just on the integration of the Indian market with the international market but 
integration among domestic markets. Not only do I differentiate between producing states and 
consuming states, I also consider the major port areas, which I expect to be most affected by an 
export ban.  Given that other authors have found little market integration within India (Mallory 
and Baylis 2012; Sekhar, 2012), I want to differentiate and test for those markets most likely to 
be integrated with world prices. Second, unlike Acharya et al (2012) I develop a theoretical 
model to predict the effect of an export ban on price transmission, which incorporates trading 
regimes and discontinuity. Finally, I also test for the effects of domestic supply shocks on 
domestic prices during the export ban period. To my knowledge, this paper is one of the first to 
econometrically explore the domestic market effect of an export ban. 
I begin by modifying a simple model of spatial price transmission from Fackler and 
Goodwin (2001), and deriving several testable hypotheses about the effect of the ban. I use a 
linear vector error correction model as a baseline analysis of spatial market relationships. Then I 
extend the linear framework by testing for thresholds. 
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A summary of my findings are as follows: 
 (1) The majority of port markets for rice and wheat are not integrated with the world market 
during the export ban, whereas a majority of port markets for rice and wheat are integrated with 
the world market during the open trade period. Moreover, thresholds between port markets and 
the world market increase during the export restriction. The increase in the price thresholds 
imply that transaction costs rose between the two markets when exports were restricted.  
(2) Fewer port markets are integrated with domestic consuming markets for rice during the 
export restrictions, than during the open trade period. However, I find the opposite effect for 
wheat, where a greater number of domestic consuming and port markets are integrated during 
export restrictions. A plausible reason for this counterintuitive finding is that India actively 
imported wheat from 1996-2006 (Western Australia Trade Office, 2012).  
(3) Fewer producing and consuming market pairs are integrated during the export restrictions as 
compared to the open trading period, and more producing and port markets pairs are integrated 
for both crops. This result is in contrast to my hypothesis. Furthermore, wheat thresholds 
between producing and consuming regions switch signs. Thus, a plausible cause for the 
unanticipated result in wheat producing and consuming markets is that production even in the 
supply regions was sufficiently low that they needed to import grains. This result is consistent 
with our finding for wheat for hypothesis 2 that consuming wheat markets became more 
integrated with port markets.  On the other hand, the decrease in integration between consumer 
and producer markets and increase in integration between port and producer markets in rice can 
possibly be explained by active storage.  
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(4) Price differences between markets might be worsened due to the inability of the world market 
to mitigate against domestic supply shocks during the export ban. I also test for the impacts of 
domestic supply shocks on domestic market prices. I find that more producing and consuming 
markets have significant domestic supply shock effects when the export restrictions are in place 
compared to when it is not imposed.  
4.2 Overview of India’s Food Policy and Export Market  
India faces long-run problems of domestic malnutrition and household food insecurity. In 
2011, India has 224.6 million inhabitants who are undernourished (FAO-SOFI, 2011) and has 
one of the highest rates of child stunting in the world (Cagliarni and Rush, 2011). Concerns with 
food insecurity have led the Indian government to be heavily involved in domestic agricultural 
markets.  
India’s government food policy consists of two pillars: (1) government procurement of 
staple crops from farmers and (2) public distribution of these crops (Dorosh, 2009). The 
government directly purchases unmilled rice or wheat from farmers or traders at organized 
wholesale markets called mandis. In theory, the Food Corporation of India (FCI) and the 
procurement arms of state governments will purchase an infinite amount of paddy or wheat at the 
minimum support price (MSP), as long as the grain satisfies a minimum standard called “fair 
average quality (FAQ)”. The MSP is set by the Ministry of Agriculture each year based on 
recommendations by the Commission on Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP) based on a cost-
plus basis using cost-of-cultivation estimates obtained through farm surveys. The government 
then distributes grain through the Public Distribution System (PDS) selling the milled grain at 
government run Fair Price Shops at Central Issued Prices (CIP). The government withholds some 
! 84!
stocks of grain from the market as a buffer for food security. 
In early 2000, agricultural policy was liberalized in India, including reforms in 2002 that 
improved mobility of grains across state lines. However, the trend toward liberalization reversed 
when global prices rose. The reported domestic wheat stock on July 1, 2006 was only 8.2 million 
tons, less than half of the 17 million ton norm. In that same month, the Indian government 
increased the level of grain procurement and distributed higher quantities of subsidized rice and 
wheat to the Fair Price Shops (Chand et al, 2010). To further enhance domestic supply in 
September 2006, the government reduced the import tariff on wheat to zero and the private 
sector was encouraged to import wheat.   
In February 2007, the government placed an export ban on wheat (Acharya et al, 2012). 
[See Figure 1 for the timeline of the wheat policy.] The government also increased the MSP for 
wheat and began to actively import wheat. These efforts only increased the wheat stock slightly; 
so that by July 1, 2007 wheat stocks were still 4.2 million tons below the July 1 norm (Dorosh, 
2009).  
India also placed an export ban on non-basmati (ordinary) rice on October 9, 2007 [see 
Figure 2 for rice policy timeline]. Though the ban was lifted on October 31, 2007, it was 
replaced with a minimum export price13 (MEP) of $425 per ton (Sharma, 2011). The MEP was 
subsequently raised and the export ban on non-basmati rice was reinstated on April 1, 2008 
(Dorosh, 2009). In addition, on March 8, 2008, the month prior to the reinstatement of the non-
basmati export ban, basmati rice’s MEP was raised to $950/ton. Several adjustments were made !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!13!Under a MEP, no export is allowed below the set minimum price. The MEP is often used together with an export tax. A low 
MEP may have little effect on domestic supplies in an implementing country and a very high MEP may result in an export ban. 
Some countries prefer an MEP to an outright export ban for revenue reasons when world prices are surging as well as to prevent 
under invoicing (Dorosh, 2009).  
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and the restrictive MEP for basmati rice continued as well (Sharma, 2011).  Due to the export 
ban and government’s active procurement, government’s rice stocks grew dramatically, and by 
mid-2009 they were more than twice as large as the norm (Kubo, 2012). In July 2010 
newspapers reported large amounts of rice and wheat rotting in FCIs storage facilities (Kubo, 
2012). Despite these high stocks, the non-basmati rice export ban and wheat ban were not lifted 
until July 19, 2011 (Director General of Foreign trade, India government 201214). 
Because export ban imposition was not continuous, in this paper, I focus on export 
restrictions period instead, which started on February 2007 for wheat and October 2007 for rice. 
I examine domestic market integration prior and during the export restrictions period. 
4.3 Data 
I analyze domestic impacts of the export ban by using weekly data for major markets in 
producing states, major retail centers in consuming states and markets in major ports cities for 
rice and wheat as summarized in Table 4.1a. To capture crucial supply, consumption, and export 
regions, I select three primary wholesale market centers that supply 35-40% of the rice and 
wheat to major urban centers in India (Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and Haryana for Wheat; West 
Bengal, Andrha Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh for Rice).  Density maps for major producing states 
are presented in Appendix Figure C1. I also choose major urban centers for each crop (Delhi, 
Mumbai and Kolkata for rice and Delhi, Mumbai and Patna for wheat) to take into account the 
effect of the ban on end consumers. Last, I choose three major ports listed on the 2005 India port 
report (I-maritime Research). Map of the major ports is presented in Appendix Figure C2. I also 
substituted closest markets due to data availability. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 http://www.aec-fncci.org/index.php?page=news&NewsID=110; http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-
business/Govt-lifts-ban-on-wheat-exports-Sharad-Pawar/articleshow/9246520.cms!
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I use local prices from January 2003 to December 2013 from AgMarkNet15, and the 
Department of Agriculture website16. For the missing price data, I follow the multiple imputation 
procedure using the Amelia R Package17 as in!Mallory and Baylis (2012). Percentages of missing 
observations are also summarized in Table 4.1b. 
Amelia performs multiple imputation, a general purpose approach to data with missing 
values. Multiple imputation has been shown to reduce bias and increase efficiency compared to 
listwise deletion and mean imputation. List-wise deletion requires one to delete an entire row of 
data even if only one data point is missing and thus could discard much valuable data. On the 
other hand, linearly interpolating or using mean conditional distribution can reduce the variance 
of the resulting sample thereby affecting inference (Friedman, 1962; King at al., 2001). Multiple 
imputation generates m completed datasets making random draws from the conditional 
distribution over the missing data. It also allows for smooth time trends and correlations across 
time and space (Honaker and King, 2010). The m completed datasets are the same for the 
observed data points, but the missing data are replaced by draws from the posterior density and 
hence incorporate the relevant level of uncertainty associated with those data points. Detailed 
graphs for observed and imputed values from Amelia are presented in Appendix Figure C3. 
To analyze price transmission from international to domestic markets, I use the weekly 
world price for rice (Thai rice 5% broken18) and wheat (US, No. 2 HRW wheat) from FAO 
Economic and Social Division19. Using the prevailing Indian Rupee-ME $ exchange rate from 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 AgMarkNet is the website of the Indian Ministry of Agriculture, http://agmarknet.nic.in/ 
16 Retail Price Info System, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, http://rpms.dacnet.nic.in/ 
17 http://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/Amelia/citation.html 18!Thai rice positively correlates with Vietnam rice prices. Overall sample correlation is 95.41% and correlation during the export 
restriction period is 90.86%. 
19 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). 2013. Economic and Social Development Statistics Division, 
http://www.fao.org/es/esc/prices 
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the Oanda weekly average exchange rates20, world prices were converted to Indian Rupee per 
kilo equivalents. The weekly nominal price series were logarithmically transformed.  
I also include rainfall data from the Indian Department of Meteorology for years 2005-
2013 and Central Statistical Organization for years 2003 and 2004 to accommodate induced 
supply shocks in my analysis. Table 4.2 below summarizes the variables used, summary statistics 
and data sources. Figures 4.3-4.8 depict monthwise domestic price movements for the selected 
markets in Table 1 vis-à-vis world price and export quantities. 
4.4 Conceptual Model for Empirical Strategy and Hypotheses  
A simple theoretical model predicts the effect of an export ban on price transmission.  I 
begin by dividing India’s grain market landscape into three regions: a supply region (S) with 
local price Ps, a domestic consumption region (C) with local price Pc, and an export region (X) 
with local price Px.  The export region can be thought of as the area around the major ports.   
From the port market, grains are sold into the world market (W), where they receive price 
Pw.  The cost to move grain domestically, from the supply region to either the consumption or 
export region, is τd.  The cost of exporting grain from the port to the world market is τw, where τw 
includes the monetary value of any export restrictions.  
In this paper, I follow Porteous (2012) and model export ban as an increase in trade cost. 
My focus is on price differences rather than prices themselves in analyzing the mechanics of how 
these policies actually affect agricultural markets while avoiding potential endogeneity issues. 
Drawing on the spatial price analysis literature, I develop a theoretical model to show how export 
bans affect the total trade costs (unobservables) and how total trade costs determine price !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Oanda Average Exchange Rates, http//www.oanda.com/currency/average!
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differences (observables) across different markets. I argue that the timing of the export ban is 
plausibly exogenous to price differences. The Indian grain market landscape is illustrated in 
Figure 4.9. 
A trader in a producing region can chose to sell to the domestic market or to the port 
market, where he will receive Pc less per unit domestic transaction costs d, or Px less per unit 
transaction costs d, respectively. The trader in a producing region will chose quantities to sell 
to each market to maximize their profit: 
Π qct,qxt( ) = Pc,t+kqct +Px,t+ jqxt −τ dqct −τ dqxt  (4.1a) 
Where qct is the quantity sold in the domestic market and qxt is the quantity sold in the port 
market at time t  and ktiP +,  is the price received upon delivery in market i , k periods after t. 
On the other hand, a trader in an port region can chose to sell to the domestic market or to 
the world market, where he will receive Px less per unit domestic transaction costs d, or Pw less 
per unit transaction costs d + w, respectively. The trader in a port region will chose quantities 
to sell to each market to maximize their expected profit: 
Π qct,qwt( ) = Pc,t+kqct +Pw,t+ jqwt −τ dqct − (τ d +τ w )qwt  (4.1b) 
Where qct is the quantity sold in the port market and qwt is the quantity sold in the world 
market at time t  and ktiP +,  is the price received upon delivery in market i , k periods after t.  
Taking first order conditions, the trader will chose the quantities to sell by equalizing the 
marginal profit in each market.  In general, for any market pair, a and b, they will set the 
expected difference in discounted prices net of transaction costs to zero: 
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Et = Pa,t+k −Pb,t+ j +τ a→b{ }= 0      (4.2) 
where τ a→b  is the total trade cost of moving the good from market a to b. The above 
relation implies that the difference in the prices for two markets is simply the cost of transporting 
the good (Fackler and Goodwin, 2001). The relationship in equation (4.2) relates to the Law of 
One Price model, which postulates that allowing for transporting cost τ , transporting 
commodity between two markets, the relationship between the prices is as follows: 
Pbt = Pat +τ        (4.3) 
Following Baulch (1997) and Barret and Li (2002), I recognize that there may be 
different possible trading regimes and/or discontinuities based on relative magnitude of actual 
observed price difference, unobserved trade costs and domestic shocks. For any two market pairs, 
a and b, trading regimes are illustrated in equation (4.4). 
Pbt −Pat = τ +ε
Case 1: Pbt −Pat = τ +ε                Perfect Integration
Case 2: Pbt −Pat < τ +ε            No incentive to trade
Case 3: Pbt −Pat > τ +ε                  Incentive to trade
"
#
$$
%
$
$     
        (4.4) 
 In case 1, markets exhibit perfect market integration. In other words, the grain is tradable 
between two markets and the price increases one for one with an increase in trade costs. In case 2, 
there is no incentive to trade because the price difference between the markets is smaller than the 
trade costs. In this case, prices are determined by local supply and demand, and price differences 
are unaffected by changes in trade costs. In case 3, the price difference is greater than the trade 
cost, thus it signals positive marginal profits to spatial arbitrage. For cases 1 and 3, the 
relationship between the trade costs and price differences is straightforward. Traders transport 
the grains according to expected price differences, but production shocks may cause those price 
! 90!
differences to be larger or smaller; that is the error term maybe greater than or less than zero 
(ε > 0 or ε<0) . In case 2, when there is no incentive to trade, price movements between markets 
and within the transaction cost will be most likely unrelated. In other words, the markets will not 
be integrated. 
Significant anecdotal evidence indicates that the Indian national border was porous even 
during the export ban, and export bans were never completely enforced over time (Kubo, 2011; 
Dorosh, 2009). Therefore, I expect the primary effect of the export ban to be reflected in prices at 
the port, where Px should drop by the change inτ w . Thus, the export ban increases the price 
difference between the world and the domestic markets.  Given that prices include a stochastic 
component, this increased price wedge may lead to lack of market integration between world 
market and port markets. From this discussion, I obtain my first hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: Fewer world and domestic market pairs exhibit integration during the export ban. 
Further, if the market pair exhibits threshold integration before and after the ban, the threshold 
will be larger when export ban is in place than when it is not in place. 
Next, I explore how the ban might differentially affect prices within India.  Assume that 
grain movement takes time, and that at the moment the export ban was imposed, some grain is 
sitting at port.  The value of this stored grain is determined by the world price less the cost of 
exporting, Pw – w, and therefore the value of stored grain decreases with the imposition of the 
export ban given that I view export ban as an increase in transaction cost.  Moving this grain to 
the domestic consumption region is not costless, and a trader will only ship the grain today if the 
expected price in the domestic market less the domestic cost of moving grain is higher than the 
expected discounted future world price less future export cost.  Thus, the grain will only move if: 
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As is the case of the Russian export ban on wheat, a trader may have the incentive to 
store the grain at the port instead of moving it to the domestic market if they expect the export 
ban to be lifted in the near future.  At a minimum, the price in the consuming region has to be 
d higher than the price at the port, Px to induce the movement of grain from port.  Thus, if grain 
movement takes time and prices are uncertain, the export ban may make domestic market prices 
more ‘sticky’. Moreover, ifd is low enough to cause influx of supply in the domestic 
consuming market, I expect it to drive down Pc, but perhaps not to the same degree as it affects 
prices in the port market, Px.  Thus, the export ban increases the price difference between the port 
markets and domestic consuming markets, which will result in their lack of market integration.   
Hypothesis 2: Fewer port markets and domestic consuming market pairs will be integrated 
during the export ban. Further, if the market pair exhibits threshold integration before and after 
the ban, the threshold will be larger when export ban is in place than when it is not in place. 
After the imposition of the export ban, farmers will be less likely to ship grain to the ports 
with the increase in trade costs, making the domestic market their primary sales outlet.   
Hypothesis 3: When the export ban is in place, more producing and consuming market pairs will 
be integrated, and less producing markets and port markets will be integrated. For market pairs 
which exhibit threshold integration before and after the ban, the threshold between producing 
and consuming market pairs will be smaller and the threshold between producing and port 
markets will be larger when export ban is in place than when it is not in place. 
The amount of rainfall is significantly correlated with agricultural production in India 
(Cagliarni and Rush, 2011) as seen in Figure 4.10. Gulati et al. (2013) and Bhattacharya et al. 
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(2011), both emphasize domestic supply shocks through droughts and deficient rainfalls as one 
of the most important variables affecting food price inflation in India. 
Hypothesis 4: When the export ban is in place, more domestic producing and consuming 
markets will have significant domestic production shocks coefficients than when it is not in place. 
4.5 Methods 
 The estimation strategy can be summarized as follows: First, because the paper aims to 
test for impacts of the export ban and the export ban was not continuous, I divide the data into 
two periods: export restrictions period (ER) and open trade period (OT). I call it export 
restrictions period to take into account other trade policy changes during the export ban period 
(i.e. wheat export quotas for month of July 2009 and rice minimum export prices for months of 
November 2008-March 2009). On the other hand, the open trade period covers the weeks prior to 
the imposition of the ban21. However, for wheat, since exports are significantly reduced even 
before the export ban was in place (see Figure 4.1 and Appendix Table C3), I redefine export 
restrictions period as “effective” export restrictions period. So that open trade period for wheat 
includes weeks in between January 2003 to July 2005 and export restrictions period includes 
weeks in between August 2005 to August 2011. On the other hand, open trade period for rice 
includes weeks in between January 2003 to September 2007 and export restrictions period 
includes weeks in between October 2007 to August 2011. These cutoffs are based on timeline of 
export restrictions based on several publications and compilation of news articles (Appendix C1) 
and what I deem is “effective” export restrictions period for wheat (Figure 2.1 and Appendix 
Table C3).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!21!The!post3ban!period!is!too!small!to!allow!empirical!analysis.!
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 Second, I generate all possible market pairs for each crop (producing and consuming 
market pairs, producing and port market pairs, port and consuming market pairs, and port and 
world market pairs). The pairing results into 30 market pairs per crop. 
 Third, I perform both the linear and threshold cointegration tests for each market pair 
and synthesize the cointegration results by reporting the number of market pairs that were 
cointegrated. This was the most sensible way of presenting results from over 100 cointegration 
tests. In addition, I compare the thresholds estimates for market pairs which exhibit thresholds in 
both periods. 
 Finally, I compare the coefficients’ significance of domestic production shock effects 
for ER and OT periods. Similar to integration results, I synthesize the result by reporting the 
number of producing and consuming markets with significant domestic supply shock effects. 
4.5.1 Domestic Market Integration 
  I test my first, second and third hypotheses using market integration framework. In 
order to determine whether the market price series are stationary, standard Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) unit root tests are used. I test for linear cointegration between markets price pairs 
using Johansen cointegration model. The tests were carried out for all possible market pairs.  
 Let pt = p1, p2( ) '  be a two-dimensional vector of price series for a price pair p1  and p2 . 
The linear Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) of order l+1 can be written as follows: 
Δpt = µ +αwt−1 + ΓiΔpt−i +ut
i=1
l
∑   (4.6) 
 where Et−1 ut( ) = 0 .  The long run relationship is defined as  
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wt = 1−β( ) pt = p1 −β p2   (4.7) 
 which is stationary as discussed by Engle and Granger (1987). The term wt−1  represents 
the error correction term obtained from the estimated long-term relationship between the two 
price series.   If β =1 , the long run relationship implies a one-to-one responses between the two 
price series. The mean-reverting behavior depends on the adjustment vector α  in the linear 
VECM. If it is close to 0, the equilibrium error is likely to be persistent. The parameters are 
estimated by maximum likelihood under the assumption that errors ut  are iid Gaussian. I use the 
Johansen test to test the null hypothesis that there are at most r cointegration vectors in the 
system. 
 The concept of threshold cointegration was introduced by Balke and Fomby (1997) as a 
way of combining cointegration and non-linearity.  In this paper, I use Hansen and Seo’s (2002) 
bivariate two-regime, threshold vector error-correction model (TVECM) to test for non-linear 
cointegration among all market pairs. The two-regime TVECM allows one to characterize a 
trading environment in which trade between spatially separated markets only occurs when 
relative prices exceed some level of transaction costs. As in equation (4.4), trading regimes occur 
based on the relative magnitude of actual observed price differences and unobserved trade costs.  
 The representation of the VECM with a two-regime threshold is given as: 
Δpt =
µ1 +α1wt−1 + Γ1iΔpt−i +ut
i=1
l
∑     if    wt−1 ≤ τˆ
µ2 +α2wt−1 + Γ2iΔpt−i +ut
i=1
l
∑     if    wt−1 > τˆ
&
'
(
(
)
(
(
  (4.8) 
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  The coefficient matrices α1  and α2  relates to the dynamics in the regimes.  Values of 
the error correction term wt−1  could either be above or below the threshold parameter, τˆ . 
Except for the cointegrating parameter β , the system allows all coefficients including wt−1  to 
switch between the regimes.  
 Threshold effect exists if 0 < P wt−1 ≤ τ( ) ≤1  , otherwise a linear cointegration model is 
more fitting. This constraint is imposed assuming that π 0 < P wt−1 β( ) ≤ τ( ) ≤ 1−π 0( )  by setting 
π 0 > 0  as a trimming parameter equal to 0.05 in the empirical estimation. This value follows 
Hansen and Seo (2002) which implies that each regime is restricted to contain at least 5% of the 
observations. Assuming the errors, ut , are iid Gaussian, the model is estimated by maximum 
likelihood.  
 A grid search algorithm is used to obtain MLE estimates of β   and  τ  (Hansen and Seo, 
2002). The grid search requires a region over which to search. Thus, two confidence intervals, 
τ L,τU[ ]  and βL,βU[ ] , are constructed for τ   and  β  respectively. Notation L and U represent 
lower and upper values. The grid search procedure over τ ,β( )  examines all pairs τ ,β( )  on the 
grids τ L,τU[ ]  and βL,βU[ ]  subject to constraint π 0 ≤ P wt−1 ≤ τ( ) ≤1−π 0 . In the empirical 
application the grid search procedure is carried out with 300 grid points as in Hansen and Seo 
(2002).  
 Once β   and  τ  have been estimated, I proceed to test for the presence of threshold 
cointegration using the Lagrange multiplier (supLM) test provided by Hansen and Seo (2002) 
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where the null hypothesis of linear cointegration is tested against the alternative of threshold 
cointegration.  I also use the Sup-Wald test by Seo (2006), where the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration is tested against threshold cointegration using a bootstraped distribution. 
4.5.2 Domestic Production Shocks 
 Similar to Loening at al. (2009), I use a high-frequency rainfall data transformation as a 
direct proxy for agricultural supply. Food crop agriculture in India is overwhelmingly rainfed so 
that conditional on planting decisions, yield variation is high and dependent on rainfall variation. . 
 To test my fourth hypothesis (i.e. domestic production supply shocks have more effect 
on prices in the production and domestic consumption regions during export restrictions period), 
I model rainfall variable as an exogenous variable in a Vector Autoregression (VAR) of all 
domestic prices.  
 The choice between VECM and VAR lies in the research question I am trying to 
answer. The foremost advantage of VECM is that it has nice interpretation with long term and 
short term equations. Thus, VECM is mostly used for cointegration analysis. On the other hand, 
VAR is commonly used for analyzing the dynamic impact of random disturbances on the system 
of variables (Enders, 2010). Thus, while I use VECM to test my first three hypotheses, I use 
VAR to test my fourth hypothesis.22  
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 In Dave Giles blog on how to effectively randomize the choice of a VAR or VECM model, he finds that the practice of 
pretesting for cointegration can result in severe overrejections of the noncausal null, whereas overfitting results in better control 
of the Type I error probability with often little loss in power." (Clarke & Mirza, 2006, p.207.) Thus, he suggests in some cases, 
VAR is preferred over VECM in testing for causality.  
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4.6 Diagnostic Tests 
I first test for the order of integration. I apply a number of tests, namely Augmented Dickey 
Fuller (ADF) test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) and the  tests by Phillips and Perron 
(1988).23 Table 4.3 presents the summary for the unit root tests. The unit root statistics for all 
variables and both their levels and differences are presented in Appendix Table C2 (one that 
includes constant and trend, one includes constant but no trend and one that excludes both 
constant and trend). I perform the test for variables in levels, logarithmic transformation of the 
variables and variables in differences. The ADF test is performed by including up to 10 lagged 
terms of the differenced terms in the regression and I use the information criterion test that 
yielded the most conservative results. In my case, it is the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) to 
choose the appropriate lag length by trading off parsimony against reduction in the sum of 
squares and a lag length where autocorrelation is not present. The ADF test statistics presented in 
Table 4.3 correspond to the regression that has the maximized AIC. On the basis of both ADF 
and Phillips and Perron tests, both with and without deterministic trend, I conclude that there is 
insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of non stationarity for all price series. 
Moreover, both tests reject the null, indicating that all the price series are unit roots.  
Knowing that the variables are integrated to the same order, I can proceed Johansen’s 
cointegration tests to find cointegrating vectors that posit non-spurious long-run relationships 
among variables. Lag order for the test for each market pair were chosen by Akaike Information 
Criteria. But I also perform Lagrange multiplier test for autocorrelation and chose the lag that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!23!ADF is the most commonly used test, but sometimes behaves poorly in the presence of serial correlation. Dickey and Fuller 
correct for serial correlation by including lagged differenced terms in the regression, however, the size and power of the ADF has 
been found to be sensitive to the number of these terms. The Phillips and Perron tests are non parametric tests of the null of the 
unit root and are considered more powerful, as they use consistent estimators of the variance (Rapomanikis et al, 2003). !
Zt − Zρ
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was sufficient to eliminate autocorrelation the in residuals. Results are presented in Tables 4.4a 
and 4.4b. 
4.7 Estimation Results  
4.7.1 Number of Integrated Market Pairs 
In this section, I present the results of Johansen’s cointegration rank tests and threshold 
cointegration tests. I summarize the results as the number of market pairs that are cointegrated 
for each pair type and crop in Table 4.5a and then list the integrated market pairs in Table 4.5b. 
More detailed results are in Appendix Table C4. So for example, in Table 4.5a, the first row of 
the second column means 0 of the 9 possible market pairs for producing and consuming regions 
are cointegrated during the export restrictions period. 
Finding linear cointegration is supportive of the law of one price model, as in equation 
4.3. On the other hand, finding threshold cointegration as opposed to linear cointegration is 
supportive of the segmented equilibrium model, as in equation 4.4. Lo and Zivot (2001) and 
Taylor (2001) suggest that linear modeling may induce misleading conclusions regarding 
cointegration if the data generating mechanism is not linear. Thus, I test for both linear and non-
linear cointegration for both regimes and make cointegration conclusions based on the preferred 
model using Hansen and Seo test (2002) and Seo test (2006). 
In this section, I also present plausible reasons for my observed results and consider the 
evidence for each of these plausible explanations when I discuss the relative prices in the 
following section. 
Results from cointegration tests show that less port markets are integrated with the world 
market during the export restriction period than the open trade period (Table 4.5a’s first row for 
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each crop). This finding is consistent with the Hypothesis 1, i.e. that the export ban is likely to 
result in less integration between port markets and world markets.  
Hypothesis 2 posits that the export ban results in a lack of market integration between the 
port markets and the domestic consuming markets. In table 4.5a, third row of each crop, I find 
that the hypothesis holds for rice but not for wheat.  
Faced with an export ban a rice trader has two choices: (1) store grain stocks that are 
already at the port in anticipation of the ban being lifted which leads to leads to less integration 
or (2) move the grain back to the interior to sell to domestic markets, which could still manifest 
in integrated markets but with relative prices favoring grain flow in the other direction. Thus, if 
grain movement takes time and prices are uncertain, the export ban may make domestic market 
prices more ‘sticky’. Thus, the export ban could possibly increase the price difference between 
the port markets and domestic consuming markets, which will result in their lack of market 
integration. 
On the other hand, a plausible reason for the contrary effect on wheat (more producing 
and port market pairs exhibit integration) is that grain movement flowed in the opposite direction 
with India’s active importation. From 1996-2006, India’s wheat yield remained stagnant and 
planted acres steadily declined (www.indexmundi.com). As a result wheat production lagged 
behind consumption from 2001-2006, resulting in beginning stocks dropping from a record 23.0 
metric million tons in 2002/2003, to a 40 year low of 2.0 MMT by 2006 (Western Australia 
Trade Office)24. In February 2006, the Indian government announced a decision to import wheat 
to arrest rising domestic prices in the wake of a production shortfall and widespread hoarding by 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 24Western Australia Trade Office. January 2012. India Wheat Market Report. 
http://www.dsd.wa.gov.au/documents/India_Wheat_Market_Report_January_2012.pdf!
! 100!
traders (Western Australia Trade Office). Appendix Figure C4 presents imports and exports vis-
à-vis wheat production from 1996-2013. Also, examining the actual relative prices show that 
wheat prices in the main Indian consuming regions are higher than the wheat world prices during 
the export restrictions period. On average, wheat world price during export restrictions period is 
11.70 Rs/kilo while average prices in Delhi, Mumbai and Patna are 14.82, 19.12 and 15.57, 
respectively.  
Finally, for the third hypothesis, i.e. more producing and consuming market pairs and 
fewer producing and port market pairs are integrated during the export restrictions period, I find 
the contrary result for both crops. During the export restrictions period, fewer producing and 
consuming market pairs are integrated and more port markets and producing markets are 
integrated for both crops as is shown in first two rows of Table 4.5.   
A plausible explanation for the counterintuitive finding in rice is that since rice is a 
storable grain and the export ban was not instituted continuously, traders may have continued to 
move rice to the port despite the ban being in place in anticipation of port markets opening up. 
Examining the price differences between rice world market and rice consuming markets during 
the export restrictions period reveal a substantial difference in favor of the world prices. Thus, 
storage is a plausible story for rice. However, because wheat is being imported during the export 
restrictions period, wheat warrants more discussion by examining thresholds and relative prices.  
4.7.2 Threshold Cointegration Results 
To further assess hypotheses 1-3, I analyzed the threshold cointegration results by 
comparing the estimated threshold parameters before and after the ban in conjunction with 
comparing the relative prices of the market pairs. The estimated beta from the cointegrating 
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vector, estimated thresholds, and proportion of weeks when there is incentive to trade consistent 
with the conceptual model and equation 4.4 are presented in Table 4.6.  
The proportion of weeks in which there is incentive to trade was determined by counting 
the proportion of observations for which β *Pbt −Pat > τ ,! where! b! is! the! destination!market!and!a!is!origin!market.! 
For instance, in Table 4.6a’s first row, for a rice producing and consuming market pair, 
Burdwan and Delhi, the estimated beta from the cointegrating vector is 1.27 during the export 
restrictions period. There is no estimated threshold and thus no estimated proportion of weeks 
when there is incentive to trade during the export restrictions period since a linear model was 
preferred in this case.  
During the open trade period, the beta from Burdwan and Delhi’s estimated cointegrating 
vector is 0.89 with a threshold of -1.70. The proportion of weeks in which there is incentive to 
trade was determined by counting the proportion of observations for which (0.89*PDelhi-
PBurdwan>-1.70), which is 93% in this case. The highlighted market pairs in Table 4.6 are those for 
which the threshold model is preferred to the linear model  in both the ER and OT periods. 
The sign on the threshold parameter provides some intuition as to the direction of trade 
flows between markets, particularly when the sign reverses between the open trade period and 
the export restriction period. In table 4.6, say for Ludhiana and Delhi for wheat, during the 
export restrictions period, the estimated threshold is -1.64 and the estimated cointegrating 
relationship is wt = Pdelhi-0.66*Pludhiana. The sign of the threshold has switched from positive in 
the open trade regime to negative in the export restriction regime, suggesting that the incentive 
for grain to flow from Ludhiana to Delhi in the open trade period was reversed in the export 
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restriction period. Here, 92% of the total observations occur when 0.66 times the market price in 
Ludhiana is more than 1.64 above the price in Delhi. This is the case where incentives are for 
grain to flow are from Delhi to Ludhiana, and is displayed in column 5 of table 4.6b. Conversely, 
8% of the total observations occur when 0.66 times the market price in Ludhiana is more than 
1.64 below the price in Delhi. This is the case where incentives are for grain to flow from 
Ludhiana to Delhi.  
 Hypothesis 1 states that for port and world market pairs where the threshold model was 
preferred to the linear model, the threshold would be larger in the export restriction regime than 
in the open trade regime. We find evidence in support of this hypothesis for one of the market 
pairs. The other market pairs either did not favor a threshold specification in one of the periods, 
or the estimated threshold was larger in the open trade regime. The evidence for the wheat 
market pair, Kachch and World is in table 4.6b. The threshold during the export restrictions 
period was larger than the threshold during the open trade period, which implies that the 
transaction cost between the two markets is higher during the export restrictions period.  
Consistent with increased transactions costs, we find that the proportion of weeks in which the 
relative prices indicate a possible incentive to trade between Kachch and world market is also 
higher in the open trade period than export restrictions period. 
Hypothesis 2 could not be explored via the threshold models because none of the port and 
consuming market pairs for either crop exhibited thresholds both before and after the ban.  
Hypothesis 3 states that for market pairs which exhibit threshold integration before and 
after the ban, the threshold between producing and consuming market pairs will be smaller 
during the ban and the threshold between producing and port markets will be larger during the 
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ban than when it is not in place. In the case of rice, thresholds increased between producing and 
port markets during the export regime period. While in the case of wheat, thresholds decreased 
between producing and consuming market pairs during the export restrictions regime. Note also 
that the threshold sign for wheat during the export restrictions regime is negative. 
One possible explanation for wheat producing and consuming markets is that production 
even in the supply regions was sufficiently low that they needed to import grains.  This 
importation into producing regions could have plausibly led to more price integration between 
port and producing regions. 
4.7.3 Robustness Tests 
One might be concerned that the results of number of significant market pairs are driven 
by the nature of the imputed data. As a robustness check I look at market pairs with less imputed 
data, thus having fewer missing observations as in Table 4.1b, and find that thresholds exist in 
those pairs in much more frequency. For instance, during the ER period for rice, there were three 
market pairs which exhibit threshold integration, namely Mumbai-Burdwan, Mangalore-Bijnaur, 
Vadodara-Bijnaur. In all the three market pairs in the ER period for rice, the percentage of 
missing data range from 2.48% to 16.83%. For wheat during the ER period, with the exception 
of Kachch-World market pair, the market pairs exhibiting thresholds are those pairs with less 
imputation. I find the same story for both crops during the OT period. 
Another concern is the close correlation in ports and consuming markets. To 
acknowledge this, I compare the population size25 of the pseudo (or proxy) port markets and the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!25!Actual'Intended'Port'Markets:!Managalore,!Karanataka!(484,785);!Cochin,!Kerala!(601,574);!Kandla,!Gujarat!(15,782);!Haldia,!West!Bengal!(200,762);!!As!we!could!not!find!price!data!for!these!markets,!we!used!
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actual port markets. While I find that some of the counterintuitive results come from those 
pseudo port markets (proxy cities) that happen to have large domestic populations and therefore 
can be thought of as consuming markets (i.e. Mysore-World during OT period and Kachch-
World during ER period), results from other market pairs were as expected, despite having large 
domestic populations.  
4.7.4 Domestic Production Shocks Results 
 Increased price differences might be worsened due to the inability of the world market to 
mitigate against domestic supply shocks. I test for the impacts of short run supply shocks on the 
market prices and find that domestic supply shock effects in prices are mostly felt in producing 
and consuming states during ER period as compared to OT. A summary of results is reported in 
Table 4.7. I find that the results for both crops are consistent with the hypothesis.  
4.8 Conclusion 
 During the global food crisis of 2007/2008, the Indian government intended to reduce the 
domestic impact of rapidly increasing world prices on the world and regional markets by 
implementing export ban on wheat and non-basmati rice in combination with domestic price 
policies and food grain procurement and distribution. By introducing these policy measures, the 
government was aiming to influence the supply of wheat and rice on the domestic market. 
In the cointegration analysis, domestic markets are integrated with the world market 
during the open trade period, and were less integrated during export restrictions, as expected. 
Countries normally impose export bans to insulate the domestic market from international price 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!nearby!port!markets!instead:!Ernakulam,!Kerala!(3,279,860);!Vadodara,!Gujarat!(1,666,703);!Kachch,!Gujarat!(2,092,371);!Mysore,!Karnataka!(887,446);!Malda,!West!Bengal!(3,997,970)!
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volatility and ensure availability in the domestic market at a lower than world price.  However, 
my results suggest that domestic consumer and producer markets were less integrated during 
export restrictions period. Plausible explanations include active role of storage in the case of rice, 
and the export ban not being instituted continuously and domestic production shocks. For wheat, 
India actually imported grain during this period, increasing the integration between ports and 
consumer markets, but decoupling producing and consuming regions.  Further, I find that the 
export ban may have exacerbated the price volatility arising from domestic supply shocks. Thus, 
the export ban in India, similar to the Russian export ban on wheat, may have had unintended 
consequences of increasing domestic price volatility. 
Since the decisions to use these blunt instruments are taken by domestic governments 
worldwide, I believe that it is useful to know if and how government market interventions affect 
market integration and thus the efficiency of domestic markets. Moreover, studying the domestic 
effect of these policies has the potential to affect the use of these policies by other countries in 
the future.  
4.9 References 
Abdulai, A. (2000). Spatial price transmission and asymmetry in the Ghanaian maize market. 
Journal of Development Economics, 63(2), 327-349. 
Abdulai, A. (2002). Using threshold cointegration to estimate asymmetric price transmission in 
the Swiss pork market. Applied Economics, 34(6), 679-687. 
Abbott, P. (2009). Development dimensions of high food prices (Vol. 18). OECD Publishing. 
 
Abbott, P. (2010, November). Stabilization Policies in Developing Countries after the 2007-08 
Food Crisis. In Global Forum on Agriculture (2010 http://www. oecd. 
org/dataoecd/50/34/46340396. pdf). 
 
Acharya, S. S., Chand, P. R., Birthal, S. K., & Negi, D. S. (2012). Market Integration and Price 
Transmission in India: A Case of Rice and Wheat with Special Reference to the World 
Food Crisis of 2007/08. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization. 
! 106!
 
Adama, C., Kwimbereb, D., Mbowec, W., & O’Connelld, S. (2012). Food Prices and Inflation in 
Tanzania. 
 
Alam, M. J., McKenzie, A. M., Buysse, J., Begum, I. A., Wailes, E. J., & Van Huylenbroeck, G. 
(2012, June). Measuring Market Integration in the Presence of Threshold Effect: The Case 
of Bangladesh Rice Markets. In 2012 Annual Meeting, August 12-14, 2012, Seattle, 
Washington (No. 124435). Agricultural and Applied Economics Association. 
 
Alexander, C., & Wyeth, J. (1994). Cointegration and market integration: An application to the 
Indonesian rice market. The Journal of Development Studies, 30(2), 303-334. 
 
Anselin, L. (1988). Spatial econometrics: methods and models (Vol. 4). Springer. 
 
Ardeni, P. G. (1989). Does the law of one price really hold for commodity prices?. American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 71(3), 661-669. 
 
Arellano, M., & Bond, S. (1991). Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo 
evidence and an application to employment equations. The Review of Economic Studies, 
58(2), 277-297. 
 
Asche, F., Bremnes, H., & Wessells, C. R. (1999). Product aggregation, market integration, and 
relationships between prices: an application to world salmon markets. American Journal 
of Agricultural Economics, 81(3), 568-581. 
 
Badinger, H., Müller, W., & Tondl, G. (2004). Regional convergence in the European Union, 
1985-1999: A spatial dynamic panel analysis. Regional Studies, 38(3), 241-253. 
 
Baffes, J., & Ajwad, M. I. (2001). Identifying price linkages: a review of the literature and an 
application to the world market of cotton. Applied Economics, 33(15), 1927-1941. 
 
Balke, N. S., & Fomby, T. B. (1997). Threshold cointegration. International economic review, 
627-645. 
 
Balke, N. S. (2000). Credit and economic activity: credit regimes and nonlinear propagation of 
shocks. Review of Economics and Statistics, 82(2), 344-349. 
 
Baltagi, B. (2008). Econometric analysis of panel data. Wiley. com. 
 
Baltagi, B. H., Bresson, G., & Pirotte, A. (2007). Panel unit root tests and spatial dependence. 
Journal of Applied Econometrics, 22(2), 339-360. 
 
Barrett, C. B. (2005). Spatial market integration. The New Palgrave Dictionnary of Economics, 
2nd Edition. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Forthcoming. 
 
Barrett, C. B., & Li, J. R. (2002). Distinguishing between equilibrium and integration in spatial 
price analysis. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 84(2), 292-307. 
! 107!
 
Baulch, B. (1997). Testing for food market integration revisited. The Journal of Development 
Studies, 33(4), 512-534. 
 
Beenstock, M., & Felsenstein, D. (2007). Spatial vector autoregressions. Spatial Economic 
Analysis, 2(2), 167-196. 
 
Bernanke, B. S., & Mihov, I. (1998). Measuring monetary policy. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 113(3), 869-902. 
 
Bhattacharya, B.B. and Kar, S. (2011). Shocks, Economic Growth and the Indian Economy. 
Working Papers from eSocialSciences. 
 
Burgess, R., & Donaldson, D. (2012). Can Openness to Trade Reduce Income Volatility? 
Evidence from Colonial India’s Famine Era. American Economic Review, 100, 449-453. 
 
Cagliarini, A., & Rush, A. (2011). Economic Development and Agriculture in India. Trends in 
Labour Supply 1 Destinations and Uses of East Asian Merchandise Exports 9 Economic 
Development and Agriculture in India 15 Banking Fees in Australia 23 Developments in 
the Structure of the Australian Financial System 29, 15. 
Chand, R. (2009). Global Food and Financial Crises: Experiences and Perspectives from India, 
Chapter 8 in Agricultural Reforms and Trade Liberalization in China and Selected Asian 
Countries: Lessons of Three Decades, Policy Assistance Series 6, FAORAP. 
Publication No. 2009/15, pp. 151-61. 
Chand, R., Raju, S. S., & Pandey, L. M. (2010). Effect of global recession on Indian agriculture. 
Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics, 65(3), 487.  
Clarkson, N., & Kulkarni, K. G. (2011). Effects of India’s Trade Policy on Rice Production and 
Exports. 
Clements, M. P., & Mizon, G. E. (1991). Empirical analysis of macroeconomic time series: VAR 
and structural models. European Economic Review, 35(4), 887-917. 
 
Damodaran, H. 2000. No move to Discontinue Paddy Purchase. The Hindu Business Line., Aug2. 
 
Davies, R. B. (1977). Hypothesis testing when a nuisance parameter is present only under the 
alternative. Biometrika, 64(2), 247-254. 
 
Del Ninno, C., Dorosh, P. A., & Subbarao, K. (2005). Food aid and food security in the short 
and long run: Country experience from Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. World Bank, Social 
Protection. 
 
Dercon, S. (1995). On market integration and liberalisation: Method and application to Ethiopia. 
The Journal of Development Studies, 32(1), 112-143. 
 
! 108!
Dickey, D. A., & Fuller, W. A. (1979). Distribution of the estimators for autoregressive time 
series with a unit root. Journal of the American statistical association, 74(366a), 427-431. 
 
Djuric, I., Glauben, T., & Goetz, L. (2009, December). The Influences of Export Controls on 
Wheat Markets in Serbia During the Food Crisis 2007-2008. In EAAE Seminar:“The Role 
of Knowledge, Innovation and Human Capital in Multifunctional Agriculture and 
Territorial Rural Development”. Belgrade-Serbia. 
 
Djuric, I., Goetz, L., & Glauben, T. (2011). Influences of the Governmental Market Interventions 
on Wheat Markets in Serbia during the Food Crisis 2007/2008. In EAAE 2011 Congress, 
Change and Uncertainty Challenges for Agriculture, Food and Natural Resources, 
August. 
 
Dollive, K. (2008). The impact of export restraints on rising grain prices. Washington (DC): ME 
International Trade Commission. Retrieved May, 17, 2011. 
 
Dorosh, P. A. (2009). Price stabilization, international trade and national cereal stocks: world 
price shocks and policy response in South Asia. Food Security, 1(2), 137-149. 
 
Engle, R. F., & Granger, C. W. (1987). Co-integration and error correction: representation, 
estimation, and testing. Econometrica: journal of the Econometric Society, 251-276. 
 
Fackler, P. L., & Goodwin, B. K. (2001). Spatial price analysis. Handbook of agricultural 
economics, 1, 971-1024. 
 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). (2011). The State of Food Insecurity in the World: 
How does International Price Volatility Affect Domestic Economies and Food Security? 
FAO, Rome, Italy.  
 
Friedman, M. (1962). The interpolation of time series by related series. Journal of the American 
Statistical Association, 57(300), 729-757. 
 
Kubo, K. (2011). India: The Burden of domestic Food Policy. Chiba, Institute of Developing 
Economies–Japan External Trade Organization. 
 
Galvão, A. B. C. (2003). Multivariate threshold models: TVARs and TVECMs. Brazilian Review 
of Econometrics, 23(1), 143-171. 
 
Galvão, A. B. C. (2006). Structural break threshold VARs for predicting ME recessions using the 
spread. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 21(4), 463-487. 
 
Galvão, A. B., & Marcellino, M. G. (2010). Endogenous monetary policy regimes and the Great 
Moderation. 
 
Gardner, B. L. (1975). The farm-retail price spread in a competitive food industry. American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 57(3), 399-409. 
! 109!
 
Getis, A., & Griffith, D. A. (2002). Comparative spatial filtering in regression analysis. 
Geographical analysis, 34(2), 130-140. 
 
Getis, A., & Ord, J. K. (1992). The analysis of spatial association by use of distance statistics. 
Geographical analysis, 24(3), 189-206. 
 
Goletti, F., & Babu, S. (1994). Market liberalization and integration of maize markets in Malawi. 
Agricultural Economics, 11(2), 311-324. 
 
González-Rivera, G., & Helfand, S. M. (2001). Economic development and the determinants of 
spatial integration in agricultural markets. Department of Economics, University of 
California, Riverside. 
 
Gonzalo, J., & Pitarakis, J. Y. (2002). Estimation and model selection based inference in single 
and multiple threshold models. Journal of Econometrics, 110(2), 319-352. 
 
Goodwin, B. K., & Harper, D. C. (2000). Price transmission, threshold behavior, and asymmetric 
adjustment in the ME pork sector. Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, 32(03). 
 
Goodwin, B. K., & Piggott, N. E. (2001). Spatial market integration in the presence of threshold 
effects. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 83(2), 302-317. 
 
Goodwin, B. K., & Schroeder, T. C. (1991). Cointegration tests and spatial price linkages in 
regional cattle markets. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 73(2), 452-464. 
 
Gotz, L., Glauben T. & Brummer B. (2010). Impacts of Export Controls on Wheat Markets 
During the Food Crisis 2007/08 in Russia and Ukraine. Agricultural and Applied 
Economics Association Conference, Denver, CO. 
Granger, C. W. (1969). Investigating causal relations by econometric models and cross-spectral 
methods. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 424-438. 
Granger, C. W. (1988). Causality, cointegration, and control. Journal of Economic Dynamics 
and Control, 12(2), 551-559. 
Gulati, A., & Saini, S. (2013). Taming Food Inflation in India. 
Hansen, B. E., & Seo, B. (2002). Testing for two-regime threshold cointegration in vector error-
correction models. Journal of econometrics, 110(2), 293-318. 
 Hahn, J., & Kuersteiner, G. (2002). Discontinuities of weak instrument limiting distributions. 
Economics Letters, 75(3), 325-331. 
 
Hsiao, C. (2003). Analysis of panel data (Vol. 34). Cambridge university press. 
 
Ihle, R., & von Cramon-Taubadel, S. (2008). A comparison of threshold cointegration and 
Markov-switching vector error correction models in price transmission analysis. In Paper 
! 110!
presented on the NCCC-134 Conference on Applied Commodity Price Analysis, 
Forecasting and Market Risk Management, USA: St. Louis. 
 
Ihle, R., von Cramon-Taubadel, S., & Zorya, S. (2009). Markov-switching estimation of spatial 
maize price transmission processes between Tanzania and Kenya. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, 91(5), 1432-1439. 
Johansen, S. (1988). Statistical analysis of cointegration vectors. Journal of economic dynamics 
and control, 12(2), 231-254. 
Kubo K. (2011). India: The Burden of domestic Food Policy. Chiba, Institute of Developing 
Economies–Japan External Trade Organization. 
 
King, G., Honaker, J., Joseph, A., & Scheve, K. (2001, March). Analyzing incomplete political 
science data: An alternative algorithm for multiple imputation. In American Political 
Science Association (Vol. 95, No. 01, pp. 49-69). Cambridge University Press. 
 
Kiviet, J. F. (1995). On bias, inconsistency, and efficiency of various estimators in dynamic 
panel data models. Journal of econometrics, 68(1), 53-78. 
 
Korinek, J., & Kim, J. (2010). Export restrictions on strategic raw materials and their impact on 
trade and global supply. OECD Trade Policy Studies The Economic Impact of Export 
Restrictions on Raw Materials, 103. 
 
Lee, L. F. (2004). Asymptotic Distributions of Quasi‐Maximum Likelihood Estimators for 
Spatial Autoregressive Models. Econometrica, 72(6), 1899-1925. 
 
Liefert, W. M., Westcott, P., & Wainio, J. (2012). Alternative policies to agricultural export bans 
that are less market-distorting. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 94(2), 435-
441. 
  
Lo, M. C., & Zivot, E. (2001). Threshold cointegration and nonlinear adjustment to the law of 
one price. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 5(4), 533-576. 
 
Loening, J. L., Durevall, D., & Ayalew Birru, Y. (2009). Inflation dynamics and food prices in 
an agricultural economy: The case of Ethiopia. rapport nr.: Working Papers in Economics 
347. 
 
Madariaga, N., Montout, S., & Ollivaud, P. (2005). Regional Convergence and Agglomeration in 
Argentina: a spatial panel data approach. 
 
Mallory, M., & Baylis, K. (2012). The Food Corporation of India and the Public Distribution 
System: Impacts on Market Integration in Wheat, Rice, and Pearl Millet. 
 
Marcellino, M., & Mizon, G. E. (2000). Modelling shifts in the wage–price and unemployment–
inflation relationships in Italy, Poland and the UK. Economic Modelling, 17(3), 387-413. 
 
! 111!
Marcellino, M., & Mizon, G. E. (2001). Small‐system modelling of real wages, inflation, 
unemployment and output per capita in Italy 1970–1994. Journal of Applied 
Econometrics, 16(3), 359-370. 
 
Martin, W., & Anderson, K. (2012). Export restrictions and price insulation during commodity 
price booms. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 94(2), 422-427. 
 
Mason, N. M., & Myers, R. J. (2013). The effects of the Food Reserve Agency on maize market 
prices in Zambia. Agricultural Economics. 
 
McNew, K. (1996). Spatial market integration: Definition, theory, and evidence. Agricultural 
and Resource Economics Review, 25, 1-11. 
 
McNew, K., & Fackler, P. L. (1997). Testing market equilibrium: is cointegration informative?. 
Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 191-207. 
Mitra, S., & Josling, T. (2009). Agricultural export restrictions: Welfare implications and trade 
disciplines. International Food & Agricultural Trade Policy Council (IPC). 
 
Mitchell, D. (2008). A note on rising food prices. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
Series, Vol. 
 
Mundlak, Y., & Brenner, C. (1992). Agricultural productivity and economic policies: concepts 
and measurements (No. 75). Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
 
Obstfeld, M., & Taylor, A. M. (1997). Nonlinear aspects of goods-market arbitrage and 
adjustment: Heckscher's commodity points revisited. Journal of the Japanese and 
international economies, 11(4), 441-479. 
 
Osterwald‐Lenum, M. (1992). A Note with Quantiles of the Asymptotic Distribution of the 
Maximum Likelihood Cointegration Rank Test Statistics1. Oxford bulletin of economics 
and statistics, 54(3), 461-472. 
 
Palaskas, T. B., & Harriss‐white, B. (1993). Testing market integration: new approaches with 
case material from the West Bengal food economy. The Journal of Development Studies, 
30(1), 1-57. 
 
Phillips, P. C., & Perron, P. (1988). Testing for a unit root in time series regression. Biometrika, 
75(2), 335-346. 
 
Porteous, O. C. (2012). Empirical Effects of Short-Term Export Bans: The Case of African 
Maize. Working paper. 
 
Quiroz, J. A., & Soto, R. (1995). International Price Signals in Agricultural Markets: Do 
Governments Care?. 
 
! 112!
Rapsomanikis, G., Hallam, D., Conforti, P., & Sarris, A. (2006). Market integration and price 
transmission in selected food and cash crop markets of developing countries: review and 
applications. Agricultural Commodity Markets and Trade: New Approaches to Analysing 
Market Structure and Instability. FAO, 187-217. 
 
Ravallion, M. (1986). Testing market integration. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 
68(1), 102-109. 
 
Report on Wheat. National Multi-Commodity Exchange of India. 2009. Available at 
http://www.nmce.com/files/study/wheat.pdf.  
 
Saxegaard, M. (2006). Excess Liquidity and the Effectiveness of Monetary Policy: Evidence from 
Sub-Saharan Africa (No. 06/115). International Monetary Fund. 
 
Sekhar, C. S. C. (2012). Agricultural market integration in India: An analysis of select 
commodities. Food Policy, 37(3), 309-322. 
 
Sexton, R. J., Kling, C. L., & Carman, H. F. (1991). Market integration, efficiency of arbitrage, 
and imperfect competition: methodology and application to ME celery. American Journal 
of Agricultural Economics, 73(3), 568-580. 
 
Shama, R. (2011). Food export restrictions: Review of the 2007-2010 experience and 
considerations for disciplining restrictive measures. Rome: FAO. 
 
Slayton, T. (2009). Rice crisis forensics: How Asian governments carelessly set the world rice 
market on fire. Center for Global Development working paper, 163. 
 
Stock, J. H., & Watson, M. W. (1988). Variable trends in economic time series. The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 2(3), 147-174. 
Welton, G. (2011). The impact of Russia’s 2010 grain export ban. Oxfam Research Reports, 28. 
 
Woolverton, A.E. & Kiawu J. (2009). Policy Responses to high Food Prices: Domestic
 Incentives and Global Implications. Presentation at the AAEA 2009 Meeting, 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin. 
 
Zoellick, R.B. 2008. Speech to Rome World Food Security Summit, June 6. 
 
 
 
 
! 113!
4.10  Tables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Commodity Primary Wholesale/Producing Markets Primary Retail/Consuming Markets Major Ports
Burdwan, West Bengal1 Delhi, Delhi2 Managalore, Karnataka1
West Godavari, Andrha Pradesh1 Kolkata, West Bengal2 Ernakulam, Kerala1
Bijnaur, Uttar Pradesh1 Mumbai, Maharashtra2 Vadodara, Gujarat1
Unnao, Uttar Pradesh1 Delhi, Delhi2 Kachch, Gujarat1
Ludhiana, Punjab1 Patna, Bihar2 Mysore, Karnataka1
Gurgaon, Haryana1 Mumbai, Maharashtra2 Malda, West Bengal1
Rice
Wheat
Source: 1-Agmarknet; 2-Department of Agriculture
Table 4.1a    Selected Markets for Rice and Wheat
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Table 4.1b    Percentage of Missing Observations for Selected Markets 
 Table 4.1b    Percentage of Missing Observations for Selected Markets
Market Type Market % Missing Obs 
(OT Period)
% Missing Obs 
(ER Period)
Rice Producing Markets Burdwan, West Bengal 4.91% 4.95%
West Godavari, Andrha Pradesh 47.68% 17.52%
Bijnaur, Uttar Pradesh 21.68% 2.97%
Rice Consuming Markets Delhi, Delhi 27.50% 20.69%
Kolkata, West Bengal 11.61% 12.87%
Mumbai, Maharashtra 17.50% 16.83%
Rice Major Ports Mangalore, Karnataka 19.20% 4.95%
Ernakulam, Kerala 5.80% 11.39%
Vadodara, Gujarat 20.98% 2.48%
Wheat Producing Markets Unnao, Uttar Pradesh 4.63% 0.91%
Ludhiana, Punjab 25.93% 12.27%
Gurgaon, Haryana 29.72% 24.09%
Wheat Consuming Markets Delhi, Delhi 1.39% 1.36%
Patna, Bihar 12.96% 0.91%
Mumbai, Maharashtra 19.81% 16.82%
Wheat Major Ports Kachch, Gujarat 5.09% 30.45%
Mysore, Karnataka 6.94% 9.55%
Malda, West Bengal 17.13% 35.45%
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Units Source
Rice Producing Market, Wholesale Prices
Bijnaur, Uttar Pradesh 528 13.51 3.49 8.00 20.89 Rs/kg Ag Marketing Information Network
Burdwan, West Bengal 528 14.29 3.70 9.47 25.50 Rs/kg Ag Marketing Information Network
West Godavari, Andrha Pradesh 528 19.33 8.72 3.76 41.00 Rs/kg Ag Marketing Information Network
Wheat Producing Markets, Wholesale Prices
Unnao, Uttar Pradesh 528 9.80 2.49 5.52 15.85 Rs/kg Ag Marketing Information Network
Ludhiana, Punjab 528 9.89 2.70 5.72 17.00 Rs/kg Ag Marketing Information Network
Gurgaon, Haryana 528 10.19 2.40 5.98 18.14 Rs/kg Ag Marketing Information Network
Rice Major Ports, Wholesale Prices
Vadodara, Gujarat 528 16.93 5.57 4.34 26.82 Rs/kg Ag Marketing Information Network
Mangalore, Karnataka 528 16.71 5.97 9.44 78.22 Rs/kg Ag Marketing Information Network
Ernakulam, Kerala 528 18.88 7.05 0.36 73.36 Rs/kg Ag Marketing Information Network
Wheat Major Ports, Wholesale Prices
Kachch, Gujarat 528 10.99 3.17 6.06 19.51 Rs/kg Ag Marketing Information Network
Mysore, Karnataka 528 15.30 4.74 7.52 26.13 Rs/kg Ag Marketing Information Network
Malda, West Bengal 528 9.91 2.63 4.00 17.10 Rs/kg Ag Marketing Information Network
Rice Consuming Markets, Retail Prices
Delhi, Delhi 528 17.62 5.55 0.00 26.00 Rs/kg
Retail Price Info System, Directorate of 
Econ and Statistics
Mumbai, Maharashtra 528 18.90 6.41 7.35 34.50 Rs/kg
Retail Price Info System, Directorate of 
Econ and Statistics
Kolkata, West Bengal 528 16.05 5.40 2.88 28.55 Rs/kg
Retail Price Info System, Directorate of 
Econ and Statistics
Table 4.2   Summary Statistics of Variables Used, Units and Sources
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Units Source
Wheat Consuming Markets, Retail Prices
Delhi, Delhi 528 14.61 4.79 0.00 24.57 Rs/kg
Retail Price Info System, Directorate of 
Econ and Statistics
Mumbai, Maharashtra 528 20.38 7.33 11.40 37.58 Rs/kg
Retail Price Info System, Directorate of 
Econ and Statistics
Patna, Bihar 528 14.47 4.19 0.00 23.00 Rs/kg
Retail Price Info System, Directorate of 
Econ and Statistics
World Prices
Rice World Price 528 16.60 7.79 6.65 34.06 Rs/kg
FAO Economic and Social Development 
Statistics Division
Wheat World Price 528 11.89 4.36 5.83 21.14 Rs/kg
FAO Economic and Social Development 
Statistics Division
Other Data
Rainfall 528 115.63 112.20 2.13 382.10 mm
Meteorological Department, Govt. of 
India 
Non-Basmati Rice Exports 528 456.31 507.00 7.23 2027.94 Rs Crore
Database on Indian Economy - Reserve 
Bank of India
Wheat Exports 528 171.18 337.37 0.00 1432.53 Rs Crore
Database on Indian Economy - Reserve 
Bank of India
Minimum Support Prices 528 8.40 2.27 5.60 11.10 Rs/kg
Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and 
Public Distribution, Govt of India
Central Issued Prices 528 8.30 0.00 8.30 8.30 Rs/kg
Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and 
Public Distribution, Govt of India
Continued Table 4.2   Summary Statistics of Variables Used, Units and Sources
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Table 4.3 Stationarity Summary for Logarithmic Transformation of Variables  
 
Market Wheat Rice 
Rice Producing Markets 
  Bijnaur, Uttar Pradesh U U 
Burdwan, West Bengal U U 
West Godavari, Andrha Pradesh U U 
Wheat Producing Markets 
  Unnao Uttar Pradesh U U 
Ludhiana, Punjab U U 
Gurgaon, Haryana U U 
Rice Major Port Markets 
  Mangalore, Karnataka U U 
Ernakulam, Kerala U U 
Vadodara, Gujarat U U 
Wheat Major Port Markets 
  Kachch, Gujarat U U 
Mysore, Karnataka U U 
Malda, West Bengal U U 
Rice Consuming Markets 
  Delhi, Delhi U U 
Mumbai, Maharashtra U U 
Kolkata, West Bengal U U 
Wheat Consuming Markets 
  Delhi, Delhi U U 
Mumbai, Maharashtra U U 
Patna, Bihar U U 
World Prices 
  Rice World Pirce U U 
Wheat World Price U U 
Exogenous Supply Shock 
  Rainfall S S 
U indicates unit root, S is stationary, -- indicates no data 
Note: Data are used are all logarithmic transformations, ran adf with lags; but no trend and with constant 
because that is how I am running the vars/vecm 
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Pair Type Market Pair
Lags based 
on AIC
Lags based 
on LM test 
for 
Autocorr
Lags based 
on AIC
Lags based 
on LM test 
for 
Autocorr
Producing and Consuming Burdwan and Delhi 2 2 4 5
Burdwan and Kolkata 5 8 4 4
Burdwan and Mumbai 1 1 4 5
Bijnaur and Delhi 2 3 5 6
Bijnaur and Kolkata 3 3 4 5
Bijnaur and Mumbai 1 1 5 5
West Godavari and Delhi 2 3 5 6
West Godavari and Kolkata 5 6 5 6
West Godavari and Mumbai 4 4 5 5
Producing and Port Burdwan and Mangalore 0 3 3 4
Burdwan and Ernakulam 5 6 5 7
Burdwan and Vadodara 1 1 1 4
Bijnaur and Mangalore 0 2 5 6
Bijnaur and Ernakulam 3 5 4 5
Bijnaur and Vadodara 1 1 4 4
West Godavari and Mangalore 4 4 5 6
West Godavari and Ernakulam 5 5 5 6
West Godavari and Vadodara 1 1 5 6
Port and Consuming Mangalore and Delhi 2 4 5 6
Mangalore and Kolkata 3 3 4 5
Mangalore and Mumbai 2 3 5 6
Ernakulam and Delhi 3 4 4 5
Ernakulam and Kolkata 5 6 4 5
Ernakulam and Mumbai 3 4 4 5
Vadodara and Delhi 2 3 4 5
Vadodara and Kolkata 5 6 3 4
Vadodara and Mumbai 1 1 4 5
Port and World Mangalore and World 5 6 5 6
Ernakulam and World 5 6 5 6
Vadodara and World 1 1 5 6
Table 4.4a  Lag order Selection for each Rice Market Pair for different periods based on AIC and LM test for 
Autocorrelation
Export restrictions 
Period Open Trade Period
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Pair Type Market Pair
Lags based 
on AIC
Lags based 
on LM test 
for 
Autocorr
Lags based 
on AIC
Lags based 
on LM test 
for 
Autocorr
Producing and Consuming Unnao and Delhi 1 1 4 4
Unnao and Patna 1 1 4 4
Unnao and Mumbai 1 1 4 4
Ludhiana and Delhi 4 6 4 5
Ludhiana and Patna 5 5 4 5
Ludhiana and Mumbai 4 6 4 5
Gurgaon and Delhi 2 4 5 5
Gurgaon and Patna 2 4 4 4
Gurgaon and Mumbai 2 5 4 5
Producing and Port Unnao and Kachch 3 4 2 3
Unnao and Mysore 5 8 4 5
Unnao and Malda 1 1 5 5
Ludhiana and Kachch 5 5 5 6
Ludhiana and Mysore 5 6 5 6
Ludhiana and Malda 4 6 4 4
Gurgaon and Kachch 2 4 5 5
Gurgaon and Mysore 3 4 4 4
Gurgaon and Malda 2 4 5 5
Port and Consuming Kachch and Delhi 3 3 5 6
Kachch and Patna 3 3 4 5
Kachch and Mumbai 4 5 4 4
Mysore and Delhi 3 5 5 6
Mysore and Patna 3 3 5 6
Mysore and Mumbai 5 6 4 5
Malda and Delhi 1 1 4 4
Malda and Patna 1 1 4 4
Malda and Mumbai 1 1 3 4
Port and World Kachch and World 2 3 2 2
Mysore and World 5 6 5 5
Malda and World 1 1 3 3
Table 4.4b   Lag order Selection for each Wheat Market Pair for different periods based on AIC and LM test 
for Autocorrelation
Export restrictions 
Period Open Trade Period
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Table 4.5a   Number of Integrated Market Pairs by Pair Type and Crop
Pair Type
Rice
Linear and Threshold 
Coint With ER
Linear and Threshold Coint 
OT
Producing and Consuming Markets 0/9 5/9
Producing and Port Markets 3/9 2/9
Port and Consuming Markets 0/9 2/9
Port and World Markets 1/3 3/3
Pair Type
Wheat
Linear and Threshold 
Coint With ER
Linear and Threshold Coint 
OT
Producing and Consuming Markets 2/9 3/9
Producing and Port Markets 4/9 1/9
Port and Consuming Markets 5/9 3/9
Port and World Markets 1/3 2/3
Note: ER stands for export restrictions regime and OT stands for open trade regime.
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Table 4.5b   List of Integrated Market Pairs by Pair Type and Crop
Pair Type
Rice
Linear and Threshold 
Coint With ER
Linear and Threshold Coint 
OT
Producing and Consuming Markets none
Burdwan and Delhi, Burdwan 
and Kolkata, Bijnaur and 
Mumbai, West Godavari and 
Delhi, West Godavari and 
Mumbai
Producing and Port Markets
Bijnaur and Mangalore, 
Bijnaur and Vadodara, 
West Godavari and 
Ernakulam
Bijanur and Mangalore, 
Bijnaur and Ernakulam
Port and Consuming Markets none
Mangalore and Delhi, 
Mangalore and Mumbai
Port and World Markets Vadodara and World
Mangalore and World, 
Ernakulam and World, 
Vadodara and World
Pair Type
Wheat
Linear and Threshold 
Coint With ER
Linear and Threshold Coint 
OT
Producing and Consuming Markets
Ludhiana and Patna, 
Ludhiana and Mumbai
Ludhiana and Delhi, 
Ludhiana and Mumbai, 
Gurgaon and Delhi
Producing and Port Markets
Unnao and Malda, 
Ludhiana and Mysore, 
Ludhiana and Malda, 
Gurgaon and Kachch Gurgaon and Kachch
Port and Consuming Markets
Kachch and Patna, 
Mysore and Delhi, 
Mysore and Patna, 
Mysore and Mumbai, 
Malda and Mumbai
Kachch and Delhi, Mysore 
and Delhi, Malda and Delhi
Port and World Markets Kachch and World
Kachch and World, Malda 
and World
Note: ER stands for export restrictions regime and OT stands for open trade regime.
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Table 4.6    Proportion of Weeks where the estimated difference is more than the Threshold (i.e. Incentive to Trade)
Crop Pair Type Market Pair
Export 
Restrictions 
Period
Export 
Restrictions 
Period
Export 
Restrictions 
Period
Open Trade 
Period
Open Trade 
Period
Open Trade 
Period
Estimated 
Cointegrated 
Vector, Beta
Estimated 
Thresholds, 
Tau
% Weeks 
when there is 
incentive to 
trade
Estimated 
Cointegrated 
Vector, Beta
Estimated 
Thresholds, 
Tau
% Weeks 
when there is 
incentive to 
trade
Rice Consuming-Producing Delhi-Burdwan 1.27 - 0.89 -1.70 93%
Kolkata-Burdwan 0.65 - 0.52 -
Mumbai-Burdwan 0.64 3.47 10% 0.51 -
Delhi-Bijnaur 0.23 - 0.82 -1.31 93%
Kolkata-Bijnaur 0.24 - 0.89 -1.94 93%
Mumbai-Bijnaur 0.15 - 0.79 0.73 19%
Delhi-West Godavari 0.79 - 0.98 -0.03 59%
Kolkata-West Godavari 0.82 - 2.30 -
Mumbai-West Godavari 0.56 - 1.79 -
Rice Port-Producing Mangalore-Burdwan 1.35 - 0.93 0.13 28%
Ernakulam-Burdwan 1.06 - 2.95 -
Vadodara-Burdwan -2.06 - 0.31 -
Mangalore-Bijnaur 0.82 1.15 7% 0.85 -0.93 75%
Ernakulam-Bijnaur 0.54 - 0.76 -1.76 93%
Vadodara-Bijnaur 0.73 3.25 1% 0.86 1.75 8%
Mangalore-West Godavari 1.43 - 4.82 -
Ernakulam-West Godavari 1.31 - -2.78 -
Vadodara-West Godavari -0.68 - 1.02 1.38 15%
Rice Consuming-Port Delhi-Managalore -4.17 - 0.95 -1.88 93%
Kolkata-Mangalore 0.45 - 1.04 -1.95 91%
Mumbai-Mangalore 3.90 - 0.53 -
Delhi-Ernakulam 0.01 - 0.17 -
Kolkata-Ernakulam 0.59 - 0.32 -
Mumbai-Ernakulam 0.09 - -0.09 -
Delhi-Vadodara -0.11 - 0.93 0.24 48%
Kolkata-Vadodara -0.63 - 1.74 -
Mumbai-Vadodara 0.34 - 0.89 1.05 27%
Rice World-Port World-Mangalore 4.52 - 1.24 -2.93 91%
World-Ernakulam 5.89 - 1.36 -5.43 93%
World-Vadodara -0.23 - 1.19 1.71 23%
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Continued Table 4.6   Proportion of Weeks where the estimated difference is more than the Threshold (i.e. Incentive to Trade)
Crop Pair Type Market Pair
Export 
Restrictions 
Period
Export 
Restrictions 
Period
Export 
Restrictions 
Period
Open Trade 
Period
Open Trade 
Period
Open Trade 
Period
Estimated 
Cointegrated 
Vector, Beta
Estimated 
Thresholds, 
Tau
% Weeks 
when there is 
incentive to 
trade
Estimated 
Cointegrated 
Vector, Beta
Estimated 
Thresholds, 
Tau
% Weeks 
when there is 
incentive to 
trade
Wheat Consuming-Producing Delhi-Unnao 0.66 -0.30 9% 0.98 -
Patna-Unnao 0.45 - 0.86 -
Mumbai-Unnao 0.17 - 0.72 -
Delhi-Ludhiana 0.66 -1.64 92% 0.76 0.21 89%
Patna-Ludhiana 0.68 -1.60 98% 0.74 0.03 79%
Mumbai-Ludhiana 0.49 -1.60 91% 0.51 0.16 31%
Delhi-Gurgaon 0.43 - 0.91 -
Patna-Gurgaon 0.36 - 0.71 -
Mumbai-Gurgaon 0.12 - 0.85 -
Wheat Port-Producing Kachch-Unnao 0.82 - 0.70 -
Mysore-Unnao 0.43 - 0.72 -
Malda-Unnao 0.99 0.96 0% 0.62 -
Kachch-Ludhiana 1.31 - 0.92 -0.08 62%
Mysore-Ludhiana 0.68 - 0.73 -0.47 93%
Malda-Ludhiana 2.47 - 0.96 0.35 31%
Kachch-Gurgaon 0.91 -1.17 90% 0.80 -
Mysore-Gurgaon 0.47 - 0.81 -
Malda-Gurgaon 1.12 - 1.05 0.31 42%
Wheat Consuming-Port Delhi-Kachch 0.48 - 0.85 0.64 72%
Patna-Kachch 0.45 - 1.02 -
Mumbai-Kachch 0.16 - 0.87 -
Delhi-Mysore 1.04 -2.40 95% 1.49 -
Patna-Mysore 1.04 -2.49 98% 1.17 -
Mumbai-Mysore 0.38 - 1.24 -
Delhi-Malda 0.31 - 0.81 -0.31 95%
Patna-Malda 0.32 - 0.74 0.32 56%
Mumbai-Malda 0.12 - 0.99 -
Wheat World-Port World-Kachch 0.90 4.98 0% 1.04 1.05 45%
World-Mysore 1.12 - -2.88 -
World-Malda 0.10 - 0.97 0.29 57%
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Table  4.7a   Multivariate VAR Significance Results for the Domestic Production Shock Effects (ER Period)
Producing Consuming Ports Producing Consuming Ports
Rainfall 2/3 3/3 0/3 2/3 2/3 1/3
Table   4.7b   Multivariate VAR Significance Results for the Domestic Production Shock Effects (OT Period)
Producing Consuming Ports Producing Consuming Ports
Rainfall 0/3 1/3 0/3 0/3 1/3 0/3
RICE WHEAT
RICE WHEAT
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4.11!Figures!
Figure!4.1!!Average!Wheat!Prices!in!Selected!Markets!and!Export!Quantity!
!! !!!!!!!Export!ban! !!!!!!!!!!!!Export!Quota!! Note:!whenever!the!“restricted!trade”!regime!does!not!prevail,!the!“open!trade”!regime!applies!
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Figure!4.2!!Average!Rice!Prices!in!Selected!Markets!and!Export!Quantity!
!! !!!!Export!ban! !!!!!!Minimum!Export!Prices!!!!!!!!!Note:!whenever!the!“restricted!trade”!regime!does!not!prevail,!the!“open!trade”!regime!applies.!
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  Figure 4.9  India’s Market Landscape 
 
 
Figure 4.10    Percentage Changes in Agricultural Production and Rainfall 
 
Source: Cagliarni and Rush (2011) 
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With just over 80 per cent of India's rainfall occurring during the summer monsoon season, which occurs from June through to
September, deficient rainfalls have often had significant effects on the Indian economy. In 2009, the summer monsoon rainfall
was lower than normal, which caused a fall in grain production of 7 per cent and pushed up grain and other food prices. In the
past, agricultural production has been much more dependent on the summer monsoon, with large fluctuations in rainfall
accounting for most of the volatility in agricultural production (Graph 6). Over time, however, the effect of the summer monsoon
rain season has been mitigated through drought management (including drought monitoring), increased use of irrigation, and
diversification of agricultural production. These measures have made food production less vulnerable to poor weather
conditions. In part, this helps explain why deficient rainfalls since the late 1990s have resulted in less significant contractions in
agricultural output. In fact, variations in agricultural output, which once accounted for 60 per cent of the variation in GDP, now
account for only 20 per cent, which in part reflects agriculture's lower share of GDP.
Graph 6
The Food Procurement and Distribution System
In addition to policies on land distribution, the Government has significant influence on the agricultural sector through other
policy instruments, including subsidies for inputs, minimum price support arrangements and government procurement of food.
One-third of input subsidies are paid in the form of fertiliser subsidies, which are equivalent to 1 per cent of GDP. Under this
subsidy scheme, the Government quotes a maximum retail price for various types of fertilisers and reimburses the seller the
difference between the retail price and the ‘market’ price. The market price for domestically produced fertilisers takes into
account transportation, storage, labour and energy costs. The subsidy for imported fertiliser is the difference between the
import price and the maximum retail price. Urea fertilisers are a major input into agricultural production and its price has been
fixed since 2003 despite large fluctuations in the cost of inputs. While India is able to produce enough urea fertiliser to meet
domestic needs, it relies on imports to satisfy its demand for compound fertilisers, so that the increase in global fertiliser prices
during 2007 and 2008 saw a large outlay in the subsidies paid for compound fertilisers (Graph 7). There are also substantial
subsidies for electricity. Many farms use unmetered power and pay a subsidised lump-sum based on the power ratings of
pump-sets used for irrigation purposes.
RBA: Bulletin June Quarter 2011-Economic Development and ... http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2011/jun/3.html
8 of 10 4/17/12 5:11 PM
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Chapter 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
With world population expected to reach 8 billion by 2030, pressure on the environment 
is projected to continually increase. The challenge faced by the society is to produce enough 
quality food to meet the needs of the growing population while preserving the natural resource 
base upon which the well-being of present and future generations depends (FAO, 2000).  
My first essay shows how environmental stresses post a threat to food security with a 
reduction in the value of agricultural production. I find that existing land degradation in Ethiopia 
reduces value of agricultural production per hectare by 17.18 Ethiopian Birr or about 3.56% of 
the average value of agricultural production per hectare. Moreover, the effect of land degradation 
shows substantial regional heterogeneity, ranging from 2.49% to 4.37%.  These results suggest 
the need for appropriate policy targeting by incorporating inherent characteristics of the regions 
in the design of policies. 
In response to increasing food prices and greater food price volatility brought about by 
environmental constraints, national governments are pursuing a variety of policies to protect 
population group. Some of these policies are said to further amplify price fluctuations while 
others are attempting to isolate or protect price signals from reaching consumers, traders and 
producers (Andersen, 2012). In Philippines, I find that market prices in distribution and 
consuming regions take longer to respond to policy changes compared to producing and 
procurement regions. My comparison of historical and simulated ‘no policy’ prices show that the 
NFA activities have a very small impact on both rice price levels and variability, and the NFA’s 
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activities only impacted food prices during the small number of self-sufficient production years 
early in the sample.  
Countries normally impose export bans to insulate the domestic market from 
international price volatility and ensure availability in the domestic market at a lower than world 
price.  However, my results in Chapter 4 suggest that domestic consumer and producer markets 
were less integrated during export restrictions period. Plausible explanations include active role 
of storage in the case of rice, and the export ban not being instituted continuously and domestic 
production shocks. For wheat, India actually imported grain during this period, increasing the 
integration between ports and consumer markets, but delinking producing and consuming 
regions. Thus, the export ban in India, similar to what happened with Russian export ban on 
wheat, may have had unintended consequences of increasing domestic price differences thereby 
resulting in lack of domestic market integration. 
In both Philippines and India studies I find that these policies may have unintended 
consequences in some markets and supply side policies would only work had there been enough 
economic activity in that sector. Since the decisions to use these distorting policy instruments are 
taken by domestic governments worldwide, studying the domestic effect of these policies has the 
potential to affect the use of these policies by other countries in the future. 
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APPENDIX A 
Appendix A1. Description of Data Sources 
Description of the GLADIS Data 
 
 The environmental variables used in this study come from GLADIS, which was developed 
in 2010 by the Food Agriculture Organization (FAO)’s Land Degradation Assessment Team. In 
GLADIS, the geographic areas are divided into fine resolution grids of 0.05 degrees, or 5 arc 
minute kmd per grid cell (9x9 kmd at the equator). The raster maps are converted to grids where 
each grid represents a value for the degree of land degradation. GLADIS contains multiple 
environmental measures of the cumulating land degradation from 1981 to 2003 and this study the 
first to use these data. GLADIS is comprised of a series of global maps on the status and trends 
of the main ecosystem services which includes soil health, water quality, biodiversity, biomass 
and social components overlaid on a rainfall-corrected normalized difference vegetation index 
map.26 Each of these ecosystem measures comes from a huge scientific database from experts 
worldwide. These measures of ecosystem health are then mapped into a normalized radar trend 
diagram according to the parameters from the database. Appendix Figure A1 represents the 
database from which the GLADIS measurement is based on and Appendix Figure A2 represents 
a radar diagram trend map. A radar combines parameters representing differing aspects of 
ecosystem services, by converting these measures into indexes that run from 0 (worst) to 100 
(best) and putting these indexes along each ecosystem service axis with equal weights. When the 
values are put in a radar diagram, they represent the strength and weakness of any ecosystem.27  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) is a numerical indicator to analyze remote sensing 
measurements to assess whether there is green vegetation present. 27 For more details on how the radar trend diagrams are constructed, see GLADIS Technical Report (Nachtergaele, 
Petri, Biancalani, Lynden and Velthuizen, 2010). 
http://www.fao.org/nr/lada/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=180&Itemid=168&lang=e!
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Description of the Farm Data and Climate Data 
The household survey was carried out in the Nile basin within Ethiopia by the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) for the 2004-2005 crop year. It covered five 
major regions. Amhara is the biggest region in the Nile basin of Ethiopia, covering 38 percent of 
the nation’s total land area, followed by Oromiya (24 percent), BG (15 percent), Tigray (11 
percent), and SNNPR (5 percent) (Ethiopian Ministry of Water Resources, 1998; Kato et al, 
2009). The household sampling frame was developed to ensure that the twenty woredas or 
districts were nationally representative of the level of rainfall patterns, classes of agro-ecological 
zones, vulnerability of food production systems and the presence of irrigation. One peasant 
association was selected from every woreda for a total 20 peasant associations. Further, random 
sampling was used to select 50 households from each peasant administration. The final dataset 
contains 1,000 households. Households may farm up to 19 plots. The household level 
questionnaire collected information about household endowment of assets, household 
composition, income and expenditures, and adoption of agricultural and land management 
technologies. A plot level survey collected information on all of the plots owned or operated by 
the household, including information about land tenure, plot quality characteristics, land 
management practices, use of inputs and outputs during belg (fall, February to June) and mehere 
(summer, June to October). Each household is geocoded, a feature of these data that has not 
previously been used. In addition to the farmer survey, IFPRI water research team’s Climate 
Research Unit of East Anglia database provided average rainfall data and temperature for years 
2004-2005. Appendix Figure A3 shows GLADIS and IFPRI merged data and Ethiopia State Map.  
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Appendix(Figure(A2.(Land(degradation(Radar(Trend(Diagram(in(Different(Land(Use(Systems(
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Source:!GLADIS!Technical!Report!No!17,!LADA!Network,!FAO
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Figure 47 Land degradation trends in different land use systems (world averages) 
 
 
4.4 The Biophysical Degradation Index 
 
The Biophisical Degradation Index (BDI) describes the state of the biophysical environment 
in a similar way as the land degradation index but does not consider the socio-economic 
factors. First the global environmental index is calculated as 1-((400-B,S,WBd)/400). Second 
the severity of the degradation has also been calculated. The method considers how many 
biophysical goods and services are heavily affected based on a threshold rule that considers 
the sum of critical axis values (Biomass < 25, Soil < 37.5, Water < 25, Biodiversity < 25.  
 
Ignoring the socio-economic aspects results in some differences although these are not large. 
Notable shifts as compared with the land degradation index are the worse environmental 
situation in the Mediterranean basin (Spain, Greece, Lebanon, Cyprus, Morocco, and Italy) 
and the improved situation for the Central Asian countries (emphasizing that problems there 
are socio-economic rather than environmental). Countries with significant water stress 
continue to score badly (Belgium, Switzerland, The Netherlands, Germany). An overview is 
given in Figure 48. 
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Appendix(Figure(A3.(GLADIS(and(IFPRI(Study(area(and(distribution(of(respondents(
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Spatially Weighted Regression
Net Income per hectare
Land Degradation -17.23***
(5.63)
Environmental Characteristics
Aridisol Soil -299.3
(482.00)
Entisol Soil -463.7*
(261.00)
Mollisol Soil -123.51
(264.00)
Slope 43.1
(42.30)
Elevation -0.004
(0.06)
Rainfall -0.76***
(0.06)
Temperature 40.90***
(15.10)
Socio-Environment Characteristics
Population Density -0.1
(1.66)
Access to Basic Facilities -0.63
(1.26)
Access to Information 9.785*
(7.90)
Farm Characteristics
Irrigation Intensity 89.8*
(72.10)
Distance of farm from home 3.9
(7.67)
Land Tenure Characteristics
Inheritance Dummy 1.1
(1.48)
Land Certified from Govt Dummy -39.7
(15.02)
Sharecropped Dummy 12.0
(18.60)
Rent Dummy -13.2
(1187.00)
Appendix Table A1.  Regression Results for Net Income as the Dependent Variable
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Spatially Weighted Regression
Net Income per hectare
Farmer Demographics
Big Ethnic Group 87.2
(27.47)
Number of Children 2.2
(2.33)
Male head 17.8
(19.95)
Farming Years -4.4
(5.44)
Livestock ownership dummy -417.5
(561.00)
Asset Index 90.3
(114.40)
Regional Fixed Effects
Tigray Region 348.7
(385.50)
Amhara Region 79.81**
(33.21)
Oromiya Region -50.4
(29.77)
Benishangul Gumuz Region -517.367***
(320.00)
Neighbor's Characteristics
N's Land Degradation -28.6***
(14.78)
Constant -2,514***
(1236.00)
Observations 828
R-squared 0.2090
Underidentification test 0.215a
                 Chi-sq(2) P-val 0.8982
Overidentification test 0.885b
                 Chi-sq(2) P-val 0.3469
a Anderson Canonical Correlation LM Statistic
b Sargan Statistic
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Continued Appendix Table A1.  Regression Results for Net Income as the Dependent 
Variable
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AgVal1 AgVal1b AgVal2 AgVal3 AgVal4 AgVal5 AgVal6 AgVal7
Predicted Land Degradation -38.6 -16.8*** -14.99*** -18.4*** -16* -17.18*** -16.75***
(37.7000) (4.8000) (6.9700) (9.3000) (12.0500) (9.44) (7.61)
Predicted Land Degradation Squared -33.18
(840.8000)
Environmental Characteristics
Aridisol Soil -124.1 -124.1 -124.1 -216.1 -411.1 -411.1
(168.20) (168.20) (168.20) (159.20) (1058.00) (1047.00)
Entisol Soil -312.5 -387.5 -298.4** -254.4 -293.12** -293.12**
(123.80) (123.80) (123.80) (243.80) (123.80) (119.40)
Mollisol Soil 0.0 0.0 0.0 -176.0000 -194.1 -194.1
(156.00) (156.00) (155.50) (169.00) (737.80) (730.10)
Slope 40.7 43.5 30.4 80.5 91.5 91.5
(35.11) (35.11) (35.11) (135.11) (229.60) (227.20)
Elevation 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Rainfall -0.28 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.338 -0.338
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.31) (0.31)
Temperature -55.89* -65.45*** -75.95*** -35.95* -30.63** -30.63**
(24.66) (24.66) (24.66) (24.66) (17.50) (14.00)
Socio-Environment Characteristics
Population Density 0.394 0.416 0.436 0.1 0.1
(0.3440) (0.3510) (0.3360) (0.13) (0.13)
Access to Basic Facilities -3.07 -1.309 1.45E+01 2.217 2.217
(25.5100) (25.8100) (24.4100) (7.94) (7.85)
Access to Information 29.44 31.24 14.61 8.802* 8.802*
(23.9800) (24.3200) (23.1500) (6.10) (5.98)
Farm Characteristics
Irrigation Intensity 60.60 45.69 90.25 56.77* 56.77*
(119.5000) (121.9000) (115.9000) (47.28) (41.28)
Distance of farm from home 16.40 18.38 26 1.5 1.5
(143.3000) (147.0000) (137.8000) (35.86) (35.48)
Appendix Table A2.  Test for Omitted Variable Bias Second Stage of Regression with Spatially Weighted Variables
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AgVal1 AgVal2 AgVal3 AgVal4 AgVal5 AgVal6 AgVal7 AgVal8
Land Tenure Characteristics
Inheritance Dummy -1.24 3.26 -6.1 -6.1
(220.1000) (10.2000) (53.67) (53.10)
Rent Dummy 57.6 -34.41 -80.4 -80.4
(32.4000) (39.6000) (186.70) (189.50)
Sharecropped Dummy 61.02 42.78 -55.4 -55.4
(812.2000) (67.0000) (56.16) (55.57)
Land Certified from Govt -36.0 -50.174 40.3 40.3
(65.9000) (161.8000) (146.10) (144.50)
Farmer Demographics
Big Ethnic Group -70.8** -80.9 -80.9
(28.5000) (130.90) (129.50)
Number of Children -13.39 -5.7 -5.7
(43.6200) (11.40) (11.28)
Male head 33.1 16.9 16.9
(32.3900) (103.70) (102.60)
Farming Years -1.98** -3.1 -3.1
(0.0570) (2.69) (2.66)
Livestock ownership dummy 35.27 478.9*** 478.9***
(40.1900) (57.92) (57.31)
Asset Index -19.13* 42.72* 42.72*
(10.6900) (27.58) (27.29)
Regional Fixed Effects
Tigray Region 203.1** 223.6**
(156.00) (141.00)
Amhara Region -63.3 -63.3
(367.50) (367.50)
Oromiya Region -158.1 -158.1
(138.00) (138.00)
Benishangul Gumuz Region -524.1*** -489.3***
(123.80) (117.80)
Continued Appendix Table A2. Test for Omitted Variable Bias Second Stage of Regression with Spatially Weighted Variables
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AgVal1 AgVal2 AgVal3 AgVal4 AgVal5 AgVal6 AgVal7 AgVal8
Neighbor's Characteristics
N's Land Degradation -27.3***
(14.09)
Constant 1,211* 1,167* 1,935* 1,211* 1,435* 1,085* 1,375* -1293.4*
(671.00) (615.00) (564.00) (780.00) (435.00) (597.00) (576.00) (440.10)
Observations 828 828 828 828 828 828 828 828
Adj R-squared 0 0 0.11 0.118 0.118 0.247 0.2456 0.2425
RESET Test= Ho: Model has no omitted variables
F Statistic 1.02 1.35 1.58 1.76 1.89 1.94 2.01 2.15
Prob>F 0.38230 0.25780 0.19200 0.15800 0.40000 0.25434 0.11638 0.1524
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Continued Appendix Table A2. Test for Omitted Variable Bias Second Stage of Regression with Spatially Weighted Variables
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AgVal1 AgVal1b AgVal2 AgVal3 AgVal4 AgVal5 AgVal6 AgVal7 AgVal8
Predicted Land Degradation 1.00 4.34 4.96 4.51 4.34 4.87 4.15 4.12
Predicted Land Degradation 
Squared 1.00
Environmental Characteristics
Aridisol Soil 4.5 4.83 3.77 5.59 4.13 4.42 4.34
Entisol Soil 5.86 5.34 4.59 4.97 3.27 3.75 4.05
Mollisol Soil 4.74 4.47 4.38 3.59 5.51 5.02 4.09
Slope 4.92 1.01 2.12 4.43 4.01 4.54 4.45
Elevation 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.04 1.04 1.13
Rainfall 1.51 1.61 2.04 2.16 2.58 2.58 4.47
Temperature 1.25 1.30 1.56 1.75 3.09 3.24 2.57
Socio-Environment Characteristics
Population Density 1.09 1.10 1.1 1.15 1.16 1.2
Access to Basic Facilities 1.10 1.20 1.26 1.42 1.44 2.4
Access to Information 1.08 1.11 1.13 1.18 1.24 1.94
Farm Characteristics
Irrigation Intensity 3.60 4.73 3.82 3.12 4.64
Distance of farm from home 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.03 1.05
Land Tenure Characteristics
Inheritance Dummy 1.49 1.62 1.67 2.87
Land Certified 1.49 1.54 1.65 3.13
Sharecrop Dummy 1.09 1.64 1.66 1.67
Rent Dummy 1 1.54 1.54 1.55
Appendix Table A3. Test for Variance Inflation Factor
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AgVal1 AgVal1b AgVal2 AgVal3 AgVal4 AgVal5 AgVal6 AgVal7 AgVal8
Farmer Demographics
Big Ethnic Group 2.59 2.78 3.78
Children 1.17 1.17 1.19
Gender 1.12 1.12 1.18
Farming Years 1.27 1.3 1.41
Asset Index 1.18 1.18 1.25
Livestock own dummy 1.19 1.2 1.21
Neighbor's Characteristics
N's Land Degradation 2.32 2.94
Regional Fixed Effects
Tigray Region 1.82
Amhara Region 3.64
Oromiya Region 3.84
Benishangul Gumuz Region 4.77
Mean VIF 1.00 1.00 4.13 4.49 4.20 4.85 4.37 4.37 4.49
Continued Appendix Table A3. Test for Variance Inflation Factor
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Appendix Table B1. Unit Root Tests for all Variables Used in the Study
including 
constant 
and trend
including 
constant 
but no 
trend
excluding 
both 
constant 
and trend
Z(rho) Z(t) Z(rho) Z(t) Z(rho) Z(t)
1% critical value -3.989 -3.458 -2.58 -28.452 -3.989 -20.321 -3.458 -13.61 -2.58
5% critical value -3.429 -2.879 -1.95 -21.321 -3.429 -14 -2.879 -8 -1.95
10% critical value -3.13 -2.57 -1.62 -18.01 -3.13 -11.2 -2.57 -5.7 -1.62
Central Luzon Wholesale Price -2.795 -0.169 1.473 -20.261* -3.319* -1.265 -0.575 0.750 1.024
ARMM Wholesale Price -2.070 0.012 1.796 -10.668 -2.265 -0.806 -0.444 1.032 1.677
Mimaropa Wholesale Price -2.360 -0.165 1.793 -15.409 -2.841 -0.932 -0.499 0.873 1.317
NCR Wholesale Price -2.686 -0.777 1.421 -22.536** -3.389* -2.456 -1.090 0.741 0.954
World Price -3.397* -1.620 -0.159 -20.940* -3.278* -5.783 -1.652 -0.367 -0.218
NFA Buying Premium -6.075*** -4.848*** -3.826*** -201.782*** -11.896*** -176.777*** -10.768*** -138.225*** -9.217***
NFA Selling Premium -2.439 -1.811 -0.907 -13.272 -2.579 -7.406 -1.943 -2.614 -1.009
diff Central Luzon Wholesale Price -9.325*** -9.343*** -9.047*** -224.661*** -14.564*** -224.842*** -14.753*** -225.728*** -14.523***
diff ARMM Wholesale Price -9.057*** -9.041*** -8.597*** -217.145*** -14.278*** -217.391*** -14.298*** -218.637*** -14.155***
diff Mimaropa Wholesale Price -8.969*** -8.949*** -8.614*** -169.093*** -11.527*** -169.110*** -11.543*** -169.175*** -11.482***
diff NCR Wholesale Price -9.946*** -9.964*** -9.679*** -175.107*** -12.395*** -175.111*** -12.422*** -175.677*** -12.379***
diff World Price -7.967*** -7.980*** -7.943*** -141.849*** -10.553*** -141.855*** -10.575*** -141.902*** -10.588***
diff NFA Buying Premium -10.398*** -10.410*** -10.432*** -313.977*** -30.673*** -314.006*** -30.717*** -313.997*** -30.789***
diff NFA Selling Premium -7.535*** -7.550*** -7.550*** -242.120*** -15.136*** -242.119*** -15.165*** -242.184*** -15.185***
Ho: unit root is present : I(1) non-stationary need to do VAR in differences; statistic is not significant
Ha: no unit root present or reject Ho: I(0) stationary implies can do VAR levels; statistic is significant
Left of critical value on the number line, significant, reject Ho.
Note: Shocks to a stationary series are temporary; thus, the series reverts to its long run means. For non stationary series, shocks resul in permanent moved away from the long run 
mean of series. Stationary series have a finite variance but not for non stationary. If you accept the null hypothesis, i.e. significant, you conclude that there is unit root. Thus you 
should first difference the series before procedding with analysis. If you reject the null hypothesis of a unit root,  and conclude that the approval series is stationary or I(0); we can 
do VAR in levels
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Phillips-Perron Test
including constant 
and trend
including constant 
but no trend
excluding both 
constant and trend
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Continued Appendix Table B1. Unit Root Tests for all Variables Used in the Study
including 
constant 
and trend
including 
constant 
but no 
trend
excluding 
both 
constant 
and trend
Z(rho) Z(t) Z(rho) Z(t) Z(rho) Z(t)
1% critical value -3.989 -3.458 -2.58 -28.452 -3.989 -20.321 -3.458 -13.61 -2.58
5% critical value -3.429 -2.879 -1.95 -21.321 -3.429 -14 -2.879 -8 -1.95
10% critical value -3.13 -2.57 -1.62 -18.01 -3.13 -11.2 -2.57 -5.7 -1.62
ln Central Luzon Wholesale Price -3.274* -0.500 1.384 -28.696*** -4.012*** -1.609 -0.751 0.303 1.144
ln ARMM Wholesale Price -2.665 -0.674 1.448 -20.217* -3.266* -2.935 -1.352 0.417 1.498
ln Mimaropa Wholesale Price -2.635 -0.730 1.650 -16.402 -2.890 -1.505 -0.826 0.367 1.464
ln NCR Wholesale Price -2.802 -1.419 1.748 -20.413* -3.269* -3.020 -1.546 0.407 1.531
ln World Price -3.261* -1.318 0.814 -21.123* -3.268* -3.641 -1.344 0.378 0.720
ln NFA Buying Premium -4.923*** -3.519*** -3.060*** -107.327*** -8.109*** -61.307*** -5.997*** -40.308*** -4.882***
ln NFA Selling Premium -3.002 -2.759* -1.535*** -18.110* -3.011 -15.191*** -2.805* -5.029 -1.549
diff ln Central Luzon Wholesale Price -8.838*** -8.889*** -8.604*** -318.541*** -20.593*** -318.710*** -20.614*** -320.545*** -20.492***
diff ln ARMM Wholesale Price -10.139*** -10.158*** -9.790*** -246.411*** -16.788*** -246.326*** -16.820*** -248.060*** -16.668***
diff ln Mimaropa Wholesale Price -8.279*** -8.295*** -8.012*** -181.209*** -12.049*** -181.208*** -12.072*** -181.328*** -12.005***
diff ln NCR Wholesale Price -8.887*** -8.881*** -8.560*** -184.847*** -13.183*** -184.897*** -13.201*** -185.959*** -13.113***
diff ln World Price -7.018*** -7.032*** -6.947*** -162.702*** -11.365*** -162.703*** -11.387*** -162.764*** -11.386***
diff ln NFA Buying Premium -10.529*** -10.542*** -10.545*** -292.639*** -24.229*** -292.688*** -24.273*** -292.786*** -24.307***
diff ln NFA Selling Premium -7.064*** -7.078*** -7.092*** -264.404*** -16.305*** -264.410*** -16.332*** -264.409*** -16.362***
Ho: unit root is present : I(1) non-stationary need to do VAR in differences; statistic is not significant
Ha: no unit root present or reject Ho: I(0) stationary implies can do VAR levels; statistic is significant
Left of critical value on the number line, significant, reject Ho.
Note: Shocks to a stationary series are temporary; thus, the series reverts to its long run means. For non stationary series, shocks resul in permanent moved away from the long run 
mean of series. Stationary series have a finite variance but not for non stationary. If you accept the null hypothesis, i.e. significant, you conclude that there is unit root. Thus you 
should first difference the series before procedding with analysis. If you reject the null hypothesis of a unit root,  and conclude that the approval series is stationary or I(0); we can 
do VAR in levels
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Phillips-Perron Test
including constant 
and trend
including constant 
but no trend
excluding both 
constant and trend
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Appendix Table 2. Test for Seasonality
2a. Correlogram for d.Central Luzon
Lag AC PAC Q Prob>Q
2 0.085 0.0719 5.9682 0.0506
4 -0.259 -0.2599 25.382 0.000
6 -0.1429 -0.0846 37.091 0.000
8 0.0251 -0.0197 39.143 0.000
10 0.1232 0.0506 44.108 0.000
12 0.0874 0.0567 46.57 0.000
2a. Correlogram for d.ARMM
Lag AC PAC Q Prob>Q
2 -0.042 -0.0616 5.6331 0.0598
4 -0.1505 -0.1579 12.033 0.0171
6 -0.1849 -0.1947 22.837 0.0009
8 0.0872 0.0412 25.022 0.0015
10 -0.0723 -0.0646 38.846 0.000
12 0.1086 0.0695 45.767 0.000
2a. Correlogram for d.Mimaropa
Lag AC PAC Q Prob>Q
2 0.1144 0.0102 33.074 0.000
4 -0.1908 -0.1451 45.165 0.000
6 -0.2166 -0.1106 73.923 0.000
8 0.0618 0.0949 79.439 0.000
10 0.1011 0.0548 82.413 0.000
12 0.0618 -0.0465 89.467 0.000
2a. Correlogram for d.NCR
Lag AC PAC Q Prob>Q
2 -0.0074 -0.0767 17.972 0.0001
4 -0.2609 -0.252 38.256 0
6 -0.204 -0.1714 63.74 0
8 0.0573 0.005 67.895 0
10 0.1661 0.0382 80.925 0
12 -0.0014 -0.0679 87.356 0
2a. Correlogram for d.World
Lag AC PAC Q Prob>Q
2 -0.043 -0.2217 41.125 0
4 -0.1098 -0.0068 53.258 0
6 -0.0851 -0.1716 55.354 0
8 -0.1155 0.0032 69.143 0
10 0.1014 0.021 72.144 0
12 -0.0133 -0.0118 73.101 0
2a. Correlogram for d.NFABuy Premium
Lag AC PAC Q Prob>Q
2 -0.0746 -0.2693 44.351 0
4 -0.0427 -0.1277 45.293 0
6 -0.0142 -0.1529 45.709 0
8 -0.0096 -0.2012 46.006 0
10 -0.0803 -0.1086 52.062 0
12 0.0218 -0.0891 52.248 0
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2a. Correlogram for d.NFA Sell Premium
Lag AC PAC Q Prob>Q
2 0.04 0.0334 2.3649 0.3065
4 -0.0588 -0.0465 5.3736 0.2511
6 -0.0703 -0.0718 6.9778 0.3229
8 -0.0206 -0.0263 7.3574 0.4986
10 -0.0902 -0.0872 9.9335 0.4463
12 0.0148 0.0048 10.21 0.5976
2b. Correlogram for Central Luzon Equation Residual
Lag AC PAC Q Prob>Q
2 -0.0122 -0.0132 0.36497 0.8332
4 -0.0072 -0.0064 0.40952 0.9817
6 -0.0344 -0.0357 0.75352 0.9933
8 -0.0589 -0.0649 1.8386 0.9856
10 0.0775 0.059 5.4973 0.8556
12 0.0594 0.0563 6.5438 0.8862
2b. Correlogram for ARMM Equation Residual
Lag AC PAC Q Prob>Q
2 0.0225 0.0226 0.14082 0.932
4 -0.0264 -0.0265 0.43293 0.9797
6 -0.1247 -0.1264 6.5308 0.3664
8 -0.0062 0.0017 6.655 0.5743
10 -0.0069 -0.0294 21.972 0.0152
12 0.1113 0.1008 26.791 0.0083
2b. Correlogram for Mimaropa Equation Residual
Lag AC PAC Q Prob>Q
2 -0.0336 -0.0337 0.31949 0.8524
4 -0.0073 -0.0087 0.41265 0.9814
6 -0.1584 -0.1617 7.4535 0.2809
8 0.0739 0.0671 9.1802 0.3273
10 0.0747 0.0829 20.477 0.025
12 -0.0319 -0.0797 23.267 0.0255
2b. Correlogram for NCR Equation Residual
Lag AC PAC Q Prob>Q
2 -0.0661 -0.0662 1.2306 0.5405
4 0.0088 0.0042 1.3318 0.856
6 -0.0871 -0.0875 3.4797 0.7467
8 -0.0384 -0.0548 5.73 0.6774
10 0.0435 0.0325 6.5 0.7717
12 -0.025 -0.0273 9.7246 0.6401
2b. Correlogram for World Equation Residual
Lag AC PAC Q Prob>Q
2 0.009 0.009 0.03004 0.9851
4 -0.1014 -0.1027 3.2849 0.5113
6 -0.1076 -0.114 10.694 0.0983
8 -0.0373 -0.0537 14.55 0.0685
10 0.0471 0.0184 15.459 0.1162
12 0.0494 0.0629 18.422 0.1035
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2b. Correlogram for NFA Buy Prce Premium Equation Residual
Lag AC PAC Q Prob>Q
2 -0.0492 -0.0494 0.72521 0.6959
4 -0.1251 -0.1309 6.4505 0.1679
6 -0.0867 -0.1303 17.444 0.0078
8 0.0132 -0.0733 18.155 0.0201
10 -0.0117 -0.0975 23.471 0.0091
12 0.0287 -0.0158 24.103 0.0197
2b. Correlogram for NFA Sell Prce Premium Equation Residual
Lag AC PAC Q Prob>Q
2 0.0167 0.0167 0.10713 0.9478
4 0.0049 0.0047 0.12366 0.9982
6 0.0097 0.0116 2.1674 0.9037
8 -0.0583 -0.0591 3.7251 0.881
10 -0.1496 -0.1617 11.889 0.2925
12 -0.0365 -0.0337 12.367 0.4167
2c. Likelihood Ratio Test for Seasonality
LR=2(LLU-LLR)=2[-2366.806-(-2376.07)]=18.53***
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Appendix Table B3a. VAR results with Trends
VARIABLES dcentralluz_wh darmm_wh dmimaropa_wh dncr_wh dworld dnfabuyprem dnfasellprem
L.dcentralluz_wh -0.360*** -0.0958 -0.0192 0.0151 0.0828 0.711 -0.102
(0.079) (0.071) (0.060) (0.088) (0.139) (0.617) (0.114)
L2.dcentralluz_wh -0.11 -0.0726 0.00897 -0.0875 0.029 0.494 -0.0349
(0.083) (0.075) (0.064) (0.093) (0.147) (0.654) (0.120)
L3.dcentralluz_wh -0.0418 0.157** 0.0533 -0.138 0.0674 1.393** -0.149
(0.082) (0.074) (0.063) (0.091) (0.144) (0.640) (0.118)
L4.dcentralluz_wh -0.137* -0.0891 -0.0796 -0.0773 0.00584 0.779 -0.0342
(0.079) (0.071) (0.061) (0.088) (0.139) (0.620) (0.114)
L.darmm_wh -0.0118 -0.00943 -0.0216 -0.104 -0.196 -0.987 -0.0462
(0.078) (0.071) (0.060) (0.087) (0.138) (0.614) (0.113)
L2.darmm_wh 0.014 -0.113 0.0242 0.0232 -0.183 1.289** 0.067
(0.077) (0.070) (0.059) (0.086) (0.136) (0.606) (0.112)
L3.darmm_wh -0.125 0.0796 0.0707 -0.0601 -0.00366 -0.374 -0.175
(0.077) (0.070) (0.059) (0.086) (0.135) (0.603) (0.111)
L4.darmm_wh 0.128 -0.0751 -0.00684 0.0919 0.0139 0.701 -0.0511
(0.079) (0.071) (0.060) (0.087) (0.138) (0.616) (0.113)
L.dmimaropa_wh 0.127 0.094 -0.0534 -0.0419 -0.261 0.365 0.0466
(0.107) (0.097) (0.082) (0.119) (0.188) (0.837) (0.154)
L2.dmimaropa_wh -0.0424 -0.0609 -0.0417 0.0456 -0.148 -0.178 -0.135
(0.104) (0.094) (0.080) (0.115) (0.182) (0.813) (0.150)
L3.dmimaropa_wh 0.0242 -0.0778 -0.178** 0.0993 0.22 -0.425 0.122
(0.100) (0.090) (0.076) (0.111) (0.175) (0.781) (0.144)
L4.dmimaropa_wh -0.294*** -0.00973 -0.118 -0.181* -0.234 0.128 0.197
(0.094) (0.085) (0.072) (0.105) (0.165) (0.737) (0.136)
L.dncr_wh 0.420*** 0.198*** 0.335*** 0.134* 0.511*** -0.827 -0.115
(0.067) (0.061) (0.052) (0.075) (0.118) (0.526) (0.097)
L2.dncr_wh -0.0735 0.00846 -0.0674 -0.191** -0.300** -0.990* 0.0974
(0.073) (0.066) (0.056) (0.082) (0.129) (0.575) (0.106)
L3.dncr_wh 0.0724 -0.0657 -0.0448 -0.00678 0.0561 -1.028* -0.0688
(0.074) (0.066) (0.056) (0.082) (0.129) (0.577) (0.106)
L4.dncr_wh 0.0789 0.0668 0.0556 -0.116 -0.0693 -0.685 0.157
(0.074) (0.067) (0.057) (0.082) (0.129) (0.577) (0.106)
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VARIABLES lncentralluz_wh lnarmm_wh lnmimaropa_wh lnncr_wh lnworld lnnfabuyprem lnnfasellprem
L.dworld 0.131*** 0.0666* 0.0599** 0.111*** 0.460*** -0.168 -0.114**
(0.038) (0.035) (0.029) (0.043) (0.068) (0.301) (0.055)
L2.dworld 0.134*** 0.140*** 0.0804*** 0.182*** -0.136* 0.143 -0.0743
(0.040) (0.036) (0.031) (0.045) (0.071) (0.314) (0.058)
L3.dworld 0.0135 0.0438 0.0321 0.0205 -0.197*** -0.23 -0.136**
(0.041) (0.037) (0.032) (0.046) (0.072) (0.322) (0.059)
L4.dworld 0.0745* 0.0471 0.0413 0.0607 0.176** -0.146 0.0415
(0.040) (0.036) (0.031) (0.045) (0.071) (0.316) (0.058)
L.dnfabuyprem -0.0135* -0.00311 -0.00901 -0.0162* -0.0152 -0.595*** 0.000486
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.014) (0.061) (0.011)
L2.dnfabuyprem -0.0181** -0.000732 0.00118 -0.00824 0.00276 -0.439*** -0.00209
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.016) (0.070) (0.013)
L3.dnfabuyprem -0.0147* -2.41E-03 -4.36E-03 -0.009 -0.00887 -0.242*** 0.0134
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.016) (0.069) (0.013)
L4.dnfabuyprem -0.0149* -9.48E-04 2.28E-04 -0.0124 -0.00915 -0.140** 0.00535
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.014) (0.060) (0.011)
L.dnfasellprem 0.0468 0.0323 -0.0148 -0.0197 -0.0085 -0.394 -0.0638
(0.047) (0.042) (0.036) (0.052) (0.082) (0.366) (0.068)
L2.dnfasellprem -0.0139 0.0025 -0.0687* 0.00643 -0.0837 -0.138 0.00597
(0.047) (0.042) (0.036) (0.052) (0.082) (0.364) (0.067)
L3.dnfasellprem 0.0107 0.0981** 0.054 -0.00158 0.00345 -0.401 -0.142**
(0.046) (0.042) (0.035) (0.051) (0.081) (0.361) (0.067)
L4.dnfasellprem 0.0271 -0.0229 -0.0126 0.0635 0.104 0.000333 0.0138
(0.046) (0.042) (0.036) (0.052) (0.082) (0.364) (0.067)
wetseason -0.0894 -0.00917 -0.250*** -0.268** -0.115 1.061 0.0846
(0.096) (0.087) (0.074) (0.106) (0.168) (0.751) (0.138)
trend 0.000644 0.00047 0.000373 0.000155 0.000275 -0.00102 0.00019
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
Constant 0.0321 0.00335 0.179** 0.250** 0.119 -0.628 -0.0802
(0.102) (0.092) (0.078) (0.113) (0.179) (0.797) (0.147)
Observations 272 272 272 272 272 272 272
R-squared 0.3834 0.2961 0.4201 0.2957 0.3291 0.3126 0.2264
Continued Appendix Table B3a. VAR results with Trends
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Appendix Table B3b. Likelihood Ratio Test for Seasonality
LR=2(LLU-LLR)=2[-2365.152-(-2366.805)]=3.306; not significant
lag LL LR df p FPE AIC HQIC SBIC 
0 -2646.33 0.793167 -0.335044 -0.335044 -.335044* 
1 -2519.9 252.86 49 0 4.48E-01 -0.9065 -.644993* -0.255194
2 -2447.57 144.66 49 0 .377428* -1.07866* -0.555646 0.223952
3 -2400.09 94.952 49 0 3.82E-01 -1.06741 -0.282892 0.886506
4 -2361.01 78.174* 49 0.005 4.13E-01 -0.994251 0.051774 1.61097
5 -2330.87 60.279 49 0.13 4.77E-01 -0.855059 0.452472 2.40147
Appendix Table B4. Lag Order Selection for Model with the trend term and seasonal dummies
Appendix Table B5. Lagrange-multiplier Test for selected VAR
Lag chi2 df Prob>chi2
1 80.3697 49 0.00313
2 131.0694 49 0.0000
3 76.78 49 0.00681
4* 58.9585 49 0.15595
5 65.9101 49 0.15377
6 61.3211 49 0.11134
7 54.9111 49 0.26063
8 55.52 49 0.24253
9 53.0948 49 0.31932
10 64.7946 49 0.06473
11 51.1051 49 0.39095
12 57.0314 49 0.20121
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APPENDIX C 
Appendix Table C1. Timeline of Export Restriction Measures for Rice and Wheat in India 
Non-basmati rice 
• April 2007- Futures trading on rice was suspended 
• October 9, 2007 – Ban exports 
• October 31, 2007 – Ban lifted and replaced with MEP 
of ME$425/t fob 
• December 2007 – MEP raised to $US500/t 
• March 5, 2008 – MEP raised to $US650/t and import 
duty was reduced to zero 
• March 27, 2008 – MEP to ME$1000/t 
• April 1, 2008 – Ban Exports 
• September 2009 – Ban extended 
• Feb 2010 – Ban continued except for 3 premium 
varieties with ME$800/t MEP and quota of 150,000t 
for MY 2010/11 
• July 2010 – Decided to continue the ban 
• September 2011 – Ban lifted 
Basmati rice 
• March 8, 2008 – MEP increased to $US950/t at the 
same time import duty was reduced to zero 
• March 17, 2008: basmati rice exports were restricted 
only to two ports, Mundra and Pipavav 
• March 27, 2008 – MEP raised to $US1100/t 
• April 1, 2008 – MEP raised to ME$1200/t 
• April 29, 2009 – Export tax of Rs.8000/t (approx. 
ME$200) 
• January 20, 2009- Tax removed and MEP reduced to 
ME$1100/t 
• September 2009 – MEP reduced to ME$900/t 
• Feb 2010 – MEP of ME$900/t 
Wheat 
• September 2006: Import tariff was reduced to zero and 
private sector allowed to import to increase supply in 
open market 
• December 2006- duty free imports 
• February 2007 – export ban on wheat and wheat 
products until end of December 2007. Also banned 
futures trading in wheat. 
• October 2007-  ban extended indefinitely 
• July 3, 2009 – Export quota of 3 million tons through 
STEs 
• July 13, 2009 – July 3 quota withdrawn and full export 
ban re-imposed 
• May 2010- Export quota of 650,000 t for one year 
• September 2011– Ban lifted 
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Appendix Table C2. Unit root tests for all variables used in the Study (Levels, Logs, Differences in Levels, Differences in Logs)
including 
constant and 
trend
including 
constant but 
no trend
excluding 
both constant 
and trend
Z(rho) Z(t) Z(rho) Z(t) Z(rho) Z(t)
1% critical value -3.96 -3.43 -2.58 -29.5 -3.96 -20.7 -3.43 -13.8 -2.58
5% critical value -3.41 -2.86 -1.95 -21.8 -3.41 -14.1 -2.86 -8.1 -1.95
10% critical value -3.12 -2.57 -1.62 -18.3 -3.12 -11.3 -2.57 -5.7 -1.62
bijnaur_rice -4.239*** -0.433 1.639 -287.179*** -13.416*** -6.326 -1.749 0.596 0.804
burdwan_rice -2.259 0.054 1.788 -12.339 -2.450 0.093 0.050 0.812 1.747
westgodavari_rice -2.896 0.056 1.639 -68.333*** -6.108*** -2.364 -0.846 1.084 1.023
unnao_wheat -3.161* -0.296 1.358 -25.409** -3.432** -1.765 -0.650 0.812 1.222
ludhiana_wheat -4.435** -0.777 1.173 -233.244*** -11.930*** -9.021 -2.083 0.512 0.546
gurgaon_wheat -3.158* -0.397 1.353 -84.717*** -6.853*** -5.105 -1.426 0.654 0.899
vadodara_rice -2.689 -0.850 1.122 -24.435** -3.563** -2.909 -1.171 0.664 0.875
mangalore_rice -3.907** -0.895 0.741 -412.083*** -16.498*** -49.927*** -5.242*** 0.975 -0.484
ernakulam_rice -3.675** -1.127 0.421 -279.252*** -13.157*** -43.807*** -4.886*** -1.075 -0.517
kachch_wheat -3.177* -0.476 1.137 -148.935*** -9.277*** -12.142 -2.365 0.555 0.499
mysore_wheat -4.772*** -0.409 1.504 -429.575*** -17.001*** -11.486 -2.392 0.528 0.509
malda_wheat -3.274* -0.946 0.762 -29.474** -3.809** -4.747 -1.301 0.641 0.711
rice world -3.439** -1.489 0.125 -19.423* -3.163* -3.395 -1.245 0.433 0.378
wheat world -2.908 -1.153 0.460 -19.050* -3.167* -3.602 -1.242 0.345 0.350
delhi_rice -2.727 -0.837 1.138 -89.615*** -7.202*** -5.398 -1.581 0.386 0.436
mumbai_rice -2.211 -1.275 0.575 -21.292* -3.319* -3.823 -1.413 0.257 0.308
kolkata_rice -2.473 -0.101 1.609 -49.719*** -5.291*** -2.189 -0.794 0.742 0.927
delhi_wheat -3.035 -0.009 2.098 -156.335*** -9.605*** -2.670 -0.992 0.830 1.134
mumbai_wheat -2.278 0.019 1.850 -23.734** -3.642** -0.821 -0.403 0.838 1.272
patna_wheat -4.501*** -0.557 1.367 -156.547*** -9.633*** -3.380 -1.182 0.625 0.860
rainfall -6.773*** -6.783*** -4.359*** -45.218*** -4.803*** -45.303 -4.814 -20.977*** -3.255***
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Phillips-Perron Test
including constant and trend
including constant but no 
trend
excluding both constant and 
trend
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Continued Appendix Table C2.  Unit root tests for all variables used in the Study (Levels, Logs, Differences in Levels, Differences in Logs)
including 
constant and 
trend
including 
constant but 
no trend
excluding 
both constant 
and trend
Z(rho) Z(t) Z(rho) Z(t) Z(rho) Z(t)
1% critical value -3.96 -3.43 -2.58 -29.5 -3.96 -20.7 -3.43 -13.8 -2.58
5% critical value -3.41 -2.86 -1.95 -21.8 -3.41 -14.1 -2.86 -8.1 -1.95
10% critical value -3.12 -2.57 -1.62 -18.3 -3.12 -11.3 -2.57 -5.7 -1.62
ln bijnaur_rice -4.410*** -0.804 1.711 -272.320*** -13.030*** -6.038 -1.838 0.311 1.109
ln burdwan_rice -2.782 -0.318 1.802 -18.930* -3.117* -0.597 -0.318 0.293 1.689
ln westgodavari_rice -4.966*** -0.706 1.495 -337.464*** -14.714*** -8.251 -2.149 0.458 0.942
ln unnao_wheat -3.494** -0.672 1.279 -27.847** -3.720** -2.727 -1.045 0.371 1.258
ln ludhiana_wheat -4.548*** -1.060 1.313 -207.880*** -11.206*** -7.456 -1.996 0.347 0.893
ln gurgaon_wheat -3.551** -0.724 1.332 -89.844*** -7.112*** -5.467 -1.620 0.329 1.061
ln vadodara_rice -2.634 -1.119 1.191 -36.269*** -4.413*** -4.407 -1.604 0.330 0.981
ln mangalore_rice -3.087 -0.233 1.849 -195.449*** -10.873*** -5.449 -1.561 0.308 0.970
ln ernakulam_rice -5.357*** -2.174 0.297 -476.095*** -18.280*** -157.177*** -9.636*** -0.162 -0.157
ln kachch_wheat -3.630** -0.864 1.097 -140.609*** -9.042*** -10.916 -2.363 0.358 0.791
ln mysore_wheat -5.107*** -0.912 1.477 -464.692*** -17.826*** -13.041* -2.678* 0.322 0.799
ln malda_wheat -3.477** -1.091 0.872 -51.144*** -5.237*** -7.102 -1.805 0.329 0.790
ln rice world -2.739 -1.320 1.026 -21.678*** -3.334*** -2.779 -1.254 0.412 1.097
ln wheat world -2.822 -1.117 0.785 -17.729 -3.062 -2.983 -1.138 0.271 0.691
ln delhi_rice -5.284*** -2.009 0.429 -486.061*** -18.604*** -99.190*** -7.581*** -0.142 -0.154
ln mumbai_rice -2.130 -1.310 1.166 -33.780*** -4.242*** -3.580 -1.383 0.208 0.724
ln kolkata_rice -3.840** -0.978 1.066 -259.831*** -12.678*** -15.763** -2.829** 0.213 0.422
ln delhi_wheat -5.506*** -1.549 0.691 -531.129*** -19.818*** -68.283*** -6.257*** 0.041 0.050
ln mumbai_wheat 2.717 -0.442 1.753 -39.041*** -4.675*** -1.665 -0.757 0.302 1.245
ln patna_wheat -5.839*** -1.366 0.840 -426.356*** -17.272*** -27.773*** -3.906*** 0.181 0.323
ln rainfall -5.853*** -5.861 -1.549 -41.364*** -4.634*** -41.536*** -4.654*** -2.716 -1.142
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Phillips-Perron Test
including constant and trend
including constant but no 
trend
excluding both constant and 
trend
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Continued Appendix Table C2.  Unit root tests for all variables used in the Study (Levels, Logs, Differences in Levels, Differences in Logs)
including 
constant and 
trend
including 
constant but 
no trend
excluding 
both constant 
and trend
Z(rho) Z(t) Z(rho) Z(t) Z(rho) Z(t)
1% critical value -3.96 -3.43 -2.58 -29.5 -3.96 -20.7 -3.43 -13.8 -2.58
5% critical value -3.41 -2.86 -1.95 -21.8 -3.41 -14.1 -2.86 -8.1 -1.95
10% critical value -3.12 -2.57 -1.62 -18.3 -3.12 -11.3 -2.57 -5.7 -1.62
d bijnaur_rice -14.581*** -14.580*** -14.403*** -614.050*** -50.467*** -614.137*** -50.489*** -615.085*** -50.119***
d burdwan_rice -9.509*** -9.460*** -9.260*** -488.318*** -23.732*** -489.214*** -23.705*** -492.193*** -23.565***
d westgodavari_rice -12.018*** -12.002*** -11.801*** -668.597*** -42.737*** -669.206*** -42.661*** -671.131*** -42.300***
d unnao_wheat -10.195*** -10.160*** -10.045*** -403.865*** -18.888*** -404.173*** -18.897*** -404.450*** -18.850***
d ludhiana_wheat -12.684*** -12.685*** -12.589*** -606.560*** -44.640*** -606.621*** -44.675*** -607.446*** -44.471***
d gurgaon_wheat -11.469*** -11.463*** -11.342*** -574.424*** -38.021*** -574.697*** -38.016*** -575.825*** -37.827***
d vadodara_rice -11.770*** -11.784*** -11.617*** -598.981*** -29.881*** -599.008*** -29.910*** -600.590*** -29.804***
d mangalore_rice -16.076*** -16.070*** -16.014*** -636.474*** -61.580*** -636.553*** -61.588*** -636.757*** -61.503***
d ernakulam_rice -14.644*** -14.632*** -14.603*** -632.855*** -55.723*** -632.994*** -55.709*** -633.158*** -55.680***
d kachch_wheat -12.566*** -12.545*** -12.453*** -707.752*** -50.165*** -708.096*** -50.120*** -708.950*** -49.890***
d mysore_wheat -17.436*** -17.425*** -17.233*** -682.088*** -61.689*** -682.178*** -61.705*** -682.957*** -61.245***
d malda_wheat -10.018*** -10.021*** -9.945*** -631.336*** -28.959*** -631.884*** -28.964*** -633.133*** -28.908***
d rice world -7.370*** -7.381*** -7.343*** -707.359*** -28.371*** -707.330*** -28.401*** -708.278*** -28.374***
d wheat world -9.776*** -9.784*** -9.743*** -586.017*** -25.294*** -586.110*** -25.314*** -586.973*** -25.298***
d delhi_rice -13.865*** -13.886*** -13.695*** -642.721*** -48.012*** -642.720*** -48.063*** -643.634*** -47.822***
d mumbai_rice -10.656*** -10.656*** -10.590*** -649.738*** -35.497*** -649.812*** -35.528*** -650.742*** -35.460***
d kolkata_rice -12.452*** -12.452*** -12.231*** -638.622*** -43.817*** -638.991*** -43.763*** -640.735*** -43.400***
d delhi_wheat -14.508*** -14.541*** -14.133*** -657.611*** -52.911*** -657.748*** -52.913*** -659.537*** -52.199***
d mumbai_wheat -13.364*** -13.308*** -13.087*** -600.252*** -37.296*** -600.765*** -37.240*** -603.073*** -36.914***
d patna_wheat -12.108*** -12.109*** -11.982*** -624.829*** -41.147*** -624.934*** -41.174*** -626.329*** -40.927***
d rainfall -7.034*** -7.037*** -7.044*** -588.028*** -23.010*** -588.048*** -23.024*** -588.048*** -23.044***
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Phillips-Perron Test
including constant and trend
including constant but no 
trend
excluding both constant and 
trend
!! 162!
 
Continued Appendix Table C2.  Unit root tests for all variables used in the Study (Levels, Logs, Differences in Levels, Differences in Logs)
including 
constant and 
trend
including 
constant but 
no trend
excluding 
both constant 
and trend
Z(rho) Z(t) Z(rho) Z(t) Z(rho) Z(t)
1% critical value -3.96 -3.43 -2.58 -29.5 -3.96 -20.7 -3.43 -13.8 -2.58
5% critical value -3.41 -2.86 -1.95 -21.8 -3.41 -14.1 -2.86 -8.1 -1.95
10% critical value -3.12 -2.57 -1.62 -18.3 -3.12 -11.3 -2.57 -5.7 -1.62
d ln bijnaur_rice -14.264*** -14.278*** -14.099*** -610.938*** -48.229*** -610.949*** -48.283*** -611.991*** -47.925***
d ln burdwan_rice -10.105*** -10.092*** -9.884*** -513.471*** -24.810*** -513.780*** -24.814*** -516.858*** -24.666***
d ln westgodavari_rice -13.957*** -13.978*** -13.772*** -666.157*** -51.208*** -666.187*** -51.259*** -667.151*** -50.929***
d ln unnao_wheat -10.493*** -10.486*** -10.383*** -419.525*** -19.460*** -419.656*** -19.478*** -419.919*** -19.433***
d ln ludhiana_wheat -12.281*** -12.293*** -12.192*** -613.262*** -43.004*** -613.260*** -43.053*** -614.273*** -42.829***
d ln gurgaon_wheat -11.280*** -11.292*** -11.170*** -576.044*** -37.090*** -576.129*** -37.121*** -577.238*** -36.949***
d ln vadodara_rice -13.737*** -13.712*** -13.478*** -657.075*** -37.809*** -657.092*** -37.846*** -658.418*** -37.684***
d ln mangalore_rice -14.812*** -14.805*** -14.606*** -632.263*** -54.807*** -632.417*** -54.775*** -633.241*** -54.408***
d ln ernakulam_rice -15.262*** -15.268*** -15.266*** -633.106*** -57.938*** -633.151*** -57.979*** -633.207*** -58.010***
d ln kachch_wheat -12.173*** -12.178*** -12.095*** -679.314*** -46.435*** -679.432*** -46.461*** -680.211*** -46.285***
d ln mysore_wheat -17.096*** -17.112*** -16.946*** -698.103*** -62.959*** -698.100** -63.030*** -698.810*** -62.596***
d ln malda_wheat -10.487*** -10.501*** -10.430*** -646.086*** -34.817*** -646.226*** -34.844*** -647.223*** -34.760***
d ln rice world -8.048*** -8.050*** -7.968*** -677.183*** -32.424*** -677.359*** -32.447*** -679.174*** -32.327***
d ln wheat world -9.468*** -9.477*** -9.430*** -579.999*** -25.191*** -580.013*** -25.214*** -581.008*** -25.192***
d ln delhi_rice -18.509*** -18.505*** -18.432*** -642.502*** -59.873*** -642.502*** -59.943*** -642.619*** -59.938***
d ln mumbai_rice -11.700*** -11.665*** -11.516*** -648.849*** -41.872*** -649.030*** -41.890*** -650.235*** -41.701***
d ln kolkata_rice -14.527*** -14.548*** -14.438*** -639.912*** -52.727*** -639.928*** -52.775*** -640.414*** -52.623***
d ln delhi_wheat -18.430*** -18.435*** -18.318*** -649.569*** -62.860*** -649.569*** -62.933*** -649.762*** -62.856***
d ln mumbai_wheat -13.516*** -13.505*** -13.326*** -587.827*** -36.261*** -597.935*** -36.273*** -589.848*** -36.028***
d ln patna_wheat -14.656*** -14.670*** -14.627*** -621.017*** -52.771*** -621.018*** -52.832*** -621.299*** -52.754***
d ln rainfall -7.487*** -7.493*** -7.501*** -576.987*** -22.977*** -576.927*** -22.985*** -576.920*** -23.005***
*** 1% significance, ** 5% significance and * 10% sognificance
Note: If p-value is significant, it means it is stationary. - can do VAR in levels. If insignificant, it means unit root. - data needs to be differenced.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Phillips-Perron Test
including constant and trend
including constant but no 
trend
excluding both constant and 
trend
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Appendix Table C3. Wheat Exports in India in 1,000 MT from 2000-2013
Market Year Exports in 1000 MT Growth Rate
2000 1569 684.50%
2001 3087 96.75%
2002 4850 57.11%
2003 5650 16.49%
2004 2120 -62.48%
2005 801 -62.22%
2006 94 -88.26%
2007 49 -47.87%
2008 23 -53.06%
2009 58 152.17%
2010 72 24.14%
2011 891 1137.50%
2012 6824 665.88%
2013 6500 -4.75%
Source: http://www.indexmundi.com/agriculture/?country=in&commodity=wheat&graph=exports
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Appendix Table C4. Detailed Cointegration Results for Rice, ER Period
Johansen 
Linear 
Cointeg 
Test Result
Estimated 
Beta 
Cointeg 
Vector in 
Linear 
VECM
Estimated 
Beta 
Cointeg 
Vector 
TVECM
Estimated 
Thresholds, 
Tau
Hansen Seo 
Threshold 
Cointeg Test 
Statistic Ho: 
LC
Hansen Seo 
Threshold 
Cointeg 
Test Result
Seo 
Threshold 
Cointeg Test 
Statistic (Ho: 
no Cointeg)
Seo 
Threshold 
Cointeg 
Test Result
Nested 
Conclusion 
from both 
Linear and 
Threshold 
Cointeg
Consuming-Producing Delhi-Burdwan no cointeg 1.27 0.72 5.11 14.28 LC 11.78 no cointeg no cointeg
Kolkata-Burdwan no cointeg 0.65 0.84 1.29 41.20 LC 19.17*** cointeg no cointeg
Mumbai-Burdwan no cointeg 0.85 0.64 3.47 20.16** TC 20.17 no cointeg no cointeg
Delhi-Bijnaur no cointeg 0.23 0.72 2.99 21.95 LC 13.12*** cointeg no cointeg
Kolkata-Bijnaur no cointeg 0.24 0.81 2.61 25.67 LC 15.6*** cointeg no cointeg
Mumbai-Bijnaur no cointeg 0.15 0.64 5.40 11.13 LC 18.72*** cointeg no cointeg
Delhi-West Godavari no cointeg 0.79 0.99 -6.07 19.58 LC 12.38 no cointeg no cointeg
Kolkata-West Godavari no cointeg 0.82 1.14 -4.46 33.12 LC 15.82*** cointeg no cointeg
Mumbai-West Godavari no cointeg 0.56 0.89 3.06 30.34 LC 12.96 no cointeg no cointeg
Port-Producing Mangalore-Burdwan no cointeg 1.35 0.84 1.48 25.01 LC 16.74*** cointeg no cointeg
Ernakulam-Burdwan no cointeg 1.06 0.78 1.84 34.15 LC 17.63*** cointeg no cointeg
Vadodara-Burdwan no cointeg -2.06 0.75 2.22 15.43 LC 12.64 no cointeg no cointeg
Mangalore-Bijnaur no cointeg 0.41 0.82 1.15 26.19*** TC 9.29*** cointeg cointeg
Ernakulam-Bijnaur no cointeg 0.54 0.76 2.07 29.09 LC 14.29 no cointeg no cointeg
Vadodara-Bijnaur no cointeg -0.54 0.73 3.25 23.57*** TC 11.53*** cointeg cointeg
Mangalore-West Godavari no cointeg 1.43 1.19 5.06 25.67 LC 27.66 no cointeg no cointeg
Ernakulam-West Godavari cointeg 1.31 1.06 -2.73 30.52 LC 14.81*** cointeg cointeg
Vadodara-West Godavari no cointeg -0.68 1.04 -0.37 12.56 LC 10.92 no cointeg no cointeg
Consuming-Port Delhi-Managalore no cointeg -4.17 0.84 -3.70 29.78 LC 8.92*** cointeg no cointeg
Kolkata-Mangalore no cointeg 0.45 0.97 2.58 15.14 LC 10.25*** cointeg no cointeg
Mumbai-Mangalore no cointeg 3.90 0.76 6.79 18.35 LC 17.45 no cointeg no cointeg
Delhi-Ernakulam no cointeg 0.01 0.93 -5.40 23.40 LC 9.82 no cointeg no cointeg
Kolkata-Ernakulam no cointeg 0.59 1.07 -2.18 31.75 LC 18.32*** cointeg no cointeg
Mumbai-Ernakulam no cointeg 0.09 0.84 2.06 20.68 LC 18.02 no cointeg no cointeg
Delhi-Vadodara no cointeg -0.11 0.95 -3.12 21.59 LC 12.92*** cointeg no cointeg
Kolkata-Vadodara no cointeg -0.63 1.07 0.06 37.25 LC 8.83** cointeg no cointeg
Mumbai-Vadodara no cointeg 0.34 0.85 -1.15 10.02 LC 15.91 no cointeg no cointeg
World-Port World-Mangalore no cointeg 4.52 0.92 4.14 27.09 LC 15.19 no cointeg no cointeg
World-Ernakulam no cointeg 5.89 0.99 5.29 39.86 LC 13.66 no cointeg no cointeg
World-Vadodara cointeg -0.23 1.04 -2.48 13.18 LC 8.01*** cointeg cointeg
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Continued Appendix Table C4. Detailed Cointegration Results for Wheat, ER Period
Johansen 
Linear 
Cointeg 
Test Result
Estimated 
Beta 
Cointeg 
Vector in 
Linear 
VECM
Estimated 
Beta 
Cointeg 
Vector 
TVECM
Estimated 
Thresholds, 
Tau
Hansen Seo 
Threshold 
Cointeg Test 
Statistic Ho: 
LC
Hansen Seo 
Threshold 
Cointeg 
Test Result
Seo 
Threshold 
Cointeg Test 
Statistic (Ho: 
no Cointeg)
Seo 
Threshold 
Cointeg 
Test Result
Nested 
Conclusion 
from both 
Linear and 
Threshold 
Cointeg
Consuming-Producing Delhi-Unnao no cointeg 0.45 0.66 -0.30 17.29* TC 13.88 no cointeg no cointeg
Patna-Unnao no cointeg 0.45 0.67 1.67 14.12 LC 14.05*** cointeg no cointeg
Mumbai-Unnao no cointeg 0.17 0.49 1.77 9.94 LC 6.61 no cointeg no cointeg
Delhi-Ludhiana cointeg 0.66 0.66 -1.64 43.05** TC 15.82 no cointeg no cointeg
Patna-Ludhiana cointeg 0.62 0.68 -1.60 42.25** TC 14.23*** cointeg cointeg
Mumbai-Ludhiana no cointeg 0.22 0.49 -1.60 45.22** TC 12.38*** cointeg cointeg
Delhi-Gurgaon no cointeg 0.43 0.69 -0.07 29.63 LC 17.10 no cointeg no cointeg
Patna-Gurgaon no cointeg 0.36 0.69 0.91 27.01 LC 17.19 no cointeg no cointeg
Mumbai-Gurgaon no cointeg 0.12 0.52 3.76 27.00 LC 8.10*** cointeg no cointeg
Port-Producing Kachch-Unnao no cointeg 0.82 0.89 -1.84 32.74 LC 34.46 no cointeg no cointeg
Mysore-Unnao no cointeg 0.43 0.64 0.03 42.92 LC 15.52*** cointeg no cointeg
Malda-Unnao no cointeg 1.13 0.99 0.96 20.58*** TC 39.92*** cointeg cointeg
Kachch-Ludhiana no cointeg 1.31 0.90 -1.76 32.96 LC 22.38*** cointeg no cointeg
Mysore-Ludhiana cointeg 0.68 0.64 -0.21 36.71 LC 15.16 no cointeg cointeg
Malda-Ludhiana cointeg 2.47 0.98 -0.90 43.46* LC 12.15 no cointeg cointeg
Kachch-Gurgaon no cointeg 0.82 0.91 -1.17 39.46*** TC 23.38*** cointeg cointeg
Mysore-Gurgaon no cointeg 0.47 0.67 1.13 30.45 LC 13.43*** cointeg no cointeg
Malda-Gurgaon no cointeg 1.12 1.03 -1.60 28.60 LC 31.77 cointeg no cointeg
Consuming-Port Delhi-Kachch no cointeg 0.48 0.75 2.00 23.96 LC 16.7*** cointeg no cointeg
Patna-Kachch cointeg 0.45 0.75 3.79 24.12 LC 16.36*** cointeg cointeg
Mumbai-Kachch no cointeg 0.16 0.54 4.25 32.14 LC 7.51*** cointeg no cointeg
Delhi-Mysore cointeg 0.93 1.04 -2.40 40.97*** TC 38.91*** cointeg cointeg
Patna-Mysore cointeg 0.88 1.04 -2.49 29.79* TC 37.68*** cointeg cointeg
Mumbai-Mysore cointeg 0.38 0.76 -2.58 29.02 LC 7.88 no cointeg cointeg
Delhi-Malda no cointeg 0.31 0.67 1.03 10.30 LC 17.90 no cointeg no cointeg
Patna-Malda no cointeg 0.32 0.66 0.97 15.15 LC 21.71*** cointeg no cointeg
Mumbai-Malda cointeg 0.12 0.74 0.32 11.36 LC 20.52 no cointeg cointeg
World-Port World-Kachch no cointeg 0.08 0.90 4.98 26.92* TC 21.05*** cointeg cointeg
World-Mysore no cointeg 1.12 1.24 -7.43 31.76 LC 12.66*** cointeg no cointeg
World-Malda no cointeg 0.10 0.83 0.24 14.17 LC 22.48*** cointeg no cointeg
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Continued Appendix Table C4. Detailed Cointegration Results for Rice, OT Period
Johansen 
Linear 
Cointeg Test 
Result
Estimated 
Beta 
Cointeg 
Vector in 
Linear 
VECM
Estimated 
Beta 
Cointeg 
Vector 
TVECM
Estimated 
Thresholds, 
Tau
Hansen Seo 
Threshold 
Cointeg Test 
Statistic Ho: 
LC
Hansen Seo 
Threshold 
Cointeg 
Test Result
Seo 
Threshold 
Cointeg Test 
Statistic (Ho: 
no Cointeg)
Seo 
Threshold 
Cointeg Test 
Result
Nested 
Conclusion 
from both 
Linear and 
Threshold 
Cointeg
Consuming-Producing Delhi-Burdwan cointeg 0.48 0.89 -1.70 46.61*** TC 49.29*** cointeg cointeg
Kolkata-Burdwan cointeg 0.52 0.84 1.29 25.98 LC 27.7 no cointeg cointeg
Mumbai-Burdwan no cointeg 0.51 0.87 -0.37 36.73 LC 26.7 no cointeg no cointeg
Delhi-Bijnaur cointeg 0.60 0.82 -1.31 61.18*** TC 46.1 no cointeg no cointeg
Kolkata-Bijnaur no cointeg 0.47 0.89 -1.94 44.62** TC 25.2 no cointeg no cointeg
Mumbai-Bijnaur cointeg 0.61 0.79 0.73 53.70*** TC 30.13*** cointeg cointeg
Delhi-West Godavari no cointeg 2.03 0.98 -0.03 59.46*** TC 18.08*** cointeg cointeg
Kolkata-West Godavari no cointeg 2.30 1.04 1.05 32.92 LC 14.15*** cointeg no cointeg
Mumbai-West Godavari cointeg 1.79 0.94 -2.45 36.24 LC 13.5 no cointeg cointeg
Port-Producing Mangalore-Burdwan cointeg 1.24 0.93 0.13 32.66* TC 38.5 no cointeg no cointeg
Ernakulam-Burdwan no cointeg 2.95 0.82 2.00 43.11 LC 22.8 no cointeg no cointeg
Vadodara-Burdwan no cointeg 0.31 0.93 -2.68 27.38 LC 18.0 no cointeg no cointeg
Mangalore-Bijnaur no cointeg 1.21 0.85 -0.93 47.02** TC 87.02*** cointeg cointeg
Ernakulam-Bijnaur no cointeg -0.43 0.76 -1.76 38.05*** TC 57.03*** cointeg cointeg
Vadodara-Bijnaur cointeg 0.34 0.86 1.75 43.26*** TC 22.8 no cointeg no cointeg
Mangalore-West Godavari no cointeg 4.82 0.99 1.95 36.42 LC 18.22*** cointeg no cointeg
Ernakulam-West Godavari no cointeg -2.78 0.87 3.54 33.48 LC 10.1 no cointeg no cointeg
Vadodara-West Godavari no cointeg 0.95 1.02 1.38 46.77*** TC 20.4 no cointeg no cointeg
Consuming-Port Delhi-Managalore cointeg 0.49 0.95 -1.88 63.7** TC 47.38*** cointeg cointeg
Kolkata-Mangalore cointeg 0.45 1.04 -1.95 45.17*** TC 31.7 no cointeg no cointeg
Mumbai-Mangalore cointeg 0.53 0.92 -1.13 35.05 LC 30.14*** cointeg cointeg
Delhi-Ernakulam no cointeg 0.17 1.06 -3.52 34.30 LC 16.67*** cointeg no cointeg
Kolkata-Ernakulam no cointeg 0.32 1.16 -3.00 35.68 LC 18.67*** cointeg no cointeg
Mumbai-Ernakulam no cointeg -0.09 1.02 -3.50 28.39 LC 17.34*** cointeg no cointeg
Delhi-Vadodara no cointeg 1.62 0.93 0.24 48.07*** TC 17.4 no cointeg no cointeg
Kolkata-Vadodara no cointeg 1.74 1.01 -0.81 24.91 LC 15.8 no cointeg no cointeg
Mumbai-Vadodara no cointeg 1.82 0.89 1.05 41.74** TC 11.1 no cointeg no cointeg
World-Port World-Mangalore no cointeg 0.36 1.24 -2.93 36.08*** TC 15.06*** cointeg cointeg
World-Ernakulam no cointeg -0.41 1.36 -5.43 39.92*** TC 14.27*** cointeg cointeg
World-Vadodara no cointeg 0.96 1.19 1.71 39.23*** TC 23.08*** cointeg cointeg
!! 167!
Continued Appendix Table C4. Detailed Cointegration Results for Wheat, OT Period
Johansen 
Linear 
Cointeg Test 
Result
Estimated 
Beta 
Cointeg 
Vector in 
Linear 
VECM
Estimated 
Beta 
Cointeg 
Vector 
TVECM
Estimated 
Thresholds, 
Tau
Hansen Seo 
Threshold 
Cointeg Test 
Statistic Ho: 
LC
Hansen Seo 
Threshold 
Cointeg 
Test Result
Seo 
Threshold 
Cointeg Test 
Statistic (Ho: 
no Cointeg)
Seo 
Threshold 
Cointeg Test 
Result
Nested 
Conclusion 
from both 
Linear and 
Threshold 
Cointeg
Consuming-Producing Delhi-Unnao no cointeg 0.98 0.78 -0.23 26.78 LC 37.96 no cointeg no cointeg
Patna-Unnao no cointeg 0.86 0.69 0.22 28.67 LC 13.94*** cointeg no cointeg
Mumbai-Unnao no cointeg 0.72 0.50 -0.19 26.69 LC 33.14*** cointeg no cointeg
Delhi-Ludhiana no cointeg 0.77 0.76 0.21 50.75*** TC 24.94*** cointeg cointeg
Patna-Ludhiana no cointeg 0.74 0.74 0.03 52.38*** TC 25.87 no cointeg no cointeg
Mumbai-Ludhiana no cointeg 0.16 0.51 0.16 43.32*** TC 23.54*** cointeg cointeg
Delhi-Gurgaon cointeg 0.91 0.86 0.33 28.99 LC 28.16*** cointeg cointeg
Patna-Gurgaon no cointeg 0.71 0.75 0.05 25.48 LC 15.30*** cointeg no cointeg
Mumbai-Gurgaon no cointeg 0.85 0.53 0.65 31.44 LC 21.15 no cointeg no cointeg
Port-Producing Kachch-Unnao no cointeg 0.70 0.90 0.21 20.92 LC 34.82*** cointeg no cointeg
Mysore-Unnao no cointeg 0.72 0.70 -0.59 27.21 LC 31.84 no cointeg no cointeg
Malda-Unnao no cointeg 0.62 0.98 0.44 29.48 LC 33.65 no cointeg no cointeg
Kachch-Ludhiana no cointeg 0.32 0.92 -0.08 47.66*** TC 38.42 no cointeg no cointeg
Mysore-Ludhiana no cointeg 0.65 0.73 -0.47 50.29*** TC 19.18 no cointeg no cointeg
Malda-Ludhiana no cointeg 0.82 0.96 0.35 55.8** TC 42.29 no cointeg no cointeg
Kachch-Gurgaon cointeg 0.80 0.99 0.10 34.45 LC 42.36*** cointeg cointeg
Mysore-Gurgaon no cointeg 0.81 0.77 0.63 29.33 LC 25.13 no cointeg no cointeg
Malda-Gurgaon no cointeg 0.74 1.05 0.31 34.67* TC 19.63 no cointeg no cointeg
Consuming-Port Delhi-Kachch no cointeg 6.34 0.85 0.64 57.5*** TC 18.1*** cointeg cointeg
Patna-Kachch no cointeg 1.02 0.79 0.19 30.21 LC 24.45*** cointeg no cointeg
Mumbai-Kachch no cointeg 0.87 0.52 0.58 19.05 LC 20.93 no cointeg no cointeg
Delhi-Mysore cointeg 1.49 1.11 -0.69 36.75 LC 34.16*** cointeg cointeg
Patna-Mysore no cointeg 1.17 0.99 -0.97 29.60 LC 21.15*** cointeg no cointeg
Mumbai-Mysore no cointeg 1.24 0.69 -0.92 30.00 LC 17.56*** cointeg no cointeg
Delhi-Malda no cointeg 2.13 0.81 -0.31 37.55*** TC 24.36*** cointeg cointeg
Patna-Malda no cointeg 0.94 0.74 0.32 30.27* TC 20.30 no cointeg no cointeg
Mumbai-Malda no cointeg 0.99 0.51 0.89 24.73 LC 17.01*** cointeg no cointeg
World-Port World-Kachch no cointeg 1.00 1.04 1.05 24.5* TC 36.64*** cointeg cointeg
World-Mysore no cointeg -2.88 1.35 0.82 31.29 LC 10.74*** cointeg no cointeg
World-Malda cointeg 0.87 0.97 0.29 34.71*** TC 34.35*** cointeg cointeg
!! 168!
Appendix Figure C1. Major Rice and Wheat Producing States 
 
 
Source: http://www.mapsofindia.com/top-ten/india-crops/top-10-rice-producing-states-of-india.jpg 
 
 
 
Source: Joshi, A.K., B. Mishra, R. Chatrath, G. Ortiz Ferrara and R.P. Singh. 2007. “Wheat Improvement in India: present status, 
emerging challenges and future prospects”. Euphytica 157(3):431-446. 
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Appendix Figure C2. Major Ports of India 
 
Source: http://ntseverma.blogspot.com/2013/10/lifelines-of-national-economy-meansof.html 
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Appendix Figure C3. Imputed Data Plots 
 
1) Aggregated the daily data to weekly by taking the median of price data in each week.  
2) Used the multiple imputation method in the Amelia r package to reduce missing 
observations further.  
3) Generated the plots below to see what the imputed data looks like. 
 
 
Notes:  
• Black dots are actual monthly observations.  
• Red dots are imputed.  
• The red vertical lines are error bars that show the degree of uncertainty regarding imputed 
data point. 
• The program generates many imputed datasets, then measures uncertainty by 
bootstrapping the imputed points. That is where the error bars come from. 
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Continued Appendix Figure C3. Imputed Data Plots 
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Continued Appendix Figure C3. Imputed Data Plots 
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Continued Appendix Figure C3. Imputed Data Plots 
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Continued Appendix Figure C3. Imputed Data Plots 
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Appendix Figure C4. India’s Wheat Exports, Imports and Production, 1996-2013 
 
 
Source: http://www.indexmundi.com 
